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Abstract 
The central goal of this project is to explore the intersection of thinking on language and 
nationalism in the British Romantic period.  This exploration prompts a reevaluation of the 
intellectual heritage of the Romantic period, and also a reevaluation of the rise of philological 
nationalism in Britain, which has traditionally been assigned to the Victorian period.  One of the 
great shifts brought by philology in the eighteenth century was to situate language in human 
history.  The Enlightenment reduced long-enshrined institutions such as monarchy, religion, and 
language to human constructions subject to change.  The language theory emerging from this 
framework was concerned with exploring the human origins and progress of language, and it 
suggested to the Romantics interest in native language in Britain.  This new paradigm fostered 
the imagination of national identity based upon shared cultural history, in the particular form of 
language. 
 This study draws upon primary philological texts from the eighteenth century, and 
considers their influence on writers in the British Romantic period.  This consideration finds 
William Wordsworth using early philology as a framework within which to negotiate his senses 
of homelessness and failed revolutionary hopes.  I also trace Walter Scott's concern with 
distinguishing between Celtic and Anglo-Saxon roots in Scotland’s cultural and linguistic 
heritage, and find him attempting to reify Scottish history through what we may call philological 
reconstruction.  Looking at another novelist, I argue that Mary Shelley, with Frankenstein, offers 
a sharp critique of how the manipulation of meaning creates chaos in societal institutions in the 
age of nationalism.  Turning back to poetry, I suggest that John Keats engages -- over the course 
of several poems and letters -- in a critical negotiation of different modes of cultural 
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identification, from religion, to Hellenism, to what he considers 'pure English.' 
 Underlying a shift in cultural concepts of identification is the premise that such concepts 
are subject to being shifted.  This premise of a malleability of cultural identification in general 
becomes a persistent feature of philological nationalism in British Romantic period writing.  
While emphasis on mutability brought the possibility of meaningful cultural redefinition, it also 
meant that meaning could be manipulated, or could prove elusive.  In the writing of the British 
Romantic period that this study explores, the negotiation of cultural identity through language, 
while valued and valuable, is often tenuous, and the resultant form of nationalism is highly 
malleable. 
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Introduction 
 
I.  “antient opinions” 
 
In the Advertisement to his 1816 novel The Antiquary, Walter Scott says that in the 
present work, as in Waverley and Guy Mannering, he has “sought my principal personages in the 
class of society who are the last to feel the influence of that general polish which assimilates to 
each other the manners of different nations” (3).  Scott does this because “the lower orders are 
less restrained by the habit of suppressing their feelings, and because I agree with Mr 
Wordsworth, that they seldom fail to express them in the strongest and most powerful language” 
(3).  Scott’s reference is to Wordsworth’s thoughts on language in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads 
– to Wordsworth’s repeated conviction in the vigorous, natural quality of the language of rustics.  
This reference is a gesture toward the specific antiquarian field of philology, which we soon 
learn is central to The Antiquary.  Scott also says, speaking of the peasantry of Scotland, “The 
antique force and simplicity of their language often tinctured with the oriental eloquence of 
Scripture, in the mouths of those of an elevated understanding, give pathos to their grief, and 
dignity to their resentment” (3).  When we consider these thoughts on language along with the 
chronological setting of the novel – 1794 – something of a puzzle emerges; why, we might ask, 
does a novel written on the heels of Waterloo (1816) and set amidst fears of French invasion 
(1794), take interest in the assimilation of manners of different nations, and speak of language’s 
power to somehow negotiate grief and resentment?  In short, what is philology doing at this 
crucial point near the beginning of the Romantic period? 
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These questions suggest that philology was closely associated with nationalism in the 
period, and that the phenomenon would be integrally associated with the sort of peril Britons felt 
in 1794.  The late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century is the time during which modern 
philology emerges, and scholars have also typically located the rise of nationalism in the 
eighteenth century.  However, philology’s influence on literature of the Romantic period has 
received little critical attention, and thus scholars have typically not recognized an intersection of 
philology and nationalism in British literature until the Victorian period.  The Victorian period 
did witness the undertaking of the Oxford English Dictionary, and the prevailing attitude about 
English was perhaps best expressed by Richard Chenevix Trench: “It would be difficult not to 
believe…that great things are in store for the one language of Europe which thus serves as 
connecting link between the North and South, between the languages spoken by the Teutonic 
nations of the North and by the Romance nations of the South" (37); or, in the words of Thomas 
Watts, Victorians envisioned “the world…circled by the accents of Shakespeare and Milton” 
(212).  Language imagined thus was a manifestation of imperialism – one more means to further 
the empire’s march.1 
Philology and nationalism in Britain looked much different in the eighteenth century – 
both were just beginning, and the ways in which they intersected manifest this difference.  As the 
frame to The Antiquary suggests, philology had more to do with negotiating a time of upheaval 
than it did with growing the empire.  As I will be demonstrating in the pages and chapters that 
follow, the language theory available to the Romantics brought to the fore interest in native 
                                                 
1.  For a more extensive discussion of Victorian philology, see Hans Aarsleff, The Study of 
Language in England, 1780-1860, or  Franklin Court, Institutionalizing English Literature: The 
Culture and Politics of Literary Study, 1750-1900. 
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language in Britain and was concerned with exploring the human origins and progress of 
language, and this collective mode of reconstructing the past was just coming to serve the 
purpose of defining the present.  Understanding philology and nationalism as closely-related 
discourses emerging from the Enlightenment and making great landfall in Romantic period 
thought allows us to recognize how early philology offered an alternative to traditional ways of 
defining identity and community that had recently come under pressure from the Enlightenment.  
In the wake of that pressure, for William Wordsworth, Walter Scott, Mary Shelley, and John 
Keats, interest in philology became a way to help define national identity and community. 
When scholarship on Romanticism overlooks the prevailing language theory of the 
period, it is overlooking the period in the study of language during which the discipline evolves 
into the science as which we know it today.  At the beginning of the eighteenth century, John 
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding drastically eroded traditional notions of a 
divine origin of language.  Following Locke, the philology of Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hugh Blair, and Johann Gottfried Herder, among others, further 
theorized about the human origin and progress of language.  In 1786, John Horne Tooke 
published the first volume of his vastly influential Diversions of Purley.  By 1819, we had 
Grimm’s Law. 
Though Jacob Grimm published his landmark German Grammar in 1819, Tooke’s 
Diversions remained the most authoritative philological work during the Romantic period, and 
this philology was notable for, among other things, its interest in Anglo-Saxon.  Tooke included 
in the Diversions, particularly in Part One, a wealth of Anglo-Saxon etymologies.  In Part Two, 
he produced Anglo-Saxon and Meso-Gothic alphabets, based upon the conviction that 
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Englishmen ought to be steeped in their mother-tongue.  “I presume,” Tooke says, “my readers to 
be acquainted with French, Latin, Italian, and Greek: which are unfortunately the usual 
boundaries of an English scholar’s acquisition” (1: 99).  But including the parent alphabets, 
Tooke hopes, will “thus lead the way to [my readers’] better acquaintance with the parent 
language, which ought long ago to have made a part of the education of our youth” (1: 99). 
Tooke’s sentiments about Anglo-Saxon were explicitly picked up by the influential 
intellectual William Hazlitt.  Hazlitt’s New and Improved Grammar of the English Tongue (1809) 
is profoundly indebted to Tooke, with Hazlitt’s section on etymology borrowed almost entirely 
from The Diversions of Purley.  And Hazlitt was not ambiguous about his borrowings and 
indebtedness, saying in the Preface that The Diversions represented to him “a very important 
change in the theory of language” (5), particularly in the area of Anglo-Saxon, and footnoting 
Tooke extensively in the Preface and throughout the Grammar.  Hazlitt’s own reason for 
producing his Grammar was out of a love of his mother-tongue, as he says in the Preface that 
“there has hitherto been no such thing as a real English Grammar.  Those which we have are little 
else than translations of the Latin Grammar into English...The following is an attempt to explain 
the principles of the English language, such as it really is” (5).  Hazlitt also laments the state of 
attention to his native tongue in The Spirit of the Age, saying that “[Lindley Murray] very 
formally translates the Latin Grammar into English (as so many had done before him) and 
fancies he has written an English Grammar; and divines applaud, and schoolmasters usher him 
into the polite world, and English scholars carry on the jest, while Horne Tooke’s genuine 
anatomy of our native tongue is laid on the shelf” (128). 
 Also an explicit follower of Tooke, Maria Edgeworth relied upon his authority in the 
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Glossary to her novel Castle Rackrent, writing in the second entry of the Glossary, 
The phrase, let alone, which is now used as the imperative of a verb, may in time 
become a conjunction, and may exercise the ingenuity of some future 
etymologist.  The celebrated Horne Tooke has proved most satisfactorily, that the 
conjunction but comes from the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb (bouant) to 
be out; also that if comes from gift, the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb which 
signifies to give &c. (123) 
 
Edgeworth’s interest in Tooke and Anglo-Saxon may seem somewhat ironic, since she wrote the 
Glossary to Castle Rackrent to help readers with the prominent Irish idiom in a novel that 
explores Irish nationalism and English imperialism.  But Marilyn Butler suggests, in her 
Introduction to the novel, that Edgeworth’s political interests are, in principle, the same as 
Tooke’s, saying about the debate over the legitimacy of low-brow language and culture: 
  A novel published in dialect in 1800 enters this debate, inevitably on the popular  
  side.  Popular rhetorical positions already familiar to contemporaries include a  
  taste for vulgar domestic history - of the kind declared by the Preface from its  
  opening sentence, and borne out in the Glossary, again virtually from the outset,  
  when the second note declares its unabashed reliance on Tooke as an authority.  
  (27) 
 
The Irish Edgeworth's interest in Tooke is significant because, as Butler suggests, the 
philosophical underpinnings of Tooke's work -- not just the Anglo-Saxon, in specific -- had 
nationalistic valence that was more broadly radical valence.  These radically potent philosophical 
underpinnings that foregrounded "vulgar domestic history" were built upon the espousal of two 
common (and closely-related) tenets of early philology, both of which challenged traditional 
concepts of linguistic authority: arbitrary signification, and language decline. 
Arbitrary signification is essentially Locke’s theory of the relationship between things, 
thoughts (or ideas), and words.  This theory, espoused also by Condillac, Rousseau, Herder, and 
Blair, holds that there is not, in modern language, any inherent connection between words and 
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things – between the word ‘tree,’ and an actual tree, for instance.  Beyond the handful of words 
in a language that are imitative, ideas are motivated by empirical perception, but words are the 
signs of ideas, not of things.  For Tooke specifically, “The business of the mind, as far as it 
concerns Language, appears to me to be very simple.  It extends no further than to receive 
impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Feelings.  What are called its operations, are merely 
the operations of Language” (1: 49).  Tooke believed that Locke came to perceive that language 
and understanding were inseparable, and that if Locke had sooner come to this perception, he, in 
Tooke’s words, “would not have talked of the composition of ideas; but would have seen it 
merely as a contrivance of Language: and that the only composition was in terms” (1: 35-36).  
Similarly, Herder’s formulation, in his prize-winning Essay on the Origin of Language (1772), 
runs thus: “Given that the human understanding could not operate without employing a word-
symbol - as we were anxious to prove - it must follow that the first moment of conscious 
awareness also occasioned the first internal emergence of language” (154); and, a few pages 
later, “Hence all processes of the mind of which we are consciously aware involve the use of 
language.  The former is indeed inconceivable without the latter” (157).  What we see here from 
Tooke and Herder is a philological expression of Enlightenment materialism.  Thought is rooted 
in sensation, and the operation of thought is inherently linguistic.  As I explore in the pages the 
follow, the tenet of arbitrary signification means that language is shaped by -- and therefore 
belongs to -- people -- specifically, diverse cultural groups of people. 
A closely related tenet of early philology -- that of language decline -- holds that 
primitive language would have possessed more vitality than modern language.  For instance, 
Condillac, in his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746), argues that language would 
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have begun with the perception of a physical need (by an anonymous hypothetical couple of 
primitive humans), hunger being the example that he gives.  Upon perceiving a tree laden with 
fruit, a natural cry would have resulted.  In time, “the cries of the passions contributed to the 
development of the operations of the mind by naturally originating the language of action, a 
language which in its early stages, conforming to the level of this couple’s limited intelligence, 
consisted of mere contortions and agitated bodily movements.  Nevertheless, when they had 
acquired the habit of connecting some ideas to arbitrary signs, the natural cries served as a model 
for them to make a new language” (115-116).  We see the same conviction of primitive language 
being rooted in empirical perception and physical sensation in Blair, and Blair carries the 
principle a step further, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), asserting, “Poetry, 
however, in its ancient original condition, was perhaps more vigorous than it is in its modern 
state.  It included then, the whole burst of the human mind; the whole exertion of its imaginative 
faculties.  It spoke then the language of passion, and no other; for to passion, it owed its birth.  
Prompted and inspired by objects, which to him seemed great, by events which interested his 
country or his friends, the early Bard arose and sung” (322).  Similarly, Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
says, in his Essay on the Origin of Languages (1781) that “by a natural progress all lettered 
languages must change character and lose vigor as they gain in clarity” (258).  All of these 
figures point to ancient or primitive poetry and language being more lively, and being so by 
virtue of being more rooted in sensation. 
 It is worth pausing at this point to note the relationship between early philology and other 
more widely-discussed eighteenth-century primitivist phenomena.  Rousseau's work on language 
origins is closely related to his Natural Man philosophy, both exploring human origins, and both 
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relevant to Frankenstein, as I will later discuss.  Blair links us to the Ballad Revival.  The year 
1765 witnesses the publication both of MacPherson’s Ossian poems and of Thomas Percy’s 
Reliques of Ancient English Poetry.  The discourse of primitivism encompassing MacPherson 
and Percy goes hand in hand, as ways to imagine cultural pasts, with early philology.  Percy is a 
key interlocutor in the Pictish Question, the philological debate concerning Scotland’s ethnic and 
linguistic heritage, which, I will later argue, is central to The Antiquary.  The leading Ossian 
apologist of the day, whose Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian appeared in the 1765 
edition of the poems, was none other than Hugh Blair.  This broader perspective helps shed light 
on how, for Blair, looking into a language's history to a time of greater linguistic vitality could 
generate nationalistic imaginings, with his example of the naturally impassioned "early Bard" 
arising to sing of matters that concerned his country. 
 Herder’s philology moves in a similar theoretical direction.  Herder posits that “we 
associate the strongest sentiments with our native language” (163).  Similarly, when talking 
about the sensory connections that lie at the roots of words, Herder says, “these connections are 
so intensely national, engendered according to the peculiar disposition and viewpoint of a people 
and conditioned by the time and circumstances of a country” (148).  To the prospect of putting 
together an etymological dictionary, Herder says, “How much learning and adaptability of mind 
are necessary to enter into the primitive intellect, the daring imagination, the national feelings of 
distant ages, and to render them in our own idiom.  Such an undertaking would light a torch and 
illuminate not only the history, the mode of thought and the literature of the country, but also 
those dark regions of the human mind where ideas cross and intermingle, where the most diverse 
feelings generate one another, where times of need rouse all the powers of the mind and test its 
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inventive ability to the full” (148).  And just as boldly, Herder later says, “By means of language 
[a child] is able to enter into communion with the way of thinking and feeling of his progenitors, 
to take part, as it were, in the workings of the ancestral mind” (163).  Seeking the roots of the 
native tongue, for Herder, is a way to “enter into the primitive intellect…the national feelings of 
distant ages.” 
This tendency to respond to the doctrine of language decline with nationalistic 
imaginings is manifested in a contemporaneously radical way in Tooke.  Tooke greatly expands 
on Rousseau’s notion of language gaining in clarity, as the most salient conviction of the 
Diversions is that language’s purpose is to communicate thoughts with dispatch, thus the full title 
of the work: Epea Ptereonta, meaning winged words, referring to the swift messenger Hermes.  
But Tooke still holds that language becomes dangerously abstract in the process of becoming 
thrifty.  Tooke thus aptly demonstrates the point of connection between the tenets of arbitrary 
signification and language decline.  If the closest language gets to ‘things’ is the fact that ideas 
are motivated by empirical perception, and words are the signs of ideas, what we have is a 
process toward abstraction.  The less sense-bound language is, the more abstract it is.  Interest in 
primitive language follows from the conviction that if primitive language is more sensuous, it is 
less abstract. 
 Abstraction, for Tooke, was a great source of societal discord.  In Part One of the 
Diversions, Tooke says that “mankind in general are not sufficiently aware that words without 
meaning, or of equivocal meaning, are the everlasting engines of fraud and injustice” (1: 75).  
And getting more specific in Part Two, he says about abstractions, “These words, the Participles 
and Adjectives, not understood as such, have caused a metaphysical jargon and a false morality, 
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which can only be examined by etymology” (2: 18).  Attention to etymology – which for his 
audience means interest in Anglo-Saxon – is necessary to brook the perils of abstract modern 
language.  Thinking becomes dangerously empty without attention to the roots of one’s native 
tongue. 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that we ought to wonder why Scott views 
language as a locus for the negotiation of national conflict in the tumultuous 1790s.  We have 
seen Blair, Herder, and Tooke begin to speak to this question with their philological theories.  In 
particular, with his assertions about the importance of etymology, Tooke brings two key tenets of 
early philology -- arbitrary signification, and language decline -- to a socially radical point that 
resonates strongly with some of the ways that scholars have defined the rise of nationalism in 
general.  Eric Hobsbawm has succinctly said, "Nationalism, like so many other characteristics of 
the modern world, is the child of the dual revolution" (145), speaking of the era framed by the 
French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.  I have already suggested that there is a 
substantial amount of agreement that nationalism as we know it today emerges in the eighteenth 
century.  Different scholars have pointed to various factors, from the spread of capitalism, to 
industrialization, to seemingly perpetual war between Britain and France.  My suggestion in 
thinking about the specific phenomenon of philological nationalism is that the Enlightenment is 
particularly relevant.  In surveying some early philology, we might already be asking why 
Herder, and Blair, and Tooke would build upon the work of Locke with a nationalistic bent.  
Scholarship on nationalism in general is especially useful here. 
To begin with, it is important to acknowledge that the eighteenth century is not the first 
time that British people consider themselves Britons.  There is an appreciable difference, though, 
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between what we call nationalism and other sorts of identification via a political body prior to the 
age of nationalism.  As Ernest Gellner explains in Nations and Nationalism, "The great, but 
valid, paradox is this: nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, 
as you might expect, the other way around.  It is not the case that the ‘age of nationalism’ is a 
mere summation of the awakening and political self-assertion of this, that, or the other nation" 
(55).  Gellner’s theory is important because it makes the movement of nationalism more than a 
mere symptom observable at any time in any place.  In contrast to what we see in the age of 
nationalism, we may find, in seventeenth-century Britain, say, professed loyalty to the crown, but 
this is an entirely different concept than that which develops in the eighteenth century, and both 
Gellner and Benedict Anderson point to the significance of the changes brought by the 
Enlightenment. 
 Elaborating upon Hobsbawm's assertion that nationalism is "the child of the dual 
revolution," Anderson says that "the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and 
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm" 
(7).  Specifically, Anderson points to two institutions that came under extreme pressure in the 
eighteenth century: religion and monarchy.  As Anderson proceeds to say, "fundamental cultural 
conceptions, all of great antiquity, lost their axiomatic grip on men's minds" (36).  Among these 
conceptions were "the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to 
ontological truth, precisely because it was an inseparable part of that truth," and "the belief that 
society was naturally organized around and under high centres -- monarchs who were persons 
apart from other human beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) 
dispensation" (36).  Anderson pointing to the eighteenth-century pressure exerted on these 
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institutions -- religion and monarchy (and, in the case of the British aristocracy, oligarchy) -- 
calls Edmund Burke to mind. 
 In Reflections on the Revolutions in France, Burke laments that, according to the 
Enlightenment thought responsible for the Revolution – what he calls “this new conquering 
empire of light and reason” (126) – "a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman…Regicide, and 
parricide, and sacrilege, are but fictions of superstition, corrupting jurisprudence by destroying 
its simplicity” (126).  Further elaborating what is at stake, Burke continues, “Nothing is more 
certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with 
manners, and with civilization, have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon two 
principles; and were indeed the result of both combined; I mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the 
spirit of religion” (127).  Burke identifies the very two pillars that I highlight in Benedict 
Anderson’s theory – monarchy and religion – as the key institutions imperiled by the Revolution.  
Burke’s pairings of regicide and sacrilege, and of “the spirit of the gentleman” and “the spirit of 
religion,” evince his conviction that both have been forces for organizing society heretofore. 
“When antient opinions and rules of life are taken away,” Burke says, “the loss cannot 
possibly be estimated.  From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know 
distinctly to what port we steer” (127).  Burke’s prognostication formulated as a question would 
run thus: in light of some of the changes of Enlightenment and Revolution -- in particular, 
secularization and democratization -- what, henceforth, will Britain’s concept of community be?  
The answer will be the concept of nation, based upon shared culture. 
When we proceed to consider the bases of shared culture, Gellner offers a succinct primer 
when he suggests, "an at least provisionally acceptable criterion of culture might be language" 
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(42).  Concerning the secularization brought by the Enlightenment, the link between 
secularization and language has been summed up by Anderson thus: “if the sacred silent 
languages were the media through which the great global communities of the past were 
imagined, the reality of such apparitions depended on an idea largely foreign to the contemporary 
Western mind: the non-arbitrariness of the sign” (14).  Of course, the successor to the concept of 
a language of divine origin, with non-arbitrary signs, is early philology, with its doctrine of 
arbitrary signification.  The reality growing in the eighteenth century was that “the old sacred 
languages – Latin, Greek, and Hebrew – were forced to mingle on equal ontological footing with 
a motley plebeian crowd of vernacular rivals" (70).  The significance of this was that if "all 
languages now shared a common (intra-)mundane status, then all were in principle equally 
worthy of study and admiration.  But by who?  Logically, since now none belonged to God, by 
their new owners: each language’s native speakers” (70-71).  When talking about Enlightenment 
secularization in general, it is worth noting Emile Durkheim's maxim that, from the very 
beginning, "religion [was] something eminently social" (11); or, in Gellner's words: "Durkheim 
taught that in religious worship society adores its own camouflaged image.  In a nationalist age, 
societies worship themselves brazenly and openly, spurning the camouflage" (55).  If religion 
had always been a tool for societal organization (if not self-adoration), then it is not as if the need 
satisfied by religion disappears with Enlightenment secularization.2  It is thus perhaps easier to 
understand how language rooted in human history would quickly be appropriated 
nationalistically. 
                                                 
2.  Jose Casanova has also argued that just as the division between the sacred and the profane 
was never as absolute as Durkheim believed it to be in primitive cultures, Enlightenment 
secularization was not absolute and uncomplicated.  See Public Religions in the Modern World. 
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The shift described generally by Anderson has been characterized specifically by Linda 
Dowling, in Language and Decadence in the Victorian Fin de Siecle, as "the relocation of the 
divine Logos within the boundaries of human history” (15).  Dowling argues that Herder's 
philology is manifested in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's philosophical writings, but she does little 
more accounting of this philological phenomenon in Romantic literature, tracing, instead, the 
manifestations of the phenomenon in Victorian literature.  In scholarship that does focus on early 
philology's impact on Romantic literature, early philology's relationship to nationalism has 
remained underexplored.  William Keach, in Arbitrary Power: Romanticism, Language, Politics, 
has offered the valuable general argument that “Romantic theories of linguistic agency, practice, 
and institution...[were] deeply implicated...in defining social changes and conflicts” (ix).  Other 
arguments tend to focus on class.  For instance, Olivia Smith, in The Politics of Language 1791-
1819, argues “that late eighteenth-century theories of language were centrally and explicitly 
concerned with class division” (viii), and, similarly, in The Politics of Language in Romantic 
Literature, Richard Marggraf Turley is primarily interested in class warfare in the form of “a 
national debate over literary taste, propriety, and cultural agency” (xi).  Coming from another 
direction, Katie Trumpener, in Bardic Nationalism: The Romantic Novel and the British Empire, 
focuses on “the literary and intellectual history of England, Scotland, Ireland, and Britain’s 
overseas colonies during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to redraw our picture 
of the origins of cultural nationalism” (xi).  But specifically, Trumpener’s argument is that “in 
Scotland and Ireland, a nationalist and traditionalist worldview takes shape from antiquarian 
reactions to Enlightenment programs for economic improvement, read as a form of political and 
cultural imperialism” (xi).  With Trumpener's focus being on the relationship between the center 
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of the British empire and its peripheral elements, antiquarian movements become less the 
impetus for nationalism than a response to other components of the Enlightenment.3 
Scholarship's tendency to miss the development of philological nationalism in British 
literature as early as the Romantic period, or to focus an argument about nationalism primarily 
on elements of the Enlightenment other than early philology, is understandable.  The reception of 
comparative philology in Britain was significantly delayed.  The Victorian period – where 
philological nationalism is traditionally placed – witnesses the landfall of Rask, Grimm, and 
Bopp, and then the landmark undertaking of the Oxford English Dictionary.4  Though Rask and 
                                                 
3.  Another interesting perspective on nationalism and empire is Yoon Sun Lee's, in Nationalism 
and Irony: Burke, Scott, Carlyle.  Lee argues that "One of Romantic nationalism's 
achievements...was the rediscovery of irony's civic potential" (5).  Inflected by class disparity 
and imperial expansion, Lee continues,"Irony could acknowledge the anomalies of Britain's 
identity, structure, and relation to its own past.  Most significantly, it could at this moment not 
only inflect the expression but also license the experience of particular types of feeling beneficial 
to the state.  A nationalism allied with irony could speak to those left unmoved by ideologies that 
took for granted spontaneous, deep attachment to a whole that was unproblematically given" (5).  
While works like Waverley and Rob Roy are certainly tasked with somehow negotiating a civic 
whole, with the British empire looming over everything, the ostensible enemy in The Antiquary 
is France. 
4.  Arguments about periodization itself also offer an interesting perspective on philological 
nationalism's traditional assignment in the Victorian period.  Ted Underwood has pointed out, in 
Why Literary Periods Mattered: Historical Contrast and the Prestige of English Studies, "In the 
late 1820s, when colleges began to hire the first professors of English Language and Literature, 
the rationale for studying literature was still primarily that it made students better writers" (86).  
And in order for students to write well, Underwood continues, "the notion had taken root that 
students needed to understand the progressive development of language and literature" (86).  
Underwood suggests that this notion was founded in large part on the prominence of the early 
philology revolving primarily around Tooke.  By the 1830s, as Franklin Court puts it in 
Institutionalizing English Literature: The Culture and Politics of Literary Study, 1750-1900, 
"Literature came to be taken as a symbolic index to history.  It served the need to find in the past 
traditional precedents that made current conceptions of progress and politics congruent with 
growing ideals of English nationalism" (87).  So, by the 1830s, early philology was, through its 
role in the institutionalization of the periodized chronological study of literature, strongly 
nationalistic.  My suggestion is that since this quality becomes pronounced in universities in the 
1830s -- not in the first two decades of the century -- it is perhaps another component of the 
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Grimm are published in the heart of the second generation of the Romantic period – Rask’s 
Grammar of the Icelandic or Old Norse Tongue in 1811, Grimm’s German Grammar in 1819 – 
they are not reviewed in English and known with any prevalence in Britain until after 1830.  
Hans Aarsleff has argued that John Horne Tooke’s reputation in Britain is what delays the 
reception of Grimm and company. 
 Richard Turley has also discussed the delayed reception of Grimm, arguing that a sort of 
xenophobia is largely responsible: “theories of history amounted to ways of asserting ownership 
over – or at least of negotiating an agreeable relationship with – the past.  Few wanted a German 
to determine this for them, particularly given that by the 1830’s, the study of language and 
linguistic history had become powerfully intertwined with the nineteenth century’s sense of 
itself” (132).  Turley goes on to argue that, ironically, this attitude toward Grimm’s work shifts in 
the 1830’s to the point where Grimm’s work has “one important quality to recommend it to 
British scholars.  Read in a certain way, it seemed to offer a means of navigating the impasse of 
traditional linguistic genealogies that had favoured Latin and Greek over English” (133).  
Grimm’s work “allowed for the dismantling of myths of Latin and Greek as linguistic patriarchs, 
while simultaneously adhering to the terms of the older, pre-morphological study in order to 
reappraise northern tongues such as English more favourably” (134).  This (sound) reasoning 
moves Turley to relate Grimm to “a fundamental shift that occurred in popular and scholarly 
perceptions of language in Britain in the 1830’s and early 1840’s, when the status of English – a 
fundamental Romantic dilemma – changed unambiguously from that of poor cousin to Latin and 
                                                 
explanation for why philological nationalism is not traditionally recognized in the Romantic 
period. 
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Greek, to equal sibling with the classical tongues” (132).  Turley is quite right that some sort of 
elevation of Germanic tongues to equal status with Greek and Latin is requisite for the 
fundamental shift toward linguistic nationalism to begin, but it is my contention that such an 
elevation begins before the 1830’s; such a shift, I suggest, is initiated in large part by the man 
whom Aarsleff credits with delaying Grimm’s reception in Britain: John Horne Tooke. 
 
II.  “Ancestral voices” 
 
 Coleridge's poem "Kubla Khan" provides an interesting example of what this Romantic 
period shift could look like.  I subtitle the first part of this chapter "antient opinions" because 
Edmund Burke's fears were representative and accurate.  The eighteenth century did witness a 
shift away from cultural concepts of identification that had been enshrined as inherently valid 
and necessary institutions for centuries.  One thing that the Enlightenment did was reduce these 
institutions to things more like matters of opinion, subject to challenge and change.  My 
argument is that a then emergent basis for cultural identification was something also historical: 
the findings of early philology, or what Coleridge would characterize as "ancestral voices." 
To begin with, we can find Coleridge being interested not only in a Herderian shift of 
"the divine Logos" to human history; Coleridge was keenly interested in Tooke’s Diversions, 
wrestling with the tenet of arbitrary signification.  In a now oft-quoted letter to William Godwin 
in September 1800, Coleridge takes on Tooke’s Diversions, saying, 
I wish you to write a book on the power of words, and the processes by which 
human feelings form affinities with them – in short, I wish you to philosophize 
Horn Tooke’s System, and to solve the great Questions – whether there be reason 
to hold, that an action bearing all the semblance of predesigning Consciousness 
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may yet be simply organic, & whether a series of such actions are possible – and 
close on the heels of this question would follow the old ‘Is Logic the Essence of 
Thinking?’ in other words – Is Thinking impossible without arbitrary signs? & -- 
how far is the word ‘arbitrary’ a misnomer?  Are not words &c parts & 
germinations of the Plant? And what is the Law of their growth? – In something 
of this order I would endeavor to destroy the old antithesis of Words & Things, 
elevating, as it were, words into Things, & living Things Too. (1: 625-6) 
 
Though Coleridge is clearly dismayed by the arbitrariness suggested by Tooke, his objection 
does not consist of an insistence on a divine origin of language.  James McKusick, in Coleridge’s 
Philosophy of Language, characterizes Coleridge’s position thus: “if, as Coleridge suggests, 
words are themselves things – elements, that is, of an organized structure that imposes mental 
categories on the external world – then the received notion of linguistic arbitrariness is in error.  
Words may be arbitrary in the Lockean sense while still retaining, by virtue of their participation 
in a synchronic system, a correspondence with nature (conceived as an objective order)” (42).  
McKusick also falls back upon a notebook entry in which Coleridge says about a proposed essay 
in defense of punning, “any harmony in the things symbolized will perforce be presented to us 
more easily as well as with additional beauty by a correspondent harmony of the Symbols with 
each other” (3: #3762).  I would strongly echo McKusick’s point that “Coleridge’s doctrine of 
harmony is not very fully worked out” (42), but the developing – as opposed to developed – 
nature of Coleridge’s philology is in keeping with Romantic philology in general.  What is most 
important to take away from Coleridge’s thoughts is the impulse to try to create something that 
would in some way reproduce a less arbitrary and more vital linguistic register, like that 
theorized to exist in the primitive state of one’s native tongue. 
 McKusick points out how familiar Coleridge is with historical philology, and with 
Herder’s work in particular, asserting that “the more closely Coleridge read Herder, the less he 
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liked him” (57).  McKusick argues that, put off by Herder’s criticism of Kant, Coleridge opted to 
espouse a transcendental perspective rather than an historical one.  While much of Coleridge’s 
work recommends itself to this summation, some very prominent work of his – the poem “Kubla 
Khan” in particular – reads as something much more like a mingling of his Tooke-motivated 
theory of philological harmony and Herderian formulation for which Linda Dowling argues. 
Coleridge frames “Kubla Khan” with an authorial note that bears traces of his Tooke-
inspired philology: 
 The author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at least of the 
external senses, during which time he has the most vivid confidence, that he could 
not have composed less than from two to three hundred lines; if that indeed can be 
called composition in which all the images rose up before him as things, with a 
parallel production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or 
consciousness of effort. (439) 
 
Coleridge speaking of “things, with a parallel production of the correspondent expressions,” 
sounds much like his philological theory of harmony in which correspondent words (or 
expressions) become things.  The overall issue, of course, is the desire to avoid a modern state of 
linguistic fragmentedness, and the man come on business from Porlock – representing civilized, 
which is to say relatively unnatural, modern society – creates disruption. 
In spite of the spatial and chronological complexities in the poem itself, we can, from the 
outset, discern at least two distinct, salient forces: relatively modern construction, and natural 
vitality.  We have modern construction in the form of Kubla himself decreeing a “stately 
pleasure-dome” (2), and with the girdling of the fertile ground with walls and towers.  And we 
have natural vitality in the “deep romantic chasm” (12), “A savage place” (14) from which the 
“sacred river” (24) is forced in the form of a “mighty fountain” (19).  In the first stanza of the 
poem, the modern construction and the natural vitality seem to be antithetical, as the towered 
 20 
 
walls are built to enclose the fecund natural landscape.  And the constructs have a philological 
overtone, as it is a “decree” that incites the construction. 
Matching the stately decreeing described in the first stanza is the meter in which it is 
described.  The first four lines are perfectly measured in iambs, tightly controlled – indeed, 
“stately.”  This controlled stateliness sets up a sharp contrast with the driving trochaic meter of 
the “chasm,” and “ceaseless, turmoil seething” (17).  The meter is further unleashed in the 
following line when we are told that it is if the earth in “fast, thick, pants were breathing” (18).  
“Pants” completes a trifecta of stresses, being the first foot of two concluding trochees that 
follow a spondee. 
The entire poem is conspicuously sensuous, loaded with alliteration.  In the first stanza, 
we have “Kubla Khan” (1), the “pleasure-dome decree” (2), the “river, ran” (3), the “caverns 
measureless to man” (4), a “sunless sea” (5), “twice five miles of fertile ground” (6), and “sunny 
spots of greenery” (11).  In the second stanza, we are told of the “woman wailing” (16), 
“ceaseless turmoil seething” (17), a “mighty fountain...momently forced” (19), and the sacred 
river “Five miles meandering with a mazy motion” (27).  In the third stanza, there is the 
“mingled measure” of the fountain and caves (33), the “damsel with a dulcimer” (37), “her 
symphony and song” (43), “deep delight” (44), “music loud and long” (45), and finally the poet’s 
“flashing eyes [and] floating hair” (50).  Besides the all the alliteration, there is assonance in 
abundance throughout the poem.  We have “Xanadu did Kubla” highlighting the ‘u’ sounds in the 
first line, the ‘a’ sounds of “ran / through caverns measureless to man” (3-4), “twice five miles” 
(6), the ‘a’ sounds in “chasm which slanted” (12), “ceaseless…seething” (17), “fast…pants” 
(18), the ‘i’ sounds of “Amid whose swift half-intermitted” (20), and “midway on the waves” 
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(32). 
The unleashing of metrical stress and sensuousness in language is in sync with the 
thematic thrust of the poem.  There is a “deep romantic chasm” that lies beneath the modern 
construction of Kubla Khan – a holy force of natural vitality that flings up the sacred river.  And 
once the sacred river is flung up, in its tumult of sound, Kubla hears “Ancestral voices 
prophesying war!” (30).  On the whole, we have a poem attempting to both discuss and 
linguistically enact tapping into holy natural vitality accompanied by “Ancestral voices,” which 
beg to be read as Tookean or Herderian native language.  Coleridge suggests a breaking free of 
the decreeing of a Khan, which calls to mind monarchical rule.  The “Ancestral voices 
prophecying war” sound like a (violent) revolution that will give way to a new concept of 
community rooted in native language.  And we see punctuating this movement, throughout the 
entire poem, and particularly in the final stanza – with its vision of the damsel with the dulcimer, 
and Coleridge’s idea that reviving within him her symphony and song would amount to feeding 
on honey-dew and drinking the milk of paradise – the continuation of a philological engagement 
with notions of sacredness or holiness.  This engagement is not a simple espousal of pre-
Enlightenment religious community; Coleridge seems to be confronting the erosion of the non-
arbitrary sign by Lockean materialism.  The solution is not a divine origin of language; the 
solution, rather, is a view of language that embraces as tightly as possible a rootedness in natural 
vitality.  Coleridge seems to wish to avoid modern fragmentation with the right kind of 
expression.  He seems to have been attuned to the etymology of the word ‘holiness’: 
‘wholeness.’ 
 In this brief reading, "Kubla Khan" seems to enact a resistance to traditional political 
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organization in society, based upon epistemological fragmentation in that model of organization.  
As an alternative, Coleridge seems to suggest native language as a carrier for a new (and more 
meaningful) sense of cultural identity.  Underlying a shift in cultural concepts of identification is 
the premise that such concepts are subject to being shifted.  In the chapters that follow, this 
premise of a malleability of cultural identification in general also becomes a persistent feature of 
philological nationalism in specific.  To William Wordsworth, Walter Scott, Mary Shelley, and 
John Keats, early philology appealed as a new mode of cultural identification.  In this 
philological nationalism, though, one of the things consistently at issue is how meaning and 
identity could be manipulated, or could prove elusive. 
In Chapter One, I extensively survey reviews of Wordsworth's work alongside his own 
writings on language.  I suggest that this collective discourse, which borrows heavily from early 
philology, serves as a framework for understanding Wordsworth's senses of homelessness and 
failed revolutionary hopes.  Emerging in some his wartime sonnets and in passages late in The 
Prelude, I argue, is a highly intellectualized sense of national identity: a philological nationalism.  
In so doing, I challenge traditional prominent readings of radicalism, resignation, and 
sublimation in Wordsworth. 
In Chapter Two, I shift focus to a periphery of the British empire.  I call attention to 
Walter Scott’s keen interest in the philological discourse known as the Pictish Question, which 
was unabashedly concerned with distinguishing between Celtic and Anglo-Saxon roots in 
Scotland’s cultural and linguistic heritage.  Engagement with the Pictish Question is ubiquitous 
in Scott’s novel The Antiquary, and I argue that the novel is simultaneously concerned with 
repelling what amounts to Germanic linguistic invasion, and with reifying Scottish history 
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through what we may call philological reconstruction.  In this process, Scott subtly wrestles with 
the viability of such historical inquiry. 
In Chapter Three, while acknowledging the influence that Jean-Jacques Rousseau has on 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, I demonstrate how profoundly the novel is shaped by the philology 
of John Horne Tooke.  Dramatizing the new ontological and epistemological models brought by 
the Enlightenment -- and specifically dramatizing the doctrine arbitrary signification -- 
Frankenstein offers a sharp critique of how the manipulation of meaning creates societal chaos.  
With this chaos following the Creature over much of western Europe, I argue that Shelley offers 
a unique general commentary on the definition of social institutions in the age of nationalism. 
In Chapter Four, I argue that John Keats's letters and poetry are significantly influenced 
by early philology.  In this framework, Keats engages -- over the course of several poems and 
letters -- in a critical negotiation of different modes of cultural identification, from religion, to 
Elizabethanism, to Hellenism.  Challenging traditional readings of "To Autumn," I argue that 
Keats casts off what he comes to view as affectation in earlier (Hellenistic) odes in favor of what 
he considers 'pure English.'  In so doing, Keats engages in a nationalistic philological shift much 
like that which I have traced in Coleridge's "Kubla Khan." 
In the cases of Wordsworth, Scott, Shelley, and Keats, we see early philology serving as a 
means for negotiating cultural identification and meaning.  This negotiation is often tenuous, and 
the resultant form of nationalism is highly malleable.  In these ways, philological nationalism 
looks different in the Romantic period than it does in the Victorian period.  A point worth 
emphasizing is William Hazlitt’s characterization of John Horne Tooke, in The Spirit of the Age, 
as “one of those who may be considered connecting links between a former period and the 
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existing generation” (105).  This study suggests that Tooke and other key figures in early 
philology force us to continue to reevaluate the intellectual heritage of the Romantic period, as 
they constitute a powerful link to some of the Enlightenment thinking of earlier in the eighteenth 
century.  At the same time, the Romantics’ engagement with this early philology also prompts a 
reassessment of the rise of a phenomenon – philological nationalism – that has traditionally been 
assigned to beyond the other boundary of the period. 
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Chapter One: William Wordsworth and the Characterization of English, the English, and England 
 
I.  Wordsworth's Volksstimme: "a new reign of taste" 
 
 Much of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads is about language, and early reviews, at both ends 
of the spectrum of opinion, found in Wordsworth's philosophy of language an attempt to define 
Englishness.  What would come to be characterized by positive reviews as simplified, purified, 
vigorous, and national, was viewed as affected and disturbingly anti-establishment by negative 
reviews.  That the same philosophy of language could to one reviewer be patriotic and to another 
be unpatriotic is a testament to the slippery nature of the nationalism engendered by philology in 
the period.  It is this chapter's ultimate contention that Wordsworth's appropriation of early 
philology enabled him to imagine a sense of national identity in the aftermath of crushed 
revolutionary hopes of the 1790s.  At the end of the 1790s, the language theory that Wordsworth 
laid out in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads was so crucial to reviewers that through 1807, and all 
the way through William Hazlitt's Spirit of the Age in 1825, criticism of his work tended to 
evaluate the work collectively, through the lens of the language theory begun in the Preface.  
This chapter also examines Wordsworth's language theory collectively, approaching it through 
the perspectives of several contemporary reviews, through some of his prose works, through 
some of the 1807 Poems, and through parts of the 1805 Prelude. 
 Reviews of Wordsworth's work were not, of course, the work itself, and the political 
context of 1807 was not the political context of the 1790s.  In spite of these facts, reviews 
spanning several years, and poetry and prose from Wordsworth spanning those same years, seem 
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to enter the same philological discourse, though they enter it on various sides.  Again, these 
varied standpoints across decades actually exemplify the distinctive feature philological 
nationalism in the Romantic period: its malleability.  In the case of the reviews, even some 
immediately contemporaneous ones were polarized on the question of Wordsworth's philosophy 
of language.  In October 1799, in a review in The British Critic, the reviewer says, "It is not by 
pomp of words, but by energy of thought, that sublimity is most successfully achieved; and we 
infinitely prefer the simplicity, even of the most unadorned tale in this volume, to all the 
meretricious frippery of the Darwinian taste" (365).  Pomp and adornment, to this reviewer, 
threaten to become an act of affectedly prostituting oneself.  Wordsworth, in the reviewer's  
estimation, is more preferable and more sublime because of his simplicity and energy.  The same 
reviewer similarly praises Wordsworth in February 1801 by saying, "he has adopted a purity of 
expression, which, to the fastidious ear, may sometimes perhaps sound poor and low, but which 
is infinitely more correspondent with true feeling than what, by the courtesy of the day, is usually 
called poetic language" (125). 
 Charles Burney appraised Wordsworth's language theory rather differently.  In the June 
1799 Monthly Review, Burney writes, "we cannot regard [these pieces] as poetry, of a class to be 
cultivated at the expence of a higher species of versification, unknown in our language at the 
time when our elder writers, whom this author condescends to imitate, wrote their ballads.--  
Would it not be degrading to poetry, as well as the English language, to go back to the barbarous 
and uncouth numbers of Chaucer?" (202-203).  Wordsworth's language is not fit for poetry, and 
at stake is the degradation not only of poetic taste but of English in general.  Furthermore, as 
Burney continues, "to give artificial rust to modern poetry, in order to render it similar to that of 
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three or four hundred years ago, can have no better title to merit and admiration than may be 
claimed by any ingenious forgery" (203).  Paradoxically, while tapping into the ballad tradition is 
'pure' to one reviewer, it is 'artificial' to another. 
 As the years went on, the reviews continued to argue both sides of this most basic 
question – energetic purity versus transgressive artificiality – concerning Wordsworth's language.  
In April 1808, a review in The Cabinet says, "his fancy frequently degenerates into conceit, his 
feeling into puerile affectation, his sublimity into bombast, and his originality of expression into 
hardness and obscurity" (249).  The Critical Review, in August 1807, says that Wordsworth is so 
sentimental as to fall into the "poor and wretched affectation of singularity" (400).  "Affectation" 
is also a repeated charge by Francis Jeffrey in the Edinburgh Review in October 1807.  On the 
other side of the fence, The Eclectic Review in August 1809 calls Wordsworth's language 
"genuine," The British Review in November 1815 calls it "simplified, purified, and invigorated" 
(371), and Hazlitt, in his Lectures of 1819 and in The Spirit of the Age (1825) characterizes 
Wordsworth's language as "pure," "vernacular," and "inartificial."  It is entirely fitting that the 
question of whether Wordsworth's language was 'pure' or 'affected', considered over many works 
and many years, received so much attention, because the question of purity was a crux of early 
philology, as we see Wordsworth exploring in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads. 
 Early in the 1800 Preface, Wordsworth says that the poetry focuses on common, rustic 
life in order to trace the following: 
  the primary laws of our nature: chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we 
  associate ideas in a state of excitement.  Humble and rustic life was generally  
  chosen, because, in that condition, the essential passions of the heart find a better 
  soil in which they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a  
  plainer and more emphatic language; because in that condition of life our  
  elementary feelings coexist  in a state of greater simplicity (122-124) 
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Wordsworth's idea is that contemporary rustic English culture and language represents a more 
primitive phase of English culture and language.  The value of this simplicity is that passion and 
emphatic feeling are heightened.  This belief concerning primitive language is derived directly 
from the tenet of language decline found throughout much early philology.  As we have seen it 
articulated by Hugh Blair, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, "Poetry...in its ancient 
original condition, was perhaps more vigorous than it is in its modern state.  It included then, the 
whole burst of the human mind; the whole exertion of its imaginative faculties.  It spoke then the 
language of passion, and no other; for to passion, it owed its birth" (322); or as articulated thus 
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: "by a natural progress all lettered languages must change character 
and lose vigor as they gain in clarity" (258). 
 John Horne Tooke also believed, as we have seen, that in gaining thrift, language became 
increasingly abstract and decreasingly rooted in sensation.  Speculatively touching upon 
language origins in Part One of the Diversions, Tooke says, “Language, it is true, is an Art, and a 
glorious one…But an art springing from necessity, and originally invented by artless men” (1: 
317).  In The Politics of Language, 1791-1819, discussing the Tookean underscoring of 
Wordsworth's interest in rustic language, Olivia Smith cites this passage from the Diversions and 
says about it, 
At this point, Horne Tooke’s work has vast repercussions.  His etymologies ignore 
many of the fundamental points of conservative theorists: the distinction between 
refined and vulgar language, the alleged limitations of primitive language, and the 
vernacular’s lack of intellectual potential…His method does away with the 
concept of a refined language by demonstrating that all words originate in the 
material, transitory world…In effect, Tooke invalidated the eighteenth-century 
dichotomies of civilization and barbarism, abstract and experiential modes of 
thought, and learning and vulgarity. (123-4) 
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The language of Tookean "artless men" is precisely what Wordsworth is interested in.  What 
contemporary conservative theorists would call refined language was what the radical Tooke 
would consider artificial language manipulated by a cultural elite to maintain unjust power.  As 
Smith argues, Tooke's work elevated the 'vulgar' and 'primitive.'  The artless rustic whose interest 
in language was to communicate thoughts efficiently spoke a language far more interesting to 
Tooke, and to Wordsworth, as well. 
 Motivated by the believed drawbacks of language decline, the next step typically taken 
by early philologists was a national one.  In wishing to guard against the dangers of modern 
abstraction, Tooke gave unprecedented attention to Anglo-Saxon etymology.  As Olivia Smith 
implies, Tooke substantially elevated the intellectual potential of the vernacular.  Blair was 
keenly interested in the Bardic tradition, writing in defense of the validity of the Ossian poems, 
which, as we have observed, emerged in the same year as Thomas Percy's Reliques of Ancient 
English Poetry, to which the Lyrical Ballads were obviously indebted.  And after Blair asserts 
that primitive poetry spoke the primitive language of passion, he posits that "the early Bard arose 
and sung" inspired by "events which interested his country or his friends" (322, my italics).  
Perhaps the most extensive theorization of the national dimension of primitive language, though, 
comes from Johann Gottfried Herder.  As we saw in conjunction with "Kubla Khan," Herder's 
Essay on the Origin of Language assigns the vigor of primitive language specifically to native 
language, or the mother-tongue.  Before getting to Herder's nationalistic conclusions, though, it 
is important to see just how extensively his premises are paralleled by Wordsworth's Preface. 
 Herder theorizes that the genesis of primitive language is preceded by a highly empirical 
stage of expression.  Herder opens his Essay  by saying, “Even as an animal man has a 
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language.  All strong sensations of body or mind, especially the most violent, those of pain as 
well as those of the passions, are spontaneously expressed by cries, sounds, and by wild 
inarticulate noises” (117).  He then goes on to say,  “A sentient being cannot confine any vivid 
sensation within itself; it must give utterance to it at the first moment of surprise, without 
deliberation or intention...These utterances are a form of language, the language of emotions, 
expressive of an original force of nature” (118).  Language-proper is generated by adding the 
human capacity for reflection to the spontaneous expression of strong sensations.  Herder 
describes this thus: “Man, endowed with mind...has by his very first act of spontaneous reflection 
invented language” (135); and, a short space later, Herder formulates his thesis again, thus: “The 
first indication of this conscious activity of the mind was a word.  With it, human language was 
invented!” (135).  For Herder, the origin of language is “spontaneous reflection.”  This very idea 
of spontaneous reflection giving expression of strong sensations appealed to Wordsworth, who in 
the Preface wrote, famously, that “all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful 
feelings” (358).  Wordsworth quickly adds that “Poems to which any value can be attached were 
never produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who, being possessed of more than usual 
organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply” (358); or, in Wordsworth's more famous 
formulation, later in the Preface, “[poetry] takes its origin from emotion recollected in 
tranquility” (365).  For Wordsworth, a desirable register of poetry is, “the spontaneous overflow 
of powerful feelings” “recollected in tranquility,” or, 'spontaneous recollection,' truncated.  Any 
direct verbal echo between the German Herder and the English Wordsworth of course relies upon 
translation, but the conceptual echo between Wordsworth's 'spontaneous recollection' theory 
about poetry and Herder's 'spontaneous reflection' theory about the genesis of language is 
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nevertheless striking.  Recognizing this striking similarity suggests that Wordsworth is drawn to 
a mode of expression that draws heavily from a Herderian theorization of primitive language. 
 Like Blair and Rousseau, Herder believed that primitive language was more vigorous 
than modern language.  Also like Blair and Rousseau, this belief has a nationalistic bent.  Further 
from Herder, "we associate the strongest sentiments with our native language" (163).  When 
theorizing about empirical connections at the roots of words, Herder says, "these connections 
are...intensely national, engendered according to the peculiar disposition and viewpoint of a 
people and conditioned by the time and circumstances of a country" (148).  What Herder is 
driving at, here, is his concept of Volksstimme.  Herder's part of the project of building a German 
nation was, of course, to cultivate a folk tradition based upon language and poetry: Volksstimme 
('the people's voice').  For Herder, Volksstimme is the foundation of the nation.  As Michael 
Baron has pointed out when discussing Herder's influence in Language and Relationship in 
Wordsworth's Writing, "The Volk ('people') in Herder is specifically a language community and a 
nation" (131).  Volksstimme is precisely the sort of thing that Ernest Gellner refers to when he 
says that "nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or 
cultural wealth...Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine 
purities restored" (56).  Volksstimme, for Herder, created authority for the construction of the 
abstract nation; for Wordsworth, attempting to claim authority in suggesting a new poetic diction, 
we can hear a falling back on a sort of Volksstimme in his interest in unrefined English and his 
repeated deferral to "the real language of men," "language really spoken by men," etc.  
Repeatedly calling it "real" seems to emphasize the desired empirical grounding, as part of the 
authority of the register lies in its grounding in sensation and passion.  Again, too, it is a register 
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that, as described by Wordsworth, is very much like primitive language, or language that has not 
gone through as much decline into abstraction as modern language.  Thus rejecting the language 
sanctioned by the conventional institutions of power in England, Wordsworth seeks to elevate the 
culturally traditional 'voice of the people.'5 
 This connection that I am suggesting Wordsworth made – the Herderian valence of 
interest in rustic English – was not lost on reviewers of Wordsworth's work.  In a November 
1815 British Review piece on "The White Doe of Rylstone," the reviewer begins by 
characterizing the movement of poetry at the center of which has stood Wordsworth's work.  The 
reviewer describes Wordsworth as "attempting to interest mankind in a species of poetry 
composed of mere simple elements" (372).  In so doing, Wordsworth has been combating "the 
refined language of Pope" and the French School (372).  Fortunately, in the estimation of this 
reviewer, "the French rules of criticism...which threatened to reduce all English poetry to a 
polished and featureless mannerism, has gradually been superseded by one more vigorous and 
more national" (371).  In rejecting "a symbolical diction as unlike as possible to the language 
immemorially spoken by men and women and children," poetic taste has been "simplified, 
purified, and invigorated" (371).  This reviewer identifies the philological virtues espoused by 
Wordsworth: simplicity and vigor, as opposed to "symbolic diction" and "refined language."  The 
poetic mode being rejected is that sanctioned by "the French rules;" just as early philology 
                                                 
5.  In British State Romanticism: Authorship, Agency, and Bureaucratic Nationalism (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), Anne Frey argues, "Trusting the state to form individuals, 
these writers begin a trajectory that culminates in Matthew Arnold and that defines the state as 
the administrator of 'culture, charged with cultivating and representing the populace" (3).  As this 
study aims to demonstrate, the engagement that the Romantics had with early philology 
suggested a basis for nationalistic sentiment opposite that which Frey describes. 
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theorized, the simple, pure, vigorous alternative is "more national."  Finally, true to Herder's 
concept of Volksstimme and to Wordsworth's "language really spoken by men," the alternative to 
excessively symbolic diction praised here by the reviewer is "language immemorially spoken by 
men and women and children." 
 Linguistic authority is viewed oppositely by The Eclectic Review in January 1808.  In 
what is a review of the 1807 Poems, the reviewer ends up talking at length about Lyrical Ballads, 
saying 
  Were these volumes (the Lyrical Ballads, &c.) now before us for criticism...we  
  would certainly protest against the unqualified rejection of those embellishments 
  of diction, suited to the elevation of enthusiastic thoughts equally above ordinary 
  discourse and ordinary capacities, which essentially distinguish Poetry from  
  Prose, and have been sanctioned by the successful usage of Bards in every age  
  and nation, civilized or barbarous, on which the light of Song has shed its  
  quickening, ennobling, and ameliorating beams. (36) 
 
This reviewer does not believe that rustic diction is fit for poetry, speaking specifically against 
"ordinary discourse" and "ordinary capacities."  This position is diametrically opposite belief in 
"language immemorially spoken by men and women and children."  Authority does not come 
from the Volk, it comes from sanctioned usage of poets.  This reviewer in the Eclectic believes 
that poetry should not lower itself to the discourse of unrefined folk, it should instead ennoble 
and ameliorate. 
 This 1808 review from the Eclectic also explicitly appropriates the idea of the 'mother-
tongue' opposite the Herderian construction, saying, "in narrative, descriptive, and ethic poetry, 
we know no law of nature, and we will acknowledge none of art, that forbids Genius to speak his 
mother-tongue, – a language which, in sound and structure, as well as in character and sentiment, 
exalts itself far above the models of common speech" (36).  Wordsworth's model of rustic 
 34 
 
language is explicitly denounced.  In place of rustic English is the 'mother-tongue of Genius.'  
This formulation directly controverts the idea of a primitivist-inflected native language in favor 
of a general language of refinement. 
We can see that, approaching and well into the second decade of the century, Wordsworth 
continued to incite retrospective appraisals of Lyrical Ballads and of his 'system' in general.  He 
also found his work punctuating current consideration of an English poetic canon.  In October 
1814, the Quarterly reviewed a recently published anthology of English poetry, and the review 
closes with reference to the emergence of Lyrical Ballads and the Lake School, saying, "there 
has been a great revival in our days – a pouring out of the spirit" (90).  After noting that "The 
publication of Percy's Reliques led the way" to this revival by the "New School," the reviewer 
says that "the Aristarchs who for twelve years past with equal pertinacity and pertness have 
directed their censures against the founders (as they are pleased to style them) of that school, 
have by this time probably found reason to suspect that they have not been more fortunate in 
poetical criticism than in political prophecy" (90).  From 1814, "twelve years past" would be 
1802, the year of the third edition of Lyrical Ballads and the final version of the Preface.  This 
revival, incited by Percy's antiquarian ballad revival, had been an affront to the English political 
establishment as much as it had been to the poetic canon, as the reviewer implies that poetic 
tastes tended to follow political persuasions. 
Indeed, as we go back to the beginning of this 1814 review, we see that sanctioning a 
canon of English poetry, of which the school of 1802 was the culmination for this reviewer, was 
overtly nationalistic, offering a purified version of literary history, and doing so consistently via 
language.  The reviewer begins by saying that "In [English poetry], as in our laws and 
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institutions, however it may have been occasionally modified by the effect of foreign models, a 
distinct national character has predominated" (60).  This "national character," the reviewer 
contends, is due in large part to the English language: "Little reflection is required to perceive 
how much the poetry of every country must be influenced by its language" (61).  Acknowledging 
that "some savage tongues" will not accommodate good poetry, also "the process of refining may 
be carried too far; and there are civilized nations who have rendered their tongue incapable of the 
highest species of poetry, by subjecting it to capricious rules" (61).  We see again, here, the 
charge of capricious refinement, as we have seen in Wordsworth and in other reviews. 
Among those tongues so constrained, the reviewer believes, are French and Spanish.  "If 
our poets are not also in shackles it is not owing to our critics, who have been, and who continue 
to be, the worst in Europe; -- the most shallow, the most contradictory, and the most 
presumptuous" (61).  The critical establishment is put up again, here, as a hindrance.  Where the 
reviewer proceeds from this belief is most interesting, because the hindrance of the critical 
establishment is identified as ineffectual against a natural democratic force: "Happily for us our 
verse beginning among the people, necessarily assumed from its birth a popular character; and 
when the English minstrel was admitted into castles and courts, the language of life and passion 
was the language of English poetry" (62).  English poetry comes from “the people,” from “a 
popular character” – from a sort of Volksstimme, according to this reviewer.  And again, this 
language is characterized by "passion," following the characterization we have seen in 
Wordsworth and Herder. 
The reviewer proceeds through the centuries evaluating the quality of the poetry by its 
degree of linguistic purity.  For instance, "Chaucer drew much from the French and Italian poets, 
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but more from observation and the stores of his own wealthy and prolific mind.  Strong English 
sense, and strong English humour characterize his original works" (65).  About the century 
following Chaucer, the critic says, "the poetry of this age was stuffed with sesquipedalian 
Latinisms, like the worst of Dr. Johnson's prose.  The southern nations of Europe dilute their 
sounds into polysyllables; we, contrariwise, at some occasional expense of euphony, purchase 
condensation and strength; in this respect our national character and our language have acted 
upon each other, and the fashion of the style ornate was an attempt in direct contradiction of 
both" (66).  While Chaucer's strong English sense and humor effectually staved off French and 
Italian influences, his immediate successors succumbed to Mediterranean linguistic compromise.  
Again, we see the reviewer explicitly equating "national character and language". 
"The fashion did not long maintain its ground in England," the reviewer goes on to say 
about the transgressions of Chaucer's successors (66).  Spenser represented a great improvement, 
even finding a fit application for the couplet, "an example of terseness, which Pope has never 
excelled," says the reviewer (73).  With reference to Pope, repeated is the indictment (seen earlier 
in the reference to Johnson's Latinisms) of the school of poetry opposed by Lyrical Ballads.  As 
for Sidney's experiment of "introducing Latin measures into English verse" (73), the Volk again 
prevailed, according to the Quarterly reviewer: "in Elizabeth's age there was too much poetry in 
the mouths of the people.  The language had become a written and cultivated tongue, and so 
violent an innovation must have appeared as ridiculous then as it does now" (73).  Emphasizing 
"poetry in the mouths of the people," we see a concept like Volksstimme again, as the strong 
democratic character of English again staves off outside influence. 
So the reviewer goes through the English canon until he closes with praise of the "great 
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revival" centered by Lyrical Ballads.  The review is strange and biased, but so was much of the 
discourse on Wordsworth's language theory, following the slippery nature of philological 
nationalism at the time.  It is telling that Wordsworth's work motivated constant retrospection on 
his prior work, as well as assessments of the English canon.  While it generally took longer for 
the more favorable reviews to register the full scope of nationalistic implications of 
Wordsworth's language theory, the harsh reviews – fairly or not, accurately or not – seized upon 
them right from the start.  Though Wordsworth himself and his admirers believed that he was 
tapping into an authentically English register, some early criticism regarded Lyrical Ballads 
xenophobically.  In October 1798, The Critical Review says about The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner, "It is a Dutch attempt at German sublimity.  Genius has here been employed in 
producing a poem of little merit" (201).  The Rime of the Ancient Mariner was, in 1798, 
generally known to be the work of Coleridge, and his time spent in Germany seems to have been 
unsettling for some reviewers.  The Analytical Review levels similar censure in December 1798, 
saying, "[The Rime of the Ancient Mariner] has more of the extravagance of a mad german poet, 
than of the simplicity of our ancient ballad writers" (583).  The philosophy perceived by the 
reviewers seems as much at issue as the diction, as they perhaps feared continental 
sentimentality.  This charge of 'Gothic-ness' also came to be leveled at Wordsworth's work.  The 
October 1798 Critical Review also says about "The Idiot Boy," "No tale less deserved the labour 
that appears to have been bestowed upon this.  It resembles a Flemish picture in the 
worthlessness of its design and the excellence of its execution" (200). 
The significance of this sort of 'Gothic-ness' is perhaps best captured in a much later 
review.  In July 1819, The Eclectic Review takes up Wordsworth's Peter Bell and "The 
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Waggoner," and the reviewer falls into a general discussion of Wordsworth's 'system' of poetic 
taste.  The reviewer says, "Mr. Wordsworth's system pours contempt on all those finer rules 
which his predecessors have worked by: he is for bringing in a Gothic horde of potters and 
pedlars and waggoners upon the classic regions of poetry: he has attempted to set up a new reign 
of taste, and he has sacrificed his genius in the adventure" (74).  The logic of this review is 
fascinating.  We hear in it the same issue that we have heard disputed since 1798: the 'system' or 
'rules' of the poetic establishment.  The ostensible fear of a poetic invasion is really pretty clearly 
a sort of xenophobia – fear of Gothic sentiment for potters, pedlars, waggoners, and the like.  
This fear produces a metaphor of poetry as a classic (or, probably more properly, a neoclassical) 
geo-political entity.  Thus, according to the reviewer, Wordsworth is attempting to set up a new 
ruling regime – his 'system.' 
This metaphor – "a new reign of taste" – registers very concisely a yet further implication 
in this philology-underscored discourse.  Richard Turley's argument in The Politics of Language 
in Romantic Literature is that Wordsworth's language theory was a deliberate attempt to redirect 
literary taste.  More interesting to me is how literary taste became a metaphor for the nation, or a 
nationalistic battleground.  We have seen how the question of pure simplicity versus affectation 
is underscored by the philological doctrine of language decline.  We have also seen how the 
desire to work against language decline becomes national.  We are now seeing how questions of 
nationalism, in the Romantic period in Britain, had much to do with radically inflected poetics 
infiltrating from abroad.  To The Eclectic Review, even in 1819, Wordsworth's 'system' is seen as 
disturbingly revolutionary, in a way. 
Though not quite so explicit as this 1819 review, we can also see the early reviews up in 
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arms over perceived revolutionary characteristics in Wordsworth's philological 'system.'  In 
January 1799, The London Review has little interest in ancient English ballads and sympathy for 
the rustic class.  Believing that Wordsworth has mistaken simplicity for "a simple style," the 
reviewer considers Wordsworth's "colloquial diction" to be "debased by inelegance and gross by 
familiarity" (34).  The reviewer much prefers Pope to Percy, preferring the "lovely nudity of a 
GRACE" to the "squalid nakedness of a BEGGAR."  The reviewer also, when quoting 
Wordsworth from the Advertisement to the 1798 edition of Lyrical Ballads, italicizes 
'experiments' and 'conversation.'  Richard Turley has suggested that this emphasis highlights the 
radical valence of 'experiments' and 'conversation' in the 1790s.  On the whole, Wordsworth's 
diction is seen by this reviewer as not only coarse but disturbingly sympathetic to figures that 
posed a perceived threat to the establishment. 
Charles Burney, in The Monthly Review in June 1799, also italicizes 'experiments' in 
quoting from the Advertisement.  In this review, Burney, as we have seen, considers 
Wordsworth's diction artificial and unfit for poetry.  Burney also goes further, though, and attacks 
the radical social valence of Wordsworth's diction and stanza choice, saying, "None but savages 
have submitted to eat acorns after corn was found" (203).  What to Wordsworth is authentic 
Englishness is to Burney ignorant savageness.  This metaphor by Burney hints at his opinion of 
schemes for revolutionary elevation of the lower classes; he goes on, though, to get more explicit 
about the politics of Wordsworth's poetry in his criticism of "The Female Vagrant": 
 As it seems to stamp a general stigma on all military transactions, which were  
  never more important in free countries than at the present period, it will perhaps  
  be asked whether the hardships described never happen during revolution, or in a 
  nation subdued?  The sufferings of individuals during war are dreadful; but is it  
  not better to try to prevent them from becoming general, or to render them  
  transient by heroic and patriotic efforts, than to fly to them for ever? (206) 
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Burney complains similarly about revolutionary sympathies in his critique of "The Complaint of 
the Forsaken Indian Woman," saying, "The want of humanity here falls not on wicked 
Europeans, but on the innocent Indian savages, who enjoy unlimited freedom and liberty, 
unbridled by Kings, magistrates, or laws" (209).  Burney calls "The Yew-Tree" "a seat for Jean 
Jacques," while actually reading "The Dramatic Fragment" as being critical of what he 
characterizes as "the savage liberty preached by some modern philosophes" (204).  Burney 
grants that "Tintern Abbey" contains some beautiful reflections, but is disturbed by "unsociable 
ideas of seclusion from the commerce of the world: as if men were born to live in woods and 
wilds, unconnected with each other!" (210).  Going on to tout educated urban society, Burney 
says, "The savage sees none of the beauties which this author describes" (210).  It is important to 
note the matrix of ideas that Burney lays out: individual seclusion is savage and ignorant, the 
liberty preached by some modern philosophes is "savage," actual 'savages' who enjoy liberty 
exhibit a want of humanity, war in defense of 'free' countries is favorable to the hardships of 
revolution, and only 'savages' would transgress to appreciate the diction that Wordsworth 
proposes to use.  What Burney's progression from diction to "patriotic efforts" shows is just how 
significantly underscored by philology were questions of radicalism and nationalism in 
Wordsworth. 
 In his Lectures on the English Poets, William Hazlitt provides an unabashed gloss on the 
suggestions of Wordsworth's 'new reign of taste' as being revolutionary.  “This school of poetry,” 
Hazlitt says, “had its origin in the French revolution, or rather in those sentiments and opinions 
which produced that revolution; and which sentiments and opinions were indirectly imported 
into this country in translations from the German about that period” (311).  Hazlitt couldn't be 
 41 
 
more clear about the source that he identifies for Wordsworth's philosophy.  We see in Hazlitt's 
assertion both the feared Gallic and the feared Gothic infiltration that we have seen in the 
reviews. 
 Attacking the canonical poseurs that had been attacked in the Quarterly Review in 1814, 
Hazlitt says, “Our poetical literature had, towards the close of the last century, degenerated into 
the most trite, insipid, and mechanical of all things, in the hands of the followers of Pope and the 
old French school of poetry.  It wanted something to stir it up, and it found that something in the 
principles and events of the French revolution” (311).  Hazlitt proceeds to conflate the new 
school of poetry and the revolution so that Wordsworth's system becomes a metaphor, just as it 
has for the Eclectic reviewer who called it a “new reign of taste”: “kings and queens were 
dethroned from their rank and station in legitimate tragedy or epic poetry, as they were 
decapitated elsewhere; rhyme was looked upon as a relic of the feudal system, and regular metre 
was abolished along with regular government” (312).  What is for an antagonistic reviewer “a 
new reign of taste” is for Hazlitt a “republic of letters” (314). 
 Hazlitt even works back, in this particular Lecture, to echo the same underpinnings of the 
revolution that we find in the early philology that influenced Wordsworth.  “They founded the 
new school,” Hazlitt says, “on a principle of sheer humanity, on pure nature void of art...They 
were for bringing poetry back to its primitive simplicity and state of nature, as [Rousseau] was 
for bringing society back to the savage state” (314-315).  Here in Hazlitt, we see the emphasis on 
pure, simple, primitive culture that we have seen in the philology of Blair, Rousseau, Tooke, and 
Herder.  It is thus not surprising that Hazlitt names the political philosophy of Rousseau.  
Hazlitt's opinion of Wordsworth is thus important not only because it explicitly registers the 
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revolutionary valence of his system of poetry, but also because it recognizes the origin of that 
system in the underpinnings of early philology. 
 The August 1807 Critical Review was as disturbed with the revolutionary new school as 
was Charles Burney in 1799, saying, "[Wordsworth] is only one of a tribe who keep each other in 
countenance by mutual applause and flattery, and who having dubbed themselves by the name of 
poets, imagine they have a right to direct the taste of the nation, and thus...abuse the good sense 
and weary out the patience of mankind with their fantastic mummeries" (400).  In 'mummery' we 
see the familiar charge of artificiality and in "tribe" we see the familiar metaphor of savageness.  
And again, these characteristics are unsettling enough to the reviewer that directing the "taste of 
the nation" is at stake. 
 This August 1807 piece from The Critical Review also goes a step further in suggesting 
that Wordsworth "must undergo a certain term of rigid penance and inward mortification; before 
he can become what he once promised to be, the poet of the heart: and not the capricious minion 
of a debasing affectation" (401).  The reviewer imagines a spiritual punishment for Wordsworth, 
for the sin of his affected diction.  The same Review, later in the same August issue, similarly 
says that while, because Wordsworth does possess talent, it takes no delight in wounding him, 
"still it would be an injustice both to ourselves and to the public if we were to suffer any inferior 
consideration to warp the impartial morality of criticism.  It is our duty...mildly to reprove where 
reproof is merited by negligence or affectation" (536).  The charges against Wordsworth subtly 
grow more serious, here, as does the role of reviewer.  Wordsworth is essentially charged with 
being deliberately mischievous.  Criticism, out of duty, becomes the arbiter of morality. 
 The trend exhibited here, begun, really by Burney in 1799, is to view Wordsworth as 
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representing such threatening revolutionary ideas as to be an enemy to decent society, or the 
establishment.  In Francis Jeffrey's extreme censures in The Edinburgh Review, Wordsworth 
indeed becomes a figurative enemy of the state in need of figurative trial.  Reviewing the 1807 
Poems for the October 1807 issue, Jeffrey begins, as many reviewers did, by hearkening back to 
Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth's perceived general philosophy of poetry, and the 'new school' of 
poetry being established.  Jeffrey levels the typical charges of vulgarity and affectation 
repeatedly.  He then sets up an archipelago of group identifications.  He expresses his fear of the 
'new school' "gaining ground among us" (215, my italics); he refers to the new style's "feebler 
admirers" (215); he says that "it belongs to the public, and not to us, to decide" upon the merit of 
the 'new school' (215, my italics); he says, "Putting ourselves thus upon our country, we certainly 
look for a verdict against this publication" (216, my italics).  "Us" would seem to be apologists 
for the establishment, or intellectual elites; the "feebler admirers" would seem to be the folk with 
whom Wordsworth's language theory resonates.  The "public" begins to get complicated, because 
it is clearly an entity larger than Jeffrey and what he is confident that he represents; his "country" 
is technically analogous to the "public," with patriotic sentiment implied for appeal.  More than 
anything, Jeffrey is trying to either mold or commandeer an identifiable group to set against 
Wordsworth.  On the whole, this activity by Jeffrey operates in the same discourse as, but is a 
sharp contrast to, Wordsworth's appropriation of a Volksstimme. 
 What clearly belies Jeffrey's activity is fear of what we might call a swinish discourse of 
a 'feeble' multitude, recalling Edmund Burke's description of the French Revolution.  Jeffrey 
speaks of being motivated to censure Wordsworth out of a sense of "public duty" (215), but his 
true motivation seems to be something closer to protecting the established order from the will of 
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the 'public.'  After professing that it is for the public to decide the merits of the new school, and 
saying that he is putting himself upon his country, he expects "a verdict against this publication" 
(216), and he nevertheless decides that "To accelerate that result, and to give a general view of 
the evidence, to those into whose hands the record may not have already fallen, we must now 
make a few observations and extracts" (216).  Jeffrey's mode is thus much more dictatorial than 
it is democratic. 
 So Jeffrey proceeds as judge, lawyer, and jury, with the preponderance of evidence being 
the impropriety of Wordsworth's diction.  When Jeffrey explains the faults of this diction, he 
deals with philology in a subtle but important way.  Jeffrey believes that proper poetic diction has 
intrinsic qualities perceptible by all readers.  He says that "Every one knows that there are low 
and mean expressions, as well as lofty and grave ones; and that some words bear the impression 
of coarseness and vulgarity, as clearly as others do of refinement and affection" (217).  This 
theory is crystallized when Jeffrey says about Wordsworth's diction, "His diction has no where 
any pretensions to elegance or dignity; and he has scarcely ever condescended to give the grace 
of correctness or melody to his versification" (217).  "Correctness" and "melody" are 
incongruous associates, as one is objective and the other subjective.  Blurring the line between 
objective and subjective is, in a sense, what Jeffrey's theory hinges on, and it flies decidedly in 
the face of early philology's doctrine of arbitrary signification.  As we have seen, Olivia Smith 
has rightly argued that Wordsworth's interest in rustic language derives in part from John Horne 
Tooke's breaking down of such absolutes: "His etymologies ignore many of the fundamental 
points of conservative theorists: the distinction between refined and vulgar language...His 
method does away with the concept of a refined language by demonstrating that all words 
 45 
 
originate in the material, transitory world" (123).  In arguing against subjectivity and malleability 
in language, Jeffrey comes from precisely the sort of conservative angle to which Smith refers. 
 About the new school's source of authority, Jeffrey believes that "instead of borrowing 
from the more popular passages of their illustrious predecessors, they have preferred furnishing 
themselves from vulgar ballads and plebeian nurseries" (218).  The question here, again, is a 
question of authoritative source for cultural identification.  Wordsworth's source is a 
Volksstimme, Jeffrey's source is "the finest passages in Virgil and Pope" (217).  Lest it seem an 
overstatement that what is at stake rises above poetic taste to the level of revolution and defining 
the nation, we observe Jeffrey's suggestion that Wordsworth "really seems anxious to court this 
literary martyrdom" (218), and his closing statement: 
  Many a generous rebel, it is said, has been reclaimed to his allegiance by the  
 spectacle of lawless outrage and excess presented in the conduct of the insurgents;  
 and we think there is every reason to hope, that the lamentable consequences  
 which have resulted from Mr Wordsworth's open violation of the established laws  
 of poetry, will operate as a wholesome warning to those who might otherwise  
 have been seduced by his example, and be the means of restoring to that ancient  
 and venerable code its due honour and authority. (231) 
 
The implication is that Wordsworth himself is rebel who has cast off allegiance to the 
establishment that Jeffrey represents.  Jeffrey's diction is overwhelming in its shaping of 
Wordsworth's philology into a metaphor, or indeed vehicle, for the revolutionary formation of a 
new concept of Englishness, with this talk of 'rebels' and "allegiance," as well as "lawless 
outrage," "insurgents," and "established laws." 
  
 
 
 46 
 
II.  "the tongue / That Shakespeare spake" 
 
 In the "Essay Supplementary to the Preface of 1815," Wordsworth lashes back at some of 
the reviews and further elucidates the nationalistic dimension that attended his philosophy of 
language.  Critics on both ends of the spectrum of opinion more explicitly registered the Preface 
to Lyrical Ballads' rejection of Pope and the 'French School' than Wordsworth himself did, but 
Wordsworth makes his disdain abundantly clear in the "Essay Supplementary," saying, "[Pope] 
bewitched the nation by his melody, and dazzled it by his polished style, and was himself blinded 
by his own success" (72).  If Pope "had not been seduced by an over-love of immediate 
popularity" and "had confided more in his native genius," he could have averted this lamentable 
fate, according to Wordsworth (72).  The terms upon and in which Wordsworth criticizes Pope 
echo the terms upon and in which Wordsworth himself was censured by some reviews.  
Wordsworth was one of a tribe that presumed to "direct the taste of the nation," and here Pope is 
described as having "bewitched the nation" linguistically.  While "native genius" would seem to 
ostensibly refer to something like 'the talent naturally possessed by Pope,' the formulation's 
proximity to Pope's 'bewitching of the nation' sounds tantalizingly like an inversion of the sort of 
formulation touted by the 1808 Eclectic reviewer who suggested that "Genius speak its native 
tongue."  I have argued that the Eclectic reviewer's formulation is itself an inversion of the 
Herderian belief in native language.  The "Essay Supplementary" inverting that inversion would 
fall in line with Wordsworth's conviction, in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, that genius lies in 
attention to the native. 
 Wordsworth goes on, in the "Essay Supplementary," to praise Percy's Reliques and to 
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observe the battle over taste that it engendered: "The Compilation was however ill suited to the 
then existing taste of city society; and Dr. Johnson, 'mid the little senate to which he gave laws, 
was not sparing in his exertions to make it an object of contempt" (75).  Wordsworth identifies 
the hegemony of elite 'city society' against, implicitly, rusticity – the conflict we have seen from 
the Preface to Lyrical Ballads through the reviews of much of Wordsworth's work.  Wordsworth 
also imagines a metaphorical government to which laws are dictated, adopting the rhetoric of 
reviewers like Burney and Jeffrey, attributing to Johnson the type of dictatorial position that we 
have seen Jeffrey take. 
 The 1814 Quarterly review that gives lengthy consideration to the English canon had 
been equally hard on Pope and Johnson, with its reference to Spenser's use of the couplet as “an 
example of terseness, which Pope has never excelled” and its reference to “sesquipedalian 
Latinisms like the worst of Dr. Johnson's prose.”  The "Essay Supplementary's" praise of Percy's 
Reliques and criticism of Pope and Johnson also comes amidst an extensive consideration of the 
definition of an English canon.  The issue of public opinion – seen in Pope's being "seduced by 
an over-love of immediate popularity" – is one that Wordsworth also raises earlier in his canon 
consideration, when talking about Shakespeare.  "At all events," Wordsworth says, "that 
Shakespeare stooped to accommodate himself to the People, is sufficiently apparent; and one of 
the most striking proofs of his almost omnipotent genius, is, that he could turn to such glorious 
purpose those materials which the prepossessions of the age compelled him to make use of.  Yet 
even this marvellous skill appears not to have been enough to prevent his rivals from some 
advantage over him in public estimation" (68).  Powerful as Shakespeare was, and though it is 
crucial that he was able to “accommodate himself to the People” by turning to “glorious 
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purpose” the “prepossessions of the age,” he may not have been the most popular playwright of 
his own day.  In this observation concerning Shakespeare, we encounter the same implicit 
question embedded in Wordsworth's discussion of Pope and Johnson: whence comes the 
authority to define worthy canonical English poetry?  Specifically, is it by dictation, as he 
characterizes Johnson's mode?  Is it through linguistic bewitchment, as he characterizes Pope's 
mode?  Or can "omnipotent genius," which he deems that Shakespeare possessed, turn to 
"glorious purpose" the "prepossessions" of "the People?" 
 What the "Essay Supplementary" thus undertakes is the same issue undertaken by 
explicitly by Francis Jeffrey and by the 1814 Quarterly review.  Jeffrey speaks of submitting to 
the verdict of public opinion, but he ultimately becomes dictatorial, and his professed concern for 
his nation becomes elitist hegemony; the 1814 Quarterly contends for a truly democratic 
character of English poetry.  In the final pages of the "Essay Supplementary," Wordsworth sets 
out to expound the prospect of turning to "glorious purpose" the "prepossessions" of "the 
People."  Wordsworth says, "every author, as far as he is great and at the same time original, has 
had the task of creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed" (80).  Since "taste" would seem to 
reside with the consumers of poetry, Wordsworth proceeds to explain how and why it is instead 
created by the producers of poetry.  "TASTE," he says, "...is a word which has been forced to 
extend its services far beyond the point to which philosophy would have confined them.  It is a 
metaphor, taken from a passive sense of the human body, and transferred to things which are in 
their essence not passive, – to intellectual acts and operations" (81).  What should rightly be an 
active intellectual undertaking has been reduced to a passive function, and this reduction has not 
been arbitrary.  As Wordsworth continues, it is owed to "the prevalence of dispositions at once 
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injurious and discreditable, being no other than that selfishness which is the child of apathy, – 
which, as Nations decline in productive and creative power, makes them value themselves upon 
a presumed refinement of judging" (81).  In question is the state of creativity in the nation, the 
vitality of which has been reduced out of apathetic selfishness on the part of "injurious and 
discreditable" dispositions.  These dispositions maintain power in a declined nation based upon 
presumption of rectitude in judgment.  In other words, when critics like Jeffrey and Burney fall 
back on 'taste,' by stressing the existence of a passive thing that must be adhered to, they ensure 
the preeminence of their judgment.  It is a deliberate ploy, Wordsworth insinuates, that hinges 
upon a linguistic ruse. 
 While Wordsworth seems bent on breaking down the type of "presumed refinement of 
judging" that we have seen in several reviews of his work, he nevertheless wishes to "direct the 
taste of the nation," as one of those very reviews put it.  While this goal stated thus may not have 
been so palpable in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth has here unequivocally begun to 
theorize the need for "creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed." 
 In the beginning of this theorization, Wordsworth does not imagine himself as quite so 
dictatorial as, say, Johnson, as insidious as those possessed of "injurious and discreditable" 
dispositions, or as linguistically bewitching as Pope.  The deceit of passive taste, Wordsworth 
goes on to explain, is antithetical to engaging with the pathetic and the sublime, because 
necessary for engagement with the pathetic and the sublime is "the exertion of a co-operating 
power in the mind of the Reader" (81).  But Wordsworth again proceeds to imagine the poet 
being a producer of this power, saying that he "has to call forth and to communicate power" (82).  
"Therefore," he goes on to say, "to create taste is to call forth and bestow power" (82).  Put even 
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more transparently: "What is all this but an advance, or a conquest, made by the soul of the 
poet?" (82). 
 There are two reasons, Wordsworth goes on to posit, that the burden of creating taste falls 
on the poet.  One is that "there are emotions of the pathetic...that are complex and 
revolutionary...against which [the heart] struggles with pride" (82).  The characterization 
"revolutionary" seems carefully chosen, as we have already encountered characterizations of 
Wordsworth's poetic project as 'revolutionary.'  It is fitting here as it comes in a discussion of 
creating an English readership.  The other reason that the poet must create taste is that "the 
medium through which, in poetry, the heart is to be affected, is language; a thing subject to 
endless fluctuations and arbitrary associations" (82).  This is a very Tookean reasoning from 
Wordsworth, and he has already identified it in action with the manipulation of the metaphor of 
'taste.'  This is a stark contrast to part of the premise of Jeffrey's opinion of Wordsworth's system, 
which, I have suggested, is an un-Tookean stance against subjectivity and fluidity in language.  
Made explicit by Wordsworth in the "Essay Supplementary," faced with the malleability of 
language's associations, "The genius of the poet melts these down for his purposes" (82).  These 
are bleak prospects for trusting general readers to exert the energy to engage with the pathetic; 
about the prospect of readers engaging with the sublime, Wordsworth believes that "there is little 
existing preparation for a poet charged with a new mission to extend [the sublime's] kingdom" 
(83).  Again Wordsworth speaks of his poetic project as a matter of defining a political body, and 
again he sees the responsibility to create this definition as residing with him. 
 Wordsworth proceeds toward the end of the essay with a philosophic crescendo.  "Away, 
then," he says, "with the senseless iteration of the word, popular" (83).  Wordsworth seems to 
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view popularity as he does taste: a sham embodied in a word that has far outrun its just 
application.  After all, great poetry is difficult for most people to comprehend.  As Wordsworth 
puts it: "wherever the instinctive wisdom of antiquity and her heroic passions uniting, in the 
heart of the poet, with the meditative wisdom of later ages, have produced that accord of 
sublimated humanity, which is at once a history of the remote past and a prophetic enunciation of 
the remotest future, there, the poet must reconcile himself for a season to few and scattered 
hearers" (83).  Having temporarily limited popularity is the price to pay for producing great 
poetry.  The definition here given for great poetry is an interesting one.  Wordsworth envisions 
his poetry coupling the "meditative wisdom of later ages" with the "instinctive wisdom of 
antiquity, an "accord" of history and prophecy.  We have seen emphasis on Wordsworth drawing 
poetic authority from English literary and cultural history throughout the discourse surrounding 
the language theory of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads.  What has become explicitly complicated 
in the "Essay Supplementary," though, is what Wordsworth has done with his own version of the 
Herderian Volksstimme we witnessed earlier.  While wanting to draw from a historical 'voice of 
the people,' he seems to depart from Herder, as the present English people make unreliable 
readers, or "few and scattered hearers." 
 Wordsworth submits a resolution to this tension in the final paragraph of the essay.  "Is it 
the result of the whole," he begins, "that, in the opinion of the Writer, the judgment of the People 
is not to be respected?  The thought is most injurious" (84).  Wordsworth opposes himself to any 
sentiment "injurious" to "the People," "injurious" being the very characterization he has given the 
disposition behind the mongering of passive 'taste.'  In the "judgment of the People" we recall 
Francis Jeffrey's request for public 'judgment' in his case against Wordsworth.  Here at the end of 
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the essay, Wordsworth recognizes that the judgment of 'the People' is at stake, and he does not 
wish to deny it.  He instead proceeds to distinguish it from the censure of reviewers: "Still more 
lamentable is his error who can believe that there is any thing of divine infallibility in the 
clamour of that small though loud portion of the community, which, under the name of the 
PUBLIC, passes itself, upon the unthinking, for the PEOPLE" (84).  The 'Public' – the clamoring 
portion of the community professing to speak for 'the People' – is quite obviously Jeffrey and his 
ilk.  Toward the censure of reviews, Wordsworth has "as much deference as it is entitled to" (84). 
 What Wordsworth is interested in elevating is the voice of 'the People.'  He quotes what 
would become the 1850 Prelude, saying, "'–Past and future, are the wings / On whose support, 
harmoniously conjoined, / Moves the great Spirit of human knowledge–'", and extrapolates that 
"The voice that issues from this Spirit, is that Vox Populi which the Deity inspires.  Foolish must 
he be who can mistake for this a local acclamation, or a transitory outcry -- transitory though it 
be for years, local though from a Nation" (84).  We see again, here, an expression existing at the 
nexus of the past and future; a page earlier, it was Wordsworth's poetry, now it is "the great Spirit 
of human knowledge," from which issues the "Vox Populi," the 'voice of the People.'  Obviously 
recalling what I have suggested is Wordsworth's formulation of a Volksstimme, this formulation 
in the "Essay Supplementary" is the authority upon which the poet draws in the face of harsh 
reviews.  The "Vox Populi" of the Essay, though, is not exactly a Herderian Volksstimme.  
Wordsworth goes on to elaborate, "to the People, philosophically characterized, and to the 
embodied spirit of their knowledge, so far as it exists and moves, at the present, faithfully 
supported by its two wings, the past and the future, [the Writer's] devout respect, his reverence, is 
due" (84).  The key phrase used by Wordsworth is "philosophically characterized."  Just as 
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Wordsworth believes that it is incumbent upon him to "create the taste by which he is to be 
enjoyed," 'the People' seems to be an abstraction that he has constructed, or a philosophized 
characterization. 
 As I discuss in the Introduction to this study, abstract construction is an important feature 
of nationalism in what Ernest Gellner refers to as the age of nationalism.  According to Benedict 
Anderson, the nation is an imagined community.  Gellner strikes yet closer to the valence that 
Herder seems to have had for Wordsworth when he says, “nationalism uses the pre-existing, 
historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth…Dead languages can be 
revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored” (56).  Here there is a key 
difference between Herder and Wordsworth.  Herder was interested in drawing upon an actual 
tradition to cultivate an actual German nation.  Herder's ideas, though, seem to have been 
appropriated by Wordsworth along lines like those described by Gellner.  In spite of Coleridge's 
criticism of the vulgarity seemingly espoused by Wordsworth's philosophy of language, critics 
have argued that neither Coleridge nor Wordsworth were truly interested in actually re-creating 
primitive language.  As Richard Turley has argued, Wordsworth is less interested in restoring 
actual idioms than he is in carving out discursive space for political reform.  Susan Manly goes 
further, saying, “Wordsworth's frequent references to 'selection' and 'purification', and his 
arrogation to the figure of the poet of a special capacity for feeling, reveal a profound 
ambivalence about common language” (98-99).  Manly's contention is that Wordsworth 
ultimately divests “the identity of 'the people'...of...radical potential” (99).  Manly's argument 
moves closer than Turley's does toward James Chandler's argument, in Wordsworth's Second 
Nature, that Wordsworth becomes a Burkean conservative by the end of the 1805 Prelude.  
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While I later explore Chandler's argument further, I do, at present, agree that Wordsworth, like 
Coleridge, is more interested in the idea of primitive language than in the actual re-creation of it.  
In the "Essay Supplementary," Herder's Volksstimme seems to give way to something more like 
the ability of a literary tradition to manipulate a fickle and unsophisticated national voice. 
 Traces of the long discourse that I have sketched on Wordsworth's language philosophy 
show up in some of the wartime sonnets of the 1807 Poems, and also in the Prelude.  In these 
poems, Wordsworth seems to be exploring ways to imagine a national identity in a way that owes 
to the type of thinking that would emerge in 1815's "Essay Supplementary:" imagination fostered 
by the discursive space afforded by early philology.  In the prose, Wordsworth is interested in 
Shakespeare's ability to connect with 'the People.'  What we will see in the wartime sonnets is 
that 'the tongue that Shakespeare spake' is connected to the revolutionary ideal of liberty, now 
allied in the Napoleonic era to nationalistic concern.  It is useful at this point to recall my 
discussion of Coleridge's “Kubla Khan,” in the introduction to this study.  In the tumult of the 
sacred river, Kubla hears “Ancestral voices prophesying war!” (30), which I have argued 
suggests a revolutionary war intent on producing a concept of community based on native 
language.  We have seen how Wordsworth's interest in a native tradition was viewed – by both 
his opponents and proponents – as allied with the revolutionary cause of the 1790s.  Both the 
English canon and the conflict between Britain and France surface repeatedly in the 1807 Poems, 
and, not coincidentally, it seems, via a recurrent use of water as a metaphor similar to what we 
see in “Kubla Khan.”  Several of the wartime sonnets in the 1807 Poems straddle the English 
channel, so to speak, some being written around Dover, some being written around Calais.  
These particular sonnets reflect on a nation that is consistently imperiled, and they seek to 
 55 
 
identify an Englishness in a particularly intellectual medium. 
 In “London, 1802,” Wordsworth appeals to Milton because England has become a “fen of 
stagnant waters” (2-3).  In contrast to the fen that England has become, Milton had “a voice 
whose sound was like the sea” (10).  Milton's voice was also “Pure as the naked heavens, 
majestic, free” (11), and Wordsworth wishes that Milton could restore to England “manners, 
virtue, freedom, power” (8).  So, in this sonnet, we see liberty – the cause of the revolution – 
which Wordsworth proposes be restored to England through its literary tradition.  And water is 
the operative metaphor, as Wordsworth wants to move England from “fen” to “sea.”  Pure and 
free, and like the sea, is Milton's voice. 
 Milton surfaces again in “It is Not to Be Thought of,” and again Wordsworth hopes for 
his faith and morals to be preserved in England.  Also recurring is the metaphor of waters, in this 
case a direct metaphor for freedom.  The sonnet begins: 
  It is not to be thought of that the Flood 
  Of British freedom, which, to the open sea 
  Of the world's praise, from dark antiquity 
  Hath flowed, 'with pomp of waters, unwithstood,' 
  Roused though it be full often to a mood 
  Which spurns the check of salutary bands, 
  That this most famous Stream in bogs and sands 
  Should perish; and to evil and to good 
  Be lost forever. (1-9) 
 
Like the stagnation into a fen in “London, 1802,” the “Flood / of British freedom” perishing in 
“bogs and sands” is what Wordsworth fears and hopes can be averted.  Deepening the parallel, in 
“London, 1802,” it is an “ancient English dower” that has been “forfeited” to precipitate 
stagnation, and in “It is Not to Be Thought of,” British freedom flows “from dark antiquity”; in 
both cases, current British identity is founded upon ancient, or antique, Englishness.  Near the 
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end of the sonnet, Wordsworth boldly states, “We must be free or die, who speak the tongue / 
That Shakespeare spake” (11-12).  In the "Essay Supplementary," Wordsworth marvels at 
Shakespeare's ability to turn to “glorious purpose” the Vox Populi.  In this earlier sonnet, 
Wordsworth founds cultural identification as a free nation on Shakespeare, and, in specific, his 
language. 
 “Near Dover,” also written in 1802 and published in the 1807 Poems, engages the same 
issues as “London, 1802” and “It is Not to Be Thought of,” but it does so in a strikingly – and 
revealingly – different tone.  Looking over the English Channel in “Near Dover,” the coast of 
France is “drawn almost into frightful neighbourhood” (4).  There is a sense of imminent 
collision between the two nations.  “I shrunk,” Wordsworth responds, and he calls the water “the 
barrier flood” (5).  In “London, 1802” and “It is Not to Be Thought of,” water is either a carrier 
for liberty or a dry or stagnant lack thereof; in “Near Dover,” water divides the locus of the cause 
of liberty Wordsworth once championed from Wordsworth's imperiled native soil.  Though there 
is a difference, in all cases, water becomes, in a sense, the arbiter of liberty. 
 What becomes more explicit in “Near Dover” than in the other two sonnets is the fluid 
nature of liberty and nationalism.  The sovereignty of England is precarious, as Wordsworth 
shrinks at the prospect of France's proximity.  Furthermore, the “barrier flood” holds power for 
both “evil and for good” (8).  “Winds blow, and waters roll, / Strength to the brave, and Power, 
and Deity; / Yet in themselves are nothing” (10-12).  As the Channel can bear power for either 
evil or good, water has no inherent meaning.  It follows, then, that “One decree / Spake laws to 
them, and said that by the soul / Only, the Nations shall be great and free” (12-14).  To “speak the 
tongue / That Shakespeare spake” brings the mandate to be free or die.  In “Near Dover,” we do 
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not hear “the tongue / That Shakespeare spake,” but we do hear a decree, and of law, no less.  In 
light of the conflict between England and France, the decree Wordsworth records is that only by 
the soul will the nations achieve liberty.  This is a highly abstract, intellectualized form of 
national identity.  But then we recall that in “London, 1802,” what England has forfeited to 
become a “fen of stagnant waters” is an “ancient English dower / Of inward happiness” (my 
italics).  The state of the nation's soul, or inner Englishness, is perhaps most at stake in all of 
these sonnets.  Shakespeare's tongue, the English canon, the intellect of Wordsworth, these are 
the things that create nationalism.  The soul is fluid, just as language is fluid, as Wordsworth 
asserts in the "Essay Supplementary."  Both are to be shaped by the poet.  As Wordsworth 
theorizes in the "Essay Supplementary," he speaks the the consciousness of the past and future 
English 'People,' and the Volksstimme, or Vox Populi, that issues from the spirit of the knowledge 
of 'the People' will, in time, vindicate him.  Water, literally a fluid, becomes the perfect metaphor 
for the fluidity of the process of forming national identity that Wordsworth is developing. 
  
III.  The “homeless voice” of Snowdon 
 
 Earl Wasserman once observed an “eighteenth-century tendency to translate all 
ontologies into psychologies” (172).  What we have been seeing in Wordsworth is different 
discourses – language tradition, literary tradition, and cultural history – coalescing into a broad 
ontology.  And we have seen this broad coalescence appropriated radically by Wordsworth's 
apologists and detractors alike.  This ontological process in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, the 
"Essay Supplementary," and the wartime sonnets can also be seen in a couple of important 
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passages of the 1805 Prelude: the climactic ascent of Mount Snowdon, and the Spots of Time. 
 Like in the wartime sonnets, water is an important presence in Wordsworth's epiphany on 
Mount Snowdon.  Wordsworth ascends Snowdon at night, through a dense fog (literally water 
vapor).  Eventually breaking up through the fog, the moonlight suddenly illuminates all around 
him, and he says, 
  ...on the shore 
  I found myself of a huge sea of mist, 
  Which meek and silent rested at my feet. 
  A hundred hills their dusky backs upheaved 
  All over this still ocean, and beyond, 
  Far, far beyond, the vapours shot themselves 
  In headlands, tongues, and promontory shapes, 
  Into the sea, the real sea, that seemed 
  To dwindle and give up its majesty, 
  Usurped upon as far as sight could reach. (13: 42-51) 
 
Snowdon itself is full of symbolic potential, being the highest point of elevation in England.  
Moreover, being situated in Wales places Snowdon in a geographical vestige of British antiquity.  
On this quintessentially English summit, Wordsworth sees a figurative sea that recalls his 
straddling of the English Channel in some of the wartime sonnets.  In those wartime sonnets, 
Wordsworth imagines England as a “fen / Of stagnant waters,” he imagines British freedom as a 
flood that has flowed to the open sea but is in danger of running out in “bogs and sands,” and he 
imagines the Channel itself as a “barrier flood” that is full of latent power, but which is 
nevertheless “calm.”  Similarly, the sea of mist on the shore of which Wordsworth stands on 
Snowdon is “meek and silent,” and “still.”  Still, silent water and the imperiled Englishness it 
represents has been the great threat in the wartime sonnets – from the the “fen of stagnant 
waters” in lieu of the voice of Milton, to the dried up flood in lieu of “the tongue / That 
Shakespeare spake,” to the “calm” Channel dividing England and France that makes Wordsworth 
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shrink. 
 The wartime sonnets represent a problem that Wordsworth is facing – imperiled 
Englishness – and imply a resolution to that problem: formation of national identity through 
Milton's voice, Shakespeare's tongue – formation of national identity through a sort of amalgam 
of language-based cultural elements.  Whereas the wartime sonnets imply this resolution, the 
climactic episode of The Prelude actually represents the resolution.  The “meek and silent” 
water, in the form of the sea of mist, is something that Wordsworth (literally) rises above on 
Snowdon.  Also, crucially, the sea upon whose shore Wordsworth stands at the end of The 
Prelude is a figurative sea of Wordsworth's creation.  This sea of mist usurps the actual sea.  The 
result is that Wordsworth is not terrified of the sea as he is in “Near Dover.”  In “Near Dover,” 
Wordsworth seems to feel his identity as an Englishman imperiled.  On Mount Snowdon, 
something quite different is at work.  Wordsworth seems to, in effect, create his own England.  
The key is that his “mind is lord and master,” as he earlier puts it in the Spots of Time episode; 
this is the very type of operation that the reviews of Wordsworth's work termed setting up a “new 
reign of taste”; this operation is also analogous to Wordsworth's formulation in the Essay 
Supplementary that creating taste is a “conquest, made by the soul of the poet.”  The actual 
England – in “Near Dover,” for instance – is an island.  At the end of The Prelude, Snowdon 
itself becomes an island with a sea of mist lapping at its shore.  Snowdon thus seems to become a 
figurative England for Wordsworth. 
 On Snowdon, England is delineated according to Wordsworth's imagination.  Where the 
idea represented by 'Milton's voice' and 'Shakespeare's tongue' enters is subtle.  The fact that the 
shore of the figurative island is delineated by “headlands, tongues, and promontory shapes” (my 
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italics) seems to be a punning nod to the role that Wordsworth's philosophy of language has 
played in the formation of this England.  What Wordsworth proceeds to note after his visual 
apprehension seems to follow in this vein: 
  ...and from the shore 
  At distance not the third part of a mile 
  Was a blue chasm, a fracture in the vapour, 
  A deep and gloomy breathing-place, through which 
  Mounted the roar of waters, torrents, streams 
  Innumerable, roaring with one voice. 
  The universal spectacle throughout 
  Was shaped for admiration and delight, 
  Grand in itself alone, but in that breach 
  Through which the homeless voice of waters rose, 
  That deep dark thoroughfare, had Nature lodged 
  The soul, the imagination of the whole. (13: 54-65) 
 
I argued in the Introduction to this study that Coleridge's “Kubla Khan” explores the philology of 
Herder with its “deep romantic chasm” (12) from which flows a “sacred river” (24) carrying the 
sound of “Ancestral voices” (30).  We can hear distinct echoes of these parts of “Kubla Khan” in 
the above passage from Wordsworth's ascent of Snowdon.  There is a “chasm” in the sea of mist, 
and Wordsworth calls it a “deep and gloomy breathing-place,” similar to how Coleridge 
describes the activity of the “deep romantic chasm” in “Kubla Khan” by saying that it is “As if 
this earth in fast thick pants were breathing” (18).  Just as the “chasm” in “Kubla Khan” becomes 
the source of the “sacred river,” on Snowdon, the chasm produces “the roar of waters, torrents, 
streams.”  Most importantly, as the “sacred river” in “Kubla Khan” bears the sound of “Ancestral 
voices,” the “waters, torrents, streams” that Wordsworth hears on Snowdon roar “with one voice” 
(my italics).  Wordsworth emphasizes the metaphor of voice, as well, recapitulating the sound as 
“the homeless voice of waters” (my italics). 
 So, my suggestion is that Wordsworth on Snowdon is deliberately entering the same 
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philological discourse that Coleridge was in “Kubla Khan.”  But as strikingly as Wordsworth 
seems to echo “Kubla Khan,” he also differs significantly.  Naturally rising from the depths of a 
chasm on the slopes of Mount Snowdon, breaking through a sea of mist that Wordsworth has had 
to rise above to surmount the anxiety of the wartime sonnets, the waters that Wordsworth hears 
are in prime position to be the Volksstimme, or Vox Populi, or 'Ancestral voice' that he has been 
striving after.  But whereas Kubla hears “Ancestral voices,” Wordsworth hears a “homeless 
voice.”  Clearly at issue in Wordsworth is the ancestry of the voice.  The semi-vagrant traveller 
throughout The Prelude has ascended the quintessentially English Snowdon and seemingly 
engaged with the national anxieties present in the sonnets from 1802, but though he seems to 
delineate a figurative England with which he is comfortable, he calls the voice serving as 
undercurrent to the scene “homeless.”  Vagrancy in Wordsworth's poetry has consistently been 
recognized as part of a broader discourse for Wordsworth, linked with 1790s radicalism and the 
war with France.  In Wordsworth's Vagrant Muse: Poetry, Poverty, and Power, for instance, Gary 
Harrison argues that vagrancy is part of a discourse “linked inextricably with the politics of 
reform, the war with France, and the steady industrial transformation of English social and 
cultural practices” (16).  Similarly, Toby Benis, in Romanticism on the Road: the Marginal Gains 
of Wordsworth's Homeless, argues that “Vagrancy law was designed to arrest the wanderer on the 
road, but also the more general mobility of mind, the openness to new, unsettling ideas that he or 
she embodied” (2).  Managing the socially ambiguous and making transparent the socially 
obscure was “a goal that acquired new urgency amid the political, social, and economic turmoil 
of the 1790s,” according to Benis (2).  For Wordsworth, once an expatriate deeply invested in the 
ideals of the French Revolution, defining a sense of home has been a tenuous undertaking; for 
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his contemporary critics, it has been a polarizing issue.6  In the same way that vagrancy was 
unsettling to the establishment in the 1790s, many of the contemporary reviews of Wordsworth 
linked his philosophy of language with radicalism and sought to rein it in.  As I earlier noted, 
Olivia Smith has argued that the radical philology of John Horne Tooke elevated 'vulgar' and 
'primitive' linguistic registers; in addition, Smith points out that “The war against France and the 
passage of repressive legislation evoked much of the 'false morality and metaphysical jargon' 
which Tooke describes as justifying political abuse” (139).  Both the opponents and allies of 
Wordsworth seemed also to early and often make a similar connection between the new 
discipline of philology and radical sympathies. 
 Thus, in light of the anti-establishment radicalism of the philology that Wordsworth has 
embraced, the “homeless voice” serving as undercurrent to the metaphorical England that 
Wordsworth has delineated on Snowdon is fitting.  Homelessness highlights the tenuous nature 
of the national voice that we have seen in the discourse surrounding Wordsworth's philosophy of 
language and poetry.  He has been as much a citizen of the ideals of the French Revolution as he 
has been a loyal subject of England.  The voice that Wordsworth has been seeking to articulate is 
rooted in linguistic and literary heritage, but is nevertheless anti-establishment and unwelcome in 
the England of his day, as he recognizes in the "Essay Supplementary" and as the negative 
contemporary reviews attest.  The voice, like the waters Wordsworth hears on Snowdon, has a 
                                                 
6.  For yet another view of vagrancy in Wordsworth, see David Simpson, Wordsworth, 
Commodification and Social Concern: The Poetics of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).  Simpson argues that Wordsworth's encounters with wanderers during 
his own wanderings constitute a "solidarity of dispossession and displacement" (56).  Outrunning 
Wordsworth's own attempts to mitigate social difference through the language of rustics were 
realities of "leveling forces deriving from machine labor and commodification and producing a 
sameness not at all to be desired" (55). 
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native source, but it has a hard time finding a present home. 
 Wordsworth then proceeds into an effusion that begins with identifying the scene on 
Snowdon as the “perfect image of a mighty mind” and goes on to tout the ability of such a mind 
to both perceive and create – being “Willing to work and to be wrought upon” (100) – “By 
sensible impressions not enthralled, / But quickened, rouzed, and made thereby more fit / To hold 
communion with the invisible world” (103-105).  Wordsworth says that such a mind enjoys 
“sovereignty within and peace at will” (114).  “Oh, who is he,” Wordsworth concludes, “that hath 
his whole life long / Preserved, enlarged, this freedom in himself? – / For this alone is genuine 
liberty” (120-122).  It is crucial that Wordsworth sums up his description of this type of mind as 
preserving and enlarging freedom, saying that “this alone is genuine liberty.”  If we don't see it in 
the middle of the passage, we see now that “sovereignty” is indeed politically charged.  
Wordsworth has been talking about creating for himself the only viable Englishness possible – 
one that is founded upon a tradition in language and literature that he values, but one that can 
also hold on to the radical values of the revolution across the Channel: a purely abstract, or 
imagined, Englishness. 
 In a sense, this is another way of recognizing a challenge familiar to criticism of 
Wordsworth: determining what sort of sublimation Wordsworth enacts as resolution to the 
tensions in his work.  M. H. Abrams's Natural Supernaturalism finds that millennial zeal fostered 
by the French Revolution leads to “the spiritual crisis not of himself only, but of his generation: 
that shattering of the fierce loyalties and inordinate hopes for mankind which the liberal English 
– and European – intellectuals had invested in the French Revolution” (77).  Wordsworth's 
spiritual redemption, according to Abrams, comes as a “theodicy of the private life...which 
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translates the painful process of self-formation, crisis, and self-recognition, which culminates in 
a stage of self-coherence, self-awareness, and assured power that is its own reward” (96).  
Another major argument on the subject, James Chandler's Wordsworth's Second Nature, sees The 
Prelude as “Wordsworth's fullest attempt to deal with the French Revolution” (32), highlighting 
“Wordsworth's claim that being turned against his country was the very heart of his moral crisis” 
(199).  Chandler's argument is that Wordsworth's resolution is “thoroughly Burkean” (32).  
Chandler focuses a great deal on the Spots of Time episode of The Prelude, saying that 
Wordsworth falls back on “the ancient English tradition of equality, handed down from father to 
son – not the egalitarianism generated out of cosmopolitan discussion of the abstract rights of 
men” (51).  The Spots of Time, Chandler argues, “must be understood as representing the 
triumph not only of mental discipline, but also of discipline-as-tradition” (199).  This “discipline-
as-tradition” is “a psychological manifestation of a national character and a native tradition” 
(187). 
 These two prominent readings do well to highlight the radical and national dimensions to 
Wordsworth's crisis.  I would disagree, however, that Wordsworth has converted to outright 
Burkean conservatism as a way of resolution in The Prelude.  To look at Chandler's main area of 
focus, the Spots of Time, the basic formula is this: occasions in life when the mind is forced to 
become lord and master possess a renovating virtue for later in life, giving the mind strength in 
later times of trial.  Just such an occasion was when the young Wordsworth became temporarily 
lost on a horseback excursion, came upon the site of an execution, read a pertinent inscription, 
became scared, and noted the overall dreariness of the scene, which also included a barren pool, 
a girl struggling to walk against the wind, and the Penrith beacon.  This episode clearly 
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represents a psychological trial for Wordsworth; there is also a subtle national character to the 
episode, as Chandler suggests; whether or not Wordsworth embraces Burkean 'discipline-as-
national-tradition,' though, seems more questionable. 
 The beacon in the scene, for instance, seems radically charged.  The Penrith beacon had 
been built in 1719 to guard against Scottish invasion.  When young Wordsworth came to it, 
however, its valence was different.  In Technologies of the Picturesque: British Art, Poetry, and 
Instruments, 1750-1830, Ron Broglio says, “In the latter half of the eighteenth century, as the 
danger of invasion subsided, the former military site became a tourist site based upon political 
surveillance.  Looking to the north from this singular vantage point, the tourist could consider the 
rising power of the British nation” (63-64).  We can imagine how a symbol of the rising power of 
the British nation – of Britain's stance in the Napoleonic era – would have troubled the radical 
sympathies in Wordsworth. 
 The gibbet would be an equally troubling symbol.  Wordsworth's radical attitude about 
legal punishment excited the ire of many of his contemporaries, including Charles Burney, who 
said, “We do not comprehend the drift of lavishing...tenderness and compassion on a criminal” 
(210).  Beyond questions about the justness of capital punishment, Wordsworth may have been 
most troubled by the inscription at the scene.  The gibbet, after all, had mouldered, but an 
inscription was kept perennially fresh.  The deceased are normally commemorated by an epitaph, 
and the young Wordsworth does find what seems to be presented as a version of an epitaph at the 
scene: 
  ...on the turf 
  Hard by, soon after that fell deed was wrought, 
  Some unknown hand had carved the murderer's name. 
  The monumental writing was engraven 
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  In times long past, and still from year to year 
  By superstition of the neighbourhood 
  The grass is cleared away; and to this hour 
  The letters are all fresh and visible. (11: 291-298) 
 
Wordsworth's Essays Upon Epitaphs are particularly illuminating to this passage, an epitaph 
presupposing, as Wordsworth says in the first of the Essays (verbally echoing the Spots of Time 
passage), “a Monument, upon which it is to engraven” (49).  Such monuments, Wordsworth 
argues throughout the Essays, are intensely national.  In the second of the Essays, Wordsworth 
treads familiar ground, criticizing Alexander Pope's epitaphs, saying that Pope's “sparkling and 
tuneful manner had bewitched the men of letters his Contemporaries, and corrupted the judgment 
of the Nation through all ranks of society” (75).  To open the third of the Essays, Wordsworth 
similarly says, “I VINDICATE the rights and dignity of Nature; and...I cannot suffer any 
individual, however highly or deservedly honoured by my Countrymen, to stand in my way.  If 
my notions are right, the Epitaphs of Pope cannot well be too severely condemned” (80).  
Opening the Essay as one would open a tract dealing with vital matters of state, Wordsworth sees 
denouncing Pope's epitaphs as vital to his vindication of “the rights and dignity of Nature.”  
Getting explicit about language, and evincing a strong Tookean bent, Wordsworth also says, 
  Words are too awful an instrument for good and evil to be trifled with: they hold 
  above all other external powers a dominion over thoughts.  If words be not  
 (recurring to a metaphor before used) an incarnation of the thought but only a  
 clothing for it, then surely will they prove an ill gift...Language, if it do not  
 uphold, and feed, and leave in quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we  
 breathe, is a counter-spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work to derange, to  
 subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve. (84-85) 
 
Distinguishing between language as incarnation of thought versus language as mere clothing for 
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thought is engaging the doctrine of arbitrary signification.7  Granting such power to language – 
the power to be an awful instrument, “to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, and to 
dissolve” – is to view language the way that Tooke the statesman did, finding it to be an 
instrument for maintaining arbitrary, unjust social power.  This is the view that, in a sense, 
motivates so many of the reviews of Wordsworth's work to regard his philosophy of language as 
a threat to the established order.  As Wordsworth aptly sums it up in the third Essay Upon 
Epitaphs, “the taste, intellectual Power, and morals of a Country are inseparably linked in mutual 
dependence” (85). 
 It is on such grounds that Wordsworth feels he must denounce Pope and his epitaphs.  
The expression of epitaphs should be genuine and grown from local tradition.  As Wordsworth 
points out, sepulchers that record only names and dates nevertheless often record many names 
within one family, and this is “a prolonged companionship, however shadowy; even a Tomb like 
this is a shrine to which the fancies of a scattered family may repair in pilgrimage...Such a frail 
memorial then is not without its tendency to keep families together; it feeds also local 
attachment, which is the tap-root of the tree of Patriotism” (93).  So the monumental writing of 
an epitaph, for Wordsworth, fosters companionship to the past, building local attachment, upon 
which patriotism is built.  Going back, now, to the Spots of Time episode, to which James 
Chandler refers when arguing that Wordsworth leaves off all radicalism and forges the resolution 
                                                 
7.  Frances Ferguson's Wordsworth: Language as Counter-Spirit (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1977), approximately recognizes the doctrine of arbitrary signification being 
questioned in Wordsworth's writing about language, arguing that "linguistic incarnation" is not "a 
fixed form which can be arrived at and sustained" (xvi).  Ferguson concludes that "Reading 
neither reconstitutes the self as a whole nor gives words any full or stable meaning, but reading 
does figure the temporary illusion of doing so" (250). 
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of a Burkean conservative, it is difficult to read the episode without some irony.  As I have 
suggested, the Penrith beacon seems to speak more of England's defense and expansion of her 
borders than it does of humble local tradition.  Also, it was characteristic of Wordsworth to view 
such things as gibbets radically.  In this light, the fact that the community is bound by the 
perennial freshening of an inscription commemorating an executed murderer seems loaded with 
irony.  Far from maintaining an effectual family shrine, the monumental writing that the young 
Wordsworth faces in the Spots of Time episode is a perpetual reminder of capital crime and 
capital punishment.  Recalling the precise sequence of the episode, Wordsworth is first scared by 
the inscription, and then notes the Penrith beacon and the generally dreary scene, as if a troubling 
local element leads him to the realization of a troubling national element.  On the whole, while 
the Spots of Time unquestionably represent the mind necessarily becoming lord and master over 
fear, it seems that the mind is confronted specifically with a troubling foundation for definition 
of community. 
 If in the Spots of Time there are still prevailing radical sympathies in Wordsworth, and he 
is troubled by the Penrith beacon, the gibbet, and what amounts to a bastardized epitaph, we can 
more readily see why he would in the climactic episode of The Prelude proclaim a state of mind 
as possessing “sovereignty within and peace at will,” and being “alone...genuine liberty.”  As I 
have argued throughout this chapter – as the reviews of Wordsworth's work attest, and as 
Wordsworth's own work attests – definition of what is national is often at stake in Wordsworth.  
Imperiled from the very start as anti-establishment, the radical Wordsworth seems to opt for 
establishing a 'reign of taste,' or for delineating an imagined nation atop Snowdon.  In this sense, 
I would generally agree with Chandler that Wordsworth's resolution is “a psychological 
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manifestation of a national character and a native tradition,” but I am less convinced that it is 
thoroughly Burkean.  I would generally agree with M. H. Abrams's argument that Wordsworth's 
spiritual crisis is resolved by a theodicy of the individual mind; in this sense, we can again lean 
on Earl Wasserman's observation of an “eighteenth-century tendency to translate all ontologies 
into psychologies” (172).  It seems, though, that this translation, in Wordsworth's case, is more 
nationally invested than Abrams allows, and in a different way than Chandler argues.  As I have 
suggested, the Spots of Time episode in The Prelude seems to retain radical undertones.  
Similarly, Wordsworth's vision on Mount Snowdon seems to include the delineation of an 
imaginary England fed by an undercurrent of philological tradition that is tangibly homeless. 
 If we question whether or not Wordsworth really wishes to retain his radicalism at the 
conclusion of the 1805 Prelude, we can look at the very conclusion.  He speculates that his 
exaltation of the mind retains its validity even if 
  ...too weak to tread the ways of truth, 
  This age fall back to old idolatry, 
  Though men return to servitude as fast 
  As the tide ebbs, to ignominy and shame 
  By nations sink together (13: 431-435) 
 
“Servitude” and “old idolatry” were two of the very things that the French Revolution sought to 
break down, and Wordsworth here continues to resist them.  Even if actual “nations sink 
together” “to ignominy and shame,” Wordsworth maintains that “the mind of man becomes / A 
thousand times more beautiful than the earth / On which he dwells” (446-448).  Wordsworth 
seems to concede defeat in actual revolution and in the status of his actual nation, but he 
maintains that what he can forge in his mind – fed by the undercurrent of the “homeless voice” – 
is far more important.  Again, this conclusion does not generally differ from traditional readings 
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such as M. H. Abrams's or James Chandler's, insofar as it recognizes Wordsworth's exaltation of 
the power of the mind.  But it is important to recognize the continued espousal of radicalism – as 
opposed to resignation to Burkean conservatism, or to spiritual concern divested of politics, and 
it is equally crucial to recognize how this continued espousal is engendered by the broad 
philological thinking developed throughout the prose and recognized in the reviews. 
 Perhaps the best synthesis of the philological concerns of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads 
and the climactic episode on Snowdon comes from the third of the Essays Upon Epitaphs, where 
Wordsworth says, 
  ...it is not only no fault but a primary requisite in an Epitaph that it shall contain  
  thoughts and feelings which are in the substance common-place, and even trite.  It 
  is grounded upon the universal intellectual property of man; – sensations which  
  all men have felt and feel in some degree daily and hourly; – truths whose very  
  interest and importance have caused them to be unattended to, as things which  
  could take care of themselves.  But it is required that these truths should be  
  instinctively ejaculated, or should rise irresistibly from circumstances; in a word  
  that they should be uttered in such connection as shall make it felt that they are  
  not adopted – not spoken by rote, but perceived in their whole compass with the  
  freshness and clearness of an original intuition.  The Writer must introduce the  
  truth with such accompaniment as shall imply that he has mounted to the sources 
  of things – penetrated the dark cavern from which the River that murmurs in  
  every one's ear has flowed from generation to generation. (78-79) 
 
The belief in “freshness and clearness,” and the idea that “these truths should be instinctively 
ejaculated,” are much like the idea of the “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” from the 
Preface.  This conviction in genuineness and purity is also figured in the “common-place” 
thoughts and feelings, and the “sensations which all men have felt and feel in some degree daily 
and hourly,” which echo the Preface's maxims about rustic English.  This nod toward a 
democratic cultural foundation for language is interestingly deepened by the notion of “universal 
intellectual property of man,” which, while highly abstract, seems to reference a broad cultural 
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basis.  In that sense, Wordsworth seems to be talking about something much like the Vox Populi 
of the "Essay Supplementary."  Upon this point, we recall also two of the more sympathetic 
reviews of Wordsworth's work: the 1815 British Review, which lauded “language immemorially 
spoken by men and women and children,” and the 1814 Quarterly, which attributed the 
resiliency of English to the fact that there was “too much poetry in the mouths of the people.”  
Perhaps most interesting in this passage from the Essays Upon Epitaphs is the final idea: that of 
mounting “to the sources of things” – to the “dark cavern from which the River that murmurs in 
every one's ear has flowed from generation to generation.”  The metaphor given by Wordsworth, 
here, is the very same that is given by Coleridge in “Kubla Khan,” and which Wordsworth 
himself gives for the “homeless voice” on Snowdon.  A one-time expatriate, literally 
marginalized by much contemporary criticism, Wordsworth seems to be seeking discursive space 
via a Volksstimme “philosophically characterized,” as he puts it near the end of the "Essay 
Supplementary."  Again recalling the "Essay Supplementary," articulating the Vox Populi of the 
past and future English people, Wordsworth must create the taste by which he is to be enjoyed  
by an untrustworthy present English people. 
 For Wordsworth, the mind of man must become “A thousand times more beautiful than 
the earth / On which he dwells,” because his own actual native land has been inhospitable.  The 
Preface's maxims about language, the debates in contemporary reviews over language and 
radicalism, such ideas as a Vox Populi and “People, philosophically characterized,” imperiled 
Englishness in the wartime sonnets, and intellectual delineation on Mount Snowdon all have a 
strong philological underscoring.  Recognizing this underscoring allows us to observe the subtle 
clearing of discursive space for a sort of nationalism in Wordsworth that may not otherwise be 
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readily visible. 
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Chapter Two: A Massy Circlet of Reconstruction: Walter Scott's The Antiquary 
 
I.  Scott’s Historicism and the Pictish Question 
  
 I began this study by considering the Advertisement to Walter Scott’s 1816 novel The 
Antiquary, in which Scott says that he has “sought my principle personages in the class of 
society who are the last to feel the influence of that general polish which assimilates to each 
other the manners of different nations” (3).  When Scott justifies this thinking with the rationale 
that “the lower orders are less restrained by the habit of suppressing their feelings, and because I 
agree with Mr Wordsworth, that they seldom fail to express them in the strongest and most 
powerful language” (3), he is directly referring to the philological concerns that we have 
observed in the previous chapter.  I have suggested that Scott’s Advertisement should make us 
wonder why a novel written on the heels of Waterloo (1816) and set amidst fears of French 
invasion (1794) takes interest in the assimilation of manners of different nations and asserts 
language’s power to “give pathos to…grief, and dignity to…resentment” (3).  If the answer holds 
in Scott as it does in Wordsworth – that early philology was a way to imagine national identity in 
a time of upheaval – then we are adding a significant layer to our understanding of Scott’s 
historicism.  Specifically, Scott was drawn to philology as a way to reconstruct Scottish history. 
Much criticism has characterized Scott's historicism as a dialog between past and future, 
arguing for varying degrees of compromise.  There is the classic reading of the middling hero – 
Alexander Welsh’s The Hero of the Waverley Novels – focusing on pragmatic compromise.  
There is Marilyn Butler's argument, in Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries,that when Scott 
begins writing novels, he has been readied by the changing times “to turn his mind to 
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reconstruction and compromise” (109); “Scott’s point,” Butler argues, “...is that a stiff-necked 
adherence to the ideals of the past, deriving as they do from a more primitive society, becomes a 
deadly self-indulgence, anachronistic, and as pointless as it is cruel” (110).  More recently, where 
a reading such as Marlon B. Ross’s “Romancing the Nation-State: The Poetics of Romantic 
Nationalism” allows the past more importance, moving forward is still dominant theme, as Ross 
suggests that Scott, in the same vein as Edmund Burke, desires “formal resolution of social 
disruptions and historical change into the harmonies of organic growth based on traditional 
values” (67).  As is implied, Ross reads Scott as being focused on seeing the growth of a modern 
British nation. 
 Critics have also suggested that Scott's work is more than a mere recording of this dialog 
between past and future -- that the work itself participates in that dialog.  For instance, L. M. 
Findlay’s “‘Perilous Linguists’: Scots, Wha Hae their Foucault Read” argues that in Scott’s story 
“My Aunt Margaret’s Mirror,” for example, national poetry and music are a “locus of 
contestation of political change, and a locus of consolation once that change is deemed 
irreversible” (37).  Taking this sort of argument a step further, Imperfect Histories: The Elusive 
Past and the Legacy of Romantic Historicism, by Anne Rigney, suggests that Scott is drawn to 
the historical novel as a hybrid – that Scott “calls into question an easy separation of fictional 
narrative and historical fact” (16).  Scott’s mode, according to Rigney, is “paradigmatic for the 
fact that imperfection and chronic dissatisfaction are an endemic part of all historical writing, 
indeed of representation tout court” (58).  Rigney’s argument suggests that Scott was drawn to a 
way of engaging with Scottish history in a malleable way.  Findlay and Rigney suggest that, in 
addition to practical political compromise, there is in Scott intellectual consolation and indeed 
preservation through intellectual reconstruction.  For Rigney, recreating a past is a way of coping 
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with dissatisfaction with outcome. 
 The general argument of this study is that in the Romantic period, early philology was 
beginning to be looked to as a way of reconstructing the past in order to define the present.  
Because of the history of Scotland, Walter Scott presents a fascinating manifestation of this sort 
of nationalism.  The Antiquary is particularly relevant to consideration of philological 
nationalism because philology figures prominently in the novel.  Katie Trumpener’s Bardic 
Nationalism argues that in the Scottish community of The Antiquary, there is a “common longing 
for a lost past that they remember, mourn, and re-create in very different ways” (123).  Though 
Trumpener highlights the importance of Bardic tradition, the dimension of The Antiquary that 
continues to be underplayed in criticism is, curiously, the antiquarian field of philology. 
 Recognizing Scott's interest in philology is, though closely related, distinct from talking 
about the presence of Scots in the novels.  Representing Scots speech is important, for as David 
Murison has pointed out, Scott to a great extent introduced English readers to Scottishness in 
prose.  Scott's goal is, as Murison puts it, “to paint Scottish 'manners', to show the impact of 
Scottish history on the Scottish people individually and severally, and to interpret Scotland and 
the Scottish way of life to the world at large” (209).  As Murison further argues, one of Scott's 
chief means was Scots speech.  It is telling that Scott added almost 200 words to the English 
language, and of them, Murison demonstrates, few of them are actual neologisms; they are 
mostly Scots, and Scott got them into the dictionary “merely by reviving or introducing them 
from some out-of-the-way original and by his use making them acceptable to a generation that 
had gone all romantic” (218).  This sort of activity is undoubtedly part of representing what Scott 
has in mind when he talks about the power of language in the Advertisement to The Antiquary, 
but what makes The Antiquary distinct from his other novels that also represent Scots speech is 
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its theoretical engagement with philology. 
 Philology enters The Antiquary in the form of what was called 'the Pictish Question.'  As 
alluded to by Sir Arthur Wardour and Jonathan Oldbuck, during their heated debate in the first 
volume of the novel, the Picts were viewed as the founders of the medieval Kingdom of 
Scotland.  Around the turn of the nineteenth century, a hot debate raged over the origin of the 
Picts – whether they were a Celtic or a Gothic people.  While it should have been a purely 
academic anthropological issue, the Pictish Question was strongly inflected by nationalism and 
centered on language, with the major interlocutors employing the methodology of the emerging 
discipline of philology.  Scott was deeply interested in the Pictish Question, writing impassioned 
reviews of major pieces in the debate and corresponding about it.  Nevertheless, Scott criticism 
has paid very little attention to the Pictish Question.  In 1951, Roland M. Smith wrote a brief 
article in Modern Language Notes titled “Sir Walter Scott and the Pictish Question.”8  In the 
intervening years, a handful of studies have been written about Scott’s interest in linguistics, and 
almost nothing has been written about Scott and the Pictish Question.  These facts are surprising 
when we note that there has been substantial critical attention given to Scott’s interest in Scottish 
history, and that the Pictish question was central to Scottish history. 
 In exploring questions of Scottish history and Celtic pride in Scott's writing, we are 
perhaps more apt to think of the Ballad Revival and the controversy surrounding the Ossian 
poems.  Being related primitivist discourses, we find some of the same people dealing with both 
the Pictish Question and the Ossian poems.  John Pinkerton and Joseph Ritson were arguably the 
two most prominent combatants over the Pictish Question.  Pinkerton received substantial 
                                                 
8.  Smith's article is limited to a sketch of the debate, Scott's opinion on the matter, and brief 
acknowledgment of the debate arising in The Antiquary. 
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material aid and collegial correspondence from none other than Thomas Percy (famous for the 
Reliques of Ancient English Poetry) while researching and writing An Inquiry into the History of 
Scotland Preceding the Reign of Malcolm III.  When Scott was making his own significant 
contribution to the Ballad Revival, with his Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, he was keenly 
interested in the opinion of Ritson, saying in a letter to George Ellis, 
Upon my return I was agreeably surprized by receiving a visit from no less a Man 
than Ritson himself who spent two days at my little Cottage.  You will readily 
believe it gave me great pleasure to have an opportunity of consulting the most 
rigid of our British Antiquaries upon the publications with which I am threatening 
the world.  I was particularly desirous to give him every information in my power 
concerning the authenticity of my Border Ballads & I believe I succeeded 
perfectly in removing every doubt from his mind. (194-195) 
 
Hugh Blair, a Scotsman who, though not figuring into the debate over the Picts, was one of the 
more prominent philologists of the day, was also arguably the leading Ossian apologist, writing a 
critical dissertation that appeared in most editions of Ossian from 1765 on.  The Ossian 
controversy does surface in The Antiquary, when, late in the novel, Scott tells us of Hector 
MacIntyre, “like many a sturdy Celt, he imagined the honour of his country and native language 
connected with the authenticity of these popular poems, and would have fought knee-deep, or 
forfeited life and land, rather than have given up a line of them” (243).  We can understand 
Scott's interest in the “rigid” authority of Ritson on the authenticity of his own poetic relics when 
we see, in this passage from The Antiquary, the explicit connection that Scott makes between 
language and national pride in the controversy over the poems. 
 This same connection is repeatedly made in the fascinating discourse on the Picts.  
Pinkerton, joined most notably by Thomas Innes, took the position that the Picts were Gothic, 
and Ritson, along with George Chalmers (among others), argued that the Picts were Celtic.  
Alluding to his own motives in a letter to Thomas Percy, Pinkerton says, “So far as I have gone I 
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find that it is to the most violent and pitiful national prejudices alone that we are indebted for the 
obscurity of our early history” (57).  While Pinkerton suggests that he desired only to illuminate 
the past, the sort of current prejudice that inflected the issue became even clearer after Pinkerton 
published his An Inquiry into the History of Scotland Preceding the Reign of Malcolm III.  
George Chalmers, in his Caledonia, which responded to Pinkerton, posits that “The Celts 
enjoyed, from their earliest progenitors, an invincible attachment to their own language which 
naturally produced a strong antipathy to innovations, in their ancient tongue, or adoptions, form 
the speech of those, whom their hatred viewed, as invaders, or oppressors” (220).  Chalmers goes 
on to suggest that this quality has been handed down through the centuries, saying, 
Neither the lapse of time, nor the change of circumstances, have at all diminished 
the strong attachment of the Celtic people to their own language, or their aversion 
from the intrusion of hostile tongues.  These passions form a striking feature, in 
the character of their undoubted descendants, in the present age.  It was one of the 
fundamental maxims of the Celtic Bards, to preserve their own language.  
Actuated by this principle, the ancient Britons, in Wales, and the Scoto-Irish, in 
North-Britain, tenaciously maintained their own speech, and obstinately resist the 
adoption of the English language, whatever may be its improvements, or its 
use(s). (220) 
 
As if possessed by the very stubborn linguistic nationalism of which he speaks, Chalmers 
considers Gothic tribes and their linguistic morals much differently than he does Celts.  He 
argues that wherever Gothic tribes spread, conquering, in Celtic lands, “the Gothic intruders not 
only adopted the names of the rivers, mountains, and other places, that the more lively genius of 
the Celts had imposed, from a more energetic, and descriptive speech; but, the Gothic colonists 
borrowed many terms from the more opulent language of their Celtic predecessors” (221).  
Chalmers continues a short space later, “The Saxons, who settled in Britain, were prompted, by 
their poverty of speech, to follow the example of their Gothic fathers” (221), and “It was owing 
to that barreness of speech, and dullness of apprehension, that we see so little description, or 
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variety, in the names of places, in the countries, which were settled by the Gothic colonists” 
(222).  Chalmers could hardly evince more “national prejudice” in assessing the history of 
linguistic interactions between Celts and Goths. 
When Scott waded into the actual Pictish Question, while not sounding so jingoistic as 
Chalmers, he clearly felt that Pinkerton's side of the question had wounded his sense of identity.  
In 1801, Scott wrote to George Ellis, 
The history of the Scottish language is involved in great difficultie[s].  If we 
suppose with Pinkerton the Picts to have spoken a dialect of the Teutonic that no 
doubt would give us the ground work of lowland Scotish but not to mention other 
difficulties attending this opinion I think it is impossible to show that there are 
any Teutonick words in our dialect which may not be traced to the Anglo Saxon, 
whereas such must unquestionably have occured had the Scotish been founded 
upon the language spoken by a separate Gothic tribe.  The introduction of the 
French I take to have been coeval with the feudal system the terms of which are 
chiefly Norman. (188-9) 
 
Scott adds later in 1801, in another letter to Ellis, 
These vile picts still disturb my slumbers.  I admit the weight of Pinkerton's 
arguments – but still – Galloway was you know a distinct tributary province 
during the reign of David Ist.  Its inhabitants are generally averrd to have been of 
Pictish origin – now if that fact be well authenticated down falls the whole system 
of Pinkerton for the Galwegians from the their names, customs, & in short from 
every distinguishing mark which we can observe regarding them, were most 
unquestionably Celts.  It is true Pinkerton talks of an Irish colony of Scots settled 
in Galloway but I think this falls short of a satisfactory solution. (191) 
 
 Scott does not explicitly admit it, the Pictish question is for him a matter of national pride, and 
one that he was losing sleep over.  Scott hints at the problem in contending that any Teutonic 
words in their dialect are come from Anglo-Saxon, and in pointing specifically to the Norman 
conquest.  If the Picts were a Gothic tribe, then the identity of contemporaneous Scotsmen is no 
longer as distinct from Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Englishmen. 
 Joseph Ritson's theory, in his Annals of the Caledonians, Picts, and Scots, is that “[the 
Picts] must...have emigrated from Celtica or Gaul, and, most probably, too, have been a maritime 
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people” (85).  This, of course, makes them originally geographically very near any Gothic tribes.  
The most stark root distinction is language – Celtic as opposed to Gothic.  And, indeed, with so 
little Pictish residue left, like Pinkerton, Chalmers, and Scott, Ritson seeks to reconstruct the 
existence of the Picts through philology.  He posits that, “Their occupation of the northernmost 
parts of Scotland is further manifested by the name of the Petland, Pightland, or Pictland, now 
Pentland, firth, a narrow sea between Caithness and the Orkneys, and of the Pentland skerries, 
certain rocks in the same sea” (104-105).  By Ritson's etymology, Pentland simply borrows the 
name of the people.  The etymology of the name itself was also debated, with Ritson rejecting 
the claim that Pict comes from the Latin word Pictus (referring to the Picts' reputed penchant for 
tattooing themselves); Ritson maintains that “With respect to the name of Picts, or Picti, it is 
most probably that which they gave themselves” (92).  So, barring Pict itself, which was, Ritson 
claimed, made into a place name, only one word generally agreed upon to be Pictish survived to 
nineteenth-century Britain, Peanfahel, and Ritson goes to great lengths to establish its 
etymology.  He writes, 
The Roman wall, [Bede] says, (meaning that of Antoninus) began at almost two 
miles distance from the monastery of AEbercurning, now Abercorn, on the west, 
at a place which, in the Pictish language (sermone Pictorum), was called 
Peanfahel, but, in the English or Saxon language, Peneltun.  Now this identical 
place Nennius, a Briton, calls Pengaaul, (the wall, which he erroneously 
confounds with that of Severus, being, he says, in the British tongue called Gual,) 
which town was called in Scotish Cenail, but in the English Peneltun.  It is, 
therefore, evident that the word Pean in Pictish, as Pen in British, and Cean in 
Scotish or Irish, signified head, and fahel in the first of those languages, as gaaul 
in the second, (both indeed, borrowing corruptly from the Latin vallum,) a wall: 
meaning, like Cenail, the head of the wall: and, consequently, that there was some 
analogy between the British language and that of the Picts, each being a branch 
from the Celtic stem (121-123) 
 
This from Ritson is comparative linguistics, thought out and written in the same tone as Jones, 
Tooke, Schlegel, Rask, Grimm, and, later, Bopp.  What have seen from Chalmers, too, employs 
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the tone and methodology of comparative linguistics in arguing for the Celtic autonomy of the 
Picts.  After saying that the indigenous southern Britons, the Caledonians, and the Picts did not at 
all systematically adopt Latin from the Romans, he says of the few nouns that they borrowed, 
“Such words, in the British, and Pictish language, as seem to the eye of cursory observation to 
exhibit some analogy, in their form, and meaning, owe such appearances to their formation from 
roots, which sprung originally from a common source.  It cannot, then, be said, with truth, or 
propriety, that the Celts borrowed, from the Latins, or the Latins, from the Celts” (220). And the 
philological bent to the Pictish question is perhaps expressed most succinctly when Chalmers 
says that “language is the true genealogy of nations” (214).  Similarly, it again seems that Walter 
Scott feels his own national genealogy in peril when he writes, with a hint of stubborn pride, in a 
review of his friend Ellis's Specimens of the Early English Poets, 
The English and Scottish languages are in earlier times exactly similar; and yet, 
from the circumstances of the two countries, they must necessarily have had a 
separate origin...there must have been some other source from which the Scoto-
Teutonic is derived, than the Anglo-Saxon spoken in Lothian.  This grand source 
we conceive to have been the language of the ancient Picts; nor would it be easy 
to alter our opinion. (157) 
 
Along with his professed reluctance to deviate from his opinion, we must note Scott's 
philological method of tracing sources and of speculating about unknown languages behind 
language.  Speculation about unknown languages becomes, in early philology, a mode of 
reconstructing the past. 
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II.  Philological Reconstruction
 
In The Politics of Language in Romantic Literature, Richard Turley discusses something 
called 'asterisk-reality.'  This philological method is a key phenomenon to bear in mind when 
considering the Pictish Question and Walter Scott's interest in it.  Turley's chief source is the 
linguist Tom Shippey, who defines and discusses asterisk-reality with some fascinating examples 
– examples that really illuminate what is going on in the debate over the Picts.  Shippey points 
out that 
the characteristic activity of the philologist came, in the end, to be 'reconstruction.'  
This might be no more than verbal.  From the circumstance that English and 
German both change the vowel of 'man' in the plural to 'men' or Manner, you 
could infer that Primitive Germanic, of which not one word has ever been 
recorded, would have said *manniz, producing as usual 'i-mutation.'  The * is the 
sign of the reconstructed form, proposed by August Schleicher in the 1860s and 
used widely ever since. (20) 
 
Further on this point, Shippey says about philologists, “The whole of their science conditioned 
them to the acceptance of what one might call '*-' or 'asterisk-reality,' that which no longer 
existed but could with 100 per cent certainty be inferred” (22).  And for philologists, beyond the 
reconstruction of language, there lay also the reconstruction of history.  As Shippey says, “The 
thousands of pages of 'dry as dust' theorems about language-change, sound-shifts and ablaut-
gradations were...an essential and natural basis for the far more exciting speculations about the 
wide plains of 'Gothia' and the hidden, secret trade routes across the primitive forests of the 
North” (21).  Shippey gives one such compelling example of how history could be reconstructed, 
revolving around Attila the Hun.  He notes that 
Attilla, though a Hun, an enemy of the Goths under Theodrid and a byword for 
bloody ferocity, nevertheless does not appear to bear a barbarian name.  'Attila' is 
the diminutive form of the Gothic word for 'father,' atta: it means 'little father,' or 
even 'dad,' and it suggests very strongly the presence of many Goths in Attila's 
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conquering armies who found loot and success much more attractive than any 
questions of saving the West, Rome, or civilisation!...Atta, Attila: what's in a 
name?  One answer is, a total revaluation of history. (16) 
 
The type of thing that Shippey recounts as having gone on with philological examination of 
Gothic history is precisely what we see going on in the Pictish Question: linguistic vestiges 
become clues to reconstructing the history of a people.  National prejudices obscure history in 
general and linguistic history in particular, then national pride armed with the new weapons of 
philology seeks to reconstruct history through language.  Indeed, the Pictish Question centers on 
a fascinating nexus of philology and history embodied in Peanfahel, the one linguistic vestige of 
Pictish, which we have seen discussed at length by Ritson.  A wall of defense preserves a people, 
as does, in the ethics of philological reconstruction, a word.  Peanfahel was (presumably) a 
construction by the Picts to preserve themselves, and, over a thousand years later, it was a means 
of reconstructing Pictish history for the preservers of Scottishness. 
 As I have suggested, Scott's fascination with philologically pervaded reconstruction of 
history is nowhere in his corpus so prevalent as in The Antiquary.  Scott plunges explicitly into 
the Pictish Question in Chapter Six, as Sir Arthur Wardour and Jonathan Oldbuck engage in a 
heated exchange on the subject in the presence of Mr. Lovel.  Lovel, and we as readers, are 
introduced to the debate by the following dialogue: 
 “Why, man, there was once a people called the Piks.” 
     
   “More properly Picts,” interrupted the baronet. 
  
“I say the Pikar, Pihar, Piochtar, Piaghter, or Peughtar,” vociferated 
Oldbuck; “they spoke a Gothic dialect.” 
 
 “Genuine Celtic,” again asseverated the knight. 
     
   “Gothic!  Gothic, I'll go to death upon it!” counter-asseverated the  
  squire. 
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 “Why, gentlemen, I conceive that is a dispute which may be easily 
settled by philologists, if there are any remains of the language.” (48) 
 
It is a matter, indeed, of philology, as Lovel points out in his first assertion in the debate.  
Wardour and Oldbuck proceed to each name the respective philologists - highlighted by Ritson, 
Chalmers, and Pinkerton - with whom they side on the question of the one surviving word.  And 
the knight and squire simultaneously inform Lovel of the one surviving word: Penval.  The two 
combatants then briefly sketch the debate over the word (which we have seen extensively in 
Ritson).  Lovel expresses doubts about the task reconstruction from one word, saying, “'It is a 
rather narrow foundation to build a hypothesis upon,'” (48), and further saying, after Wardour 
and Oldbuck debate which half of the word was borrowed from another language, and from 
which other language it was borrowed, “'The Piks, or Picts...must have been singularly poor in 
dialect, since in the only remaining word of their vocabulary, and that consisting of only two 
syllables, they have been confessedly obliged to borrow one of them from another language...But 
what strikes me most, is the poverty of the language which has left so slight vestiges behind it'” 
(49).  Lovel, here, is picking up the question with which Chalmers deals when Chalmers speaks 
of what he claims to be the proportionally sparse and uncouth remnants of Gothic dialects left 
behind by conquering Gothic tribes.  Linguistic residue implies cultural value, and Wardour is 
keenly aware of this implication, quickly remonstrating Lovel, saying, “'You are in error...it was 
a copious language, and they were a great and powerful people – built two steeples; one at 
Brechin, one at Abernethy.  The Pictish maidens of the blood-royal were kept at Edinburgh 
Castle, thence called Castrum Puellarum'” (49).  Wardour insists that the Picts were a significant 
part of Scottish history, and he suggests that this fact goes hand in hand with their having had a 
copious language.  And, again, it is through philology that the reconstruction of Pictish history 
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takes place, as Wardour implies that the common name – The Maiden Castle – for Edinburgh 
Castle indicates something about Pictish sovereignty. 
After Oldbuck sarcastically attempts to refute Wardour's claim about Edinburgh Castle, 
Wardour goes on to point to the list of Pictish kings, which appears in Henry Maule's The History 
of the Picts (1706).  Wardour observes, “'Half of them have the Celtic patronymic Mac prefixed'” 
(49).  In response to this last bit of philological evidence, Oldbuck mocks the throat-rattling 
phonology of the Celtic names, and then he insinuates that the history of Pictish kings was 
dreamed up by crazy Highlanders.  The debate then quickly deteriorates when Oldbuck says that 
he little esteems Henry Maule, and when Wardour replies that Oldbuck is being irreverent of 
ancestry and social rank; Oldbuck retorts that he is prouder of himself being the descendant of 
Aldobrand Oldenbuck than he would be if he were the descendant of Wardour's ancestors, “'not 
one of whom, I suppose, could write their own name'” (50).  When Wardour informs Oldbuck 
that the name of one of his distinguished ancestors “'is written fairly with his own hand in the 
earliest copy of the Ragman-roll'” (50), Oldbuck snaps back that the fact “'only serves to shew 
that he was one of the earliest who set the mean example of submitting to Edward I.  What have 
you to say for the stainless loyalty of your family, Sir Arthur, after such a backsliding as that?'” 
(50) At this, Wardour goes off in a huff.  This exchange shows the subtle connections in the 
minds of the characters of the novel and the academics of Scott's day between philology, history, 
and nationalism.  Though the steps in between Celtic patronymics and Scottish submission to 
Edward I make little sense, it is no coincidence that Scottish submission is where Scott brings the 
reader by the end of a passage that is initially about philology. 
 As Chalmers, Ritson, and Pinkerton engage in the Pictish Question in the context of a 
larger consideration of the early history of Scotland, so does Oldbuck.  When Lovel and Oldbuck 
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first meet, riding together in a coach in Chapter One, Oldbuck threatens the coachman with legal 
punishment if he does not get one of the horses reshod, but Oldbuck's motive is likely, according 
to Scott, “'his desire of shewing his companion a Pict's camp...about a hundred yards distant from 
the place where this interruption took place'” (10).  This interruption comes shortly after Lovel 
inquires as to the subject of the folio that Oldbuck is carrying in the coach, which we learn is “'a 
book illustrative of the Roman remains in Scotland'” (10).  As Lovel will soon find out, Oldbuck 
is keenly interested in the Roman conquest of the Caledonians.  Once in Fairport, Oldbuck takes 
Lovel to a piece of property that he owns, the Kaim of Kinprunes, points out to Lovel an earthen 
wall and ditch, and then proceeds to elaborate his claim that it was the site of the final conflict 
between Agricola and the Caledonians.  Oldbuck's strongest piece of tangible evidence of his 
claim is a stone bearing “'a sacrificing vessel, and the letters A. D. L. L. which may stand, 
without much violence, for Agricola Dicavit Libens Lubens [Agricola willingly and happily 
dedicated this]'” (29).  That a linguistic vestige such as this could be used for such a drastic 
reconstruction of history is justified, according to Oldbuck, by the fact that “'the Dutch 
antiquaries claim Caligula as the founder of a light-house, on the sole authority of the letters C. 
C. P. F., which they interpret Caius Caligula Pharum Fecit [Gaius Caligula built the lighthouse]'” 
(29).  As he claims the Dutch antiquaries do, Oldbuck reconstructs Agricola's history from scant 
linguistic evidence.  This reconstruction is of such importance to Oldbuck that the parsimonious 
antiquary paid a steep price for the property; as he tells Lovel, “'...it was a national concern'” 
(29). 
 Oldbuck's interest in Agricola's conquest of Caledonia is further elucidated some chapters 
later when he fondly believes Lovel to have aspirations as a belletristic author and therefore 
suggests to him that he write an epic poem on the subject of “'The battle between the 
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Caledonians and the Romans – The Caledoniad; or, Invasion Repelled – Let that be the title – It 
will suit the present taste, and you may throw in a touch of the times'” (107).  When Lovel points 
out that the Roman invasion was not repelled, Oldbuck says, “'No; but you are a poet – free of 
the corporation, and as little bound down to truth or probability as Virgil himself – You may 
defeat the Romans in spite of Tacitus'” (107).  The series of passages concerning Oldbuck's 
archeological endeavors lays bare what is at stake in the discourse: nationalism – 'the present 
taste,' 'the times' – calling to mind the rhetoric of Pinkerton, Chalmers, and Ritson.  We must note 
at that if, as Ann Rigney suggests, the historical novel appeals to Walter Scott because it is a sort 
of hybrid, allowing Scott to question “an easy separation of fictional narrative and historical 
fact” (16), then here in Volume One of The Antiquary, Oldbuck suggests a model that takes 
philological reconstruction to its most extreme end, appropriating it as revision. 
 Oldbuck's devotion to philological reconstruction is perhaps most starkly manifest when 
he, his nephew Hector, and Edie Ochiltree visit the Meicklebackit house to obtain Elspeth's story 
of the fate of Eveline Neville.  Upon entering the household, Oldbuck hears Elspeth “chaunting 
forth an old ballad in a wild and doleful recitative” (310).  There on urgent business, Oldbuck 
says, “'It's a historical ballad...a genuine and undoubted fragment of minstrelsy! – Percy would 
admire its simplicity – Ritson could not impugn its authenticity'” (310).  We hear of the same 
players – Percy and Ritson – as in the philological discourse over the Picts, and the stakes in 
Oldbuck hearing this ballad seem to be the same, as Oldbuck says, after noting that the Ballad 
dealt with Glenallan's Earl meeting opposition on the way to the Battle of Harlaw, “'I wish...she 
would resume that canticle, or legendary fragment – I always suspected there was a skirmish of 
cavalry before the main battle of the Harlaw'” (312).  Oldbuck clearly implies that such 
antiquarian work has the power to confirm desired reconstructions of history. 
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 That such work is of paramount value to Oldbuck is clear in his myopic attention to 
Elspeth's chanting.  After Oldbuck rashly determines that Ritson could not impugn the ballad's 
authenticity, Ochiltree says, “'Aye, but it is a sad thing...to see human nature sae far owerta'en as 
to be skirling at auld sangs on the back of a loss like her's'” (310-311), but Oldbuck's response is, 
“'Hush, hush!... – she has gotten the thread of the story again'” (311).  Ochiltree evidently already 
knows (on probably better evidence than Oldbuck does) that the ballad is authentic, but his 
concern is more with Elspeth's dotage in the face of the loss of her grandson; Oldbuck is 
enthralled by antiquarian interest.  Whereas we come to find out that the fate of Eveline Neville – 
which Oldbuck has come to Elspeth to find out – is worth a fortune, Oldbuck says upon hearing 
part of Elspeth's singing, “'Chafron!...equivalent, perhaps, to cheveron – the word's worth a 
dollar'” (311). 
Ochiltree finally manages to get Oldbuck back on track by saying, “'If your honor 
pleases...had ye not better proceed to the business that brought us a' here?  I'se engage to get ye 
the sang ony time'” (312).  At this, Oldbuck submits, but he never does get the ballad from 
Ochiltree.  Delivery of the ballad by Ochiltree would render Oldbuck far less an agent in the 
discourse – it would minimize his role as historicist.  Elspeth is so senile as to be less a human 
than she is an old text (indeed, it is fitting that Elspeth dies in this scene) for Oldbuck to discover, 
interpret, and appropriate. 
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III.  Philological Invasion 
 
It is entirely fitting that Oldbuck suggest to Lovel that 'The Caledoniad' would 'suit the 
present taste,' and that he 'may throw in a touch of the times,' because, as I have suggested, there 
is a clear and likely nationalistic backdrop to The Antiquary.  Set in 1794, when fear of French 
invasion was rampant in Britain, we find the characters in the novel motivated by and alluding to 
fear of French invasion in several places in the novel.  In Chapter Six, Oldbuck reports to the 
Wardours that “'The worst sort of frenzy, a military frenzy, hath possessed man, woman, and 
child'” (45), and Isabella's response is, “'And high time, I think...when we are threatened with 
invasion from abroad, and insurrection at home'” (45-46).  The gentry's fears are even shared by 
the beggar Ochiltree, as he tries to diffuse the duel between Hector and Lovel by saying, “'Gang 
hame, gang hame, like gude lads – the French will be ower to herry us ane o' thae days, and ye'll 
hae fighting aneugh'” (162).  And the fear clearly sweeps the entire community at the end of the 
novel, as the beacons are (mistakenly) lit.  In spite of the fear of martial invasion, interest in 
philology and history consistently takes the place of interest in current politics. 
 In spite of the ancient Scottish title being extended in Lovel at the end of the novel, The 
Antiquary ultimately makes no gesture toward future political changes; it is, rather, all about 
antiquarianism.  During the day trip to St. Ruth's, Isabella Wardour sets the stage for a thematic 
epiphany by noting that while “The meanest tower of a freebooting baron, or squire, who lived 
by his lance and broad-sword, is consecrated by its appropriate legend,” the monks who served 
as historians for the nation are little remembered (133).  Lovel's answer is that quiet learning 
does not make a drastic enough impression on people: “The eras, by which the vulgar compute 
time, have always reference to some period of fear and tribulation, and they date by a tempest, an 
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earthquake, or burst of civil commotion” (133).  Set up, here, are alternative ways of defining the 
Scottish nation in 1794.  As we have seen already, military frenzy is gripping the nation, but The 
Antiquary consistently shifts the actual battleground to antiquarianism in general, and philology 
in particular.  Lovel is a soldier, but his real purpose in the novel is the unearthing of Scottish 
history; he is truly, as Arthur Wardour mistakenly calls him early in the novel, “'Mr...Shovel'” 
(51). 
 The other characters, too, are consistently used to paint a picture of abstract nationalism, 
as opposed to a nationalism manifested in political contest.  While Wardour's zeal concerning the 
notion of Scottish sovereignty is clear enough in his debate with Oldbuck, over the Picts, he has 
no real aspiration to affect the current political lot of Scotland – to tear down the Hanoverian rule 
in favor of the Stuart, for instance.  Scott says about Wardour, “His father, Sir Anthony, had been 
a Jacobite, and had displayed all the enthusiasm of that party, while it could be served with 
words only...upon the approach of the Highland army in 1745, it would appear that the worthy 
baronet's zeal became a little more moderate just when its warmth was of most consequence” 
(37).  The result, Scott continues, was that while Sir Anthony Wardour blustered yet delayed, the 
then-provost of Fairport – none other than Jonathan Oldbuck's father – seized Knockwinnock in 
the name of George II, and Sir Anthony and young Arthur were sent off to the Tower of London, 
only to be later released upon discovery that they had done nothing more than pay lip-service to 
Bonnie Prince Charlie.  Completing the picture, Scott says that Sir Arthur, “in his more advanced 
years, as he became too lazy or unwieldy for field-sports, he supplied them by now and then 
reading Scotch history; and, having gradually acquired a taste for antiquities, though neither very 
deep nor very correct, he became a crony of his neighbor, Mr Oldbuck of Monkbarns, and a joint 
labourer with him in his antiquarian pursuits” (38).  What emerges, here, is the picture of an 
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historicist – a Scotsman interested in a purely abstract sort of nationalism.  Wardour has no real 
interest in effecting present change; he is interesting in reconstructing histories that suit his 
sensibilities. 
 Of how Oldbuck's antiquarianism compares to Wardour's, Scott tells us, early in the 
novel, “The faith of Sir Arthur, as an antiquary, was boundless, and Mr Oldbuck 
(notwithstanding the affair of the Praetorium at the Kaim of Kinprunes) was much more 
scrupulous in receiving legends as current and authentic coin” (38).  But while more shrewd an 
antiquarian than Wardour, Oldbuck is perhaps every bit as zealous and as myopic in his zeal.  
When Isabella Wardour wonders why martial history is remembered more than quiet learning, 
before Lovel offers his answer, Oldbuck is befuddled.  This befuddlement rises from his myopic 
zeal for intellectual nationalism, which is explicitly manifest in the day-trip to St. Ruth's.  About 
the comparative disregard for quiet learning, he laments to Lovel, “to put our ancient chronicles, 
our noble histories, our learned commentaries, and national muniments, to such offices of 
contempt and subjection, has greatly degraded our nation” (131).  For Oldbuck, the nation is 
significantly defined by attention to its history. 
When Wardour accuses Oldbuck of falling into grumbling about current affairs, Oldbuck 
says that he is “'a tame grumbler...I neither make nor mar king...but pray heartily for our own 
sovereign, pay scot and lot, and grumble at the exciseman'” (47).  Oldbuck is a loyalist, but 
wishes for no part in impacting current political arrangements.  Oldbuck is unequivocally a 
Scotsman, in spite of his German ancestry, his pride in which ancestry owing entirely to 
Aldobrand Oldenbuck's status as a typographer.  When debating Wardour about the Picts, 
Oldbuck's criticism of Wardour's ancestor's submission to Edward II follows his conviction that 
“'my descent from that great restorer of learning is more creditable to me as a man of letters, than 
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if I had numbered in my genealogy all the brawling, bullet-headed, iron-fisted, old Gothic barons 
since the days of Crentheminach-cryme – not one of whom, I suppose, could write their own 
name'” (50).  What consistently emerges in Oldbuck's character is that a devotion to 
intellectualism is far more important than political allegiance and martial manifestations of 
nationalism. 
As sketching salient characteristics of Lovel, Wardour, and Oldbuck suggests, the real 
battleground in the novel is antiquarian.  Even before the end of the novel makes clear that there 
is no French invasion actually underway, we can see a different invasion consistently highlighted 
by Scott.  At the heart of the Pictish Question is the desire on the part of the Celtic apologists to 
deny Germanic linguistic invasion.  At the heart of The Antiquary is an attempted invasion, much 
of it occurring linguistically, by the German charlatan Dousterswivel. 
 There is a hint of Dousterwivel's status in the novel as early as the Chapter Six dialogue 
just quoted between Oldbuck and Isabella.  After Isabella suggests that it is high time for military 
frenzy, Oldbuck says, “'But what says Sir Arthur, whose dreams are of standing armies and 
German oppression?'” (46).  Sir Arthur does indeed find himself under German oppression in the 
novel, having yielded himself to the knavery of Dousterswivel.  We have already seen how 
important antiquarian excavation - both literal and figurative - is in the novel, and Dousterswivel 
continues this theme, albeit antithetically.  The etymology of his name begins to suggest as 
much, coming from 'dowse,' which is to use a divining rod in search of water or minerals, and 
'swivel,' meaning to twist.  A very concrete manifestation of this etymology comes in the first 
scene in which we see Dousterswivel: “Holding the forked ends of the wand each between a 
finger and thumb, and thus keeping the rod upright, he proceeded to pace the ruined aisles and 
cloisters, followed by the rest of the company...the assistants observed the rod to turn in his 
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fingers, although he pretended to hold it very tight” (135).  Dousterswivel practices and 
represents false or twisted literal and figurative searching or digging into the ground. 
 Though his archeological enterprises are phony, Dousterswivel does succeed in digging 
into the pockets of Sir Arthur Wardour.  At the same time, though, and even more pervasively, 
Dousterswivel invades the novel linguistically.  Scott is consistently at pains to write 
Dousterswivel's German butchery of the language of the Scottish characters.  One of the first 
things that Dousterswivel says in the novel is, “'If you pleashe, gentlemans and ladies, and 
ashking pardonsh of Sir Arthur and Miss Wardour, and this worthy clergymansh, and my goot 
friend Mr Oldenbuck, who is my countrymansh, and of goot young Mr Lofel also, I think it is all 
owing to de hand of glory'” (133).  In addition to his phonetic massacre, Dousterswivel alters 
Oldbuck's name to its German form, seemingly deliberately, for Dousterswivel calls Oldbuck his 
countryman. 
 In a further affront to the Antiquary, Dousterswivel reduces the fate of Scottish history to 
an absurd German ritual.  When Dousterswivel interrupts to suggest that “'it is all owing to de 
hand of glory,'” he is invading a discussion between Wardour, Oldbuck, Isabella, and Lovel about 
the fate of “'our ancient chronicles, our noble histories, our learned commentaries, and national 
muniments'” (131), as Oldbuck says, which were once preserved by monks.  When Isabella 
wonders why so little is left known of the work of monks while martial histories of barons are so 
well remembered, Lovel replies that people are generally more impressed with tribulations – the 
things of martial histories – than with quiet learning.  It is in response to this that Dousterswivel 
posits that the monks concealed their treasures, in the face of the Reformation, with the aid of a 
German ritual in which a hanged murderer's hand is cut off, smoked with juniper and yew, then 
has a candle of bear, badger, boar, and piglet fat placed into it and lit at the right time and with 
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the right ceremony to put a hex on any future seeking of treasure.  Dousterswivel here invades 
Scottish history and effectively mocks any antiquarian attempts to recover it. 
 When Dousterswivel and Sir Arthur Wardour are on a midnight expedition at the ruins, it 
is the German's language that identifies him.  Lovel and Ochiltree watch from a concealed 
position as two others enter part of the ruins.  Lovel is initially unable to figure out who the 
others are, but then, as Scott writes, “After conversing together some time in whispers, the two 
figures advanced into the midst of the chancel, and a voice which Lovel at once recognized, from 
its tone and dialect, to be that of Dousterswivel, pronounced in a louder but still a smothered 
tone, 'Indeed, mine goot sir, dere cannot be one finer hour nor season for dis great purpose'” 
(169-170).  Dousterswivel's twisting of 'D's' into 'T's' and 'Th's' into 'D's' highlights his idiocy, 
and this linguistic highlighting is his calling card when he is otherwise unidentifiable. 
 Dousterswivel's linguistic and archaeological knavery is most exposed in his midnight 
adventure with Edie Ochiltree.  While Dousterswivel assaults the Scots with many a “mine goot 
sir” and “by mine goot wort,” and while he butchers several pronouns and even Oldbuck's proper 
name, none of his peers return the favor.  But Edie Ochiltree – whom Dousterswivel is wont to 
call Edies Ochiltrees – engages in a telling linguistic tit-for-tat with the German, and he 
completely pulls the wool over the German's eyes, archaeologically speaking, as well. 
When Edie first begins to call out the German, he says, “'And do you really believe the like o' 
that, Mr Dusterdivel'” (196).  He calls him “Dusterdivel” twice more in the space of the next 
page, and then, when he begins the story of Malcolm Misticot, he addresses him as “'Maister 
Dustandsnivel'” (198), mocking Dousterswivel's phony ceremonial use of incense the night 
before, which incited a sneezing fit from Edie that Dousterswivel took for the ghost of Misticot.  
The linguistic response by Dousterswivel is another series of accidental blunders that paints the 
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German as even more of an absurd linguistic invader.  After Edie finishes the story of Malcolm 
Misticot, Dousterswivel asks, “'And so you do tink dat dis golds and silvers belonged to goot Mr 
Malcolm Mishdigoat?'” (200), and, the space of half a page later, he refers to “'goot Maister 
Mistygoat's grave'” (201). 
 Already working to bring about the financial ruin of the ancient estate of Knockwinnock, 
and already invading the novel linguistically, Dousterswivel will proceed to assault Scottish 
history by seeking the treasure of Misticot.  The story of Malcolm Misticot, threaded throughout 
the novel, is about a fight for a certain version of Scottish history. 
 Told most fully by Edie Ochiltree, the story goes that Sir Richard Wardour, a Norman, 
married Sybil Knockwinnock, who was heir to the Knockwinnock estate.  Sybil, however, had 
been in love with a cousin, and just four months after marrying Sir Richard Wardour, she gave 
birth to a bastard son.  The son, Malcolm, was sent off to be raised in the Highlands, while Sir 
Richard Wardour produced a legitimate heir.  When Sir Richard died, Malcolm, with Highland 
warriors in entourage, claimed the estate of Knockwinnock, held it for a long time, and built the 
tower that came to bear his name.  Ultimately, Sir Richard's son challenged Malcolm in the lists 
and won, banishing Malcolm to monastic life, restoring Knockwinnock to the Wardours. 
 This story is rife with implications for the identity of the two central Norman-rooted 
Scotsmen in the novel.  The story of Misticot has direct bearing on Sir Arthur Wardour, as he is 
the current Lord of Knockwinnock.  Misticot was the rival of Sir Arthur's ancestors, and Sir 
Arthur has earlier in the novel engaged in some agenda-driven philological reconstruction to 
theorize that 'Misticot' is merely a corruption of 'Misbegot.'  In spite of the issue of Highland 
Scot versus half-Norman Scot, Sir Arthur seeks the supposed treasure of Misticot to bail him out 
of financial ruin that he has brought on by subjecting himself to the knavery of Dousterswivel; in 
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this way, Sir Arthur desires to reach into the Scottish past, in spite of its imperfection, to save 
himself from ruin at the hands of the German invader. 
 The story of Misticot also, of course, is strikingly parallel to the story of Lovel's ancestry.  
Lovel's ancestry is slowly unraveled, chiefly through the account by Elspeth of the fate of 
Eveline Neville.  We ultimately come to learn that Lovel is the love-child of the Earl of Glenallan 
and Eveline Neville.  After the child had already been conceived, the Earl and Eveline were 
deceived into believing that they were too closely related to be married, and this believed 
disgrace was the reason for Eveline's suicide.  The truth, Elspeth tells the Earl, is that Eveline and 
he were second-cousins, and Eveline was simply despised by the Countess of Glenallan in 
accordance with her dislike for everyone from her husband's extended family.  In the background 
of antiquarian debates and the knavery of Dousterswivel for the first two volumes of the novel, 
the task of determining Lovel's roots rises to prominence in Volume Three, and the culmination 
is the discovery that he is heir to the Earldom of Glenallan.  Like Misticot, Lovel is a love-child 
reared in exile who returns to claim an ancient Scottish title.  To boot, it is Lovel's money – in the 
'Search 1' coffer – that is passed off as the lost treasure of Misticot; in this way, in addition to 
preserving the Earldom of Glenallan, Lovel begins the financial rescue of the estate of 
Knockwinnock. 
 After this discovery of some of Misticot's supposed treasure, when Ochiltree and 
Dousterswivel go on a midnight quest after the non-existent 'Search 2' coffer, the philological 
battle between the two continues.  Ochiltree calls the German “'Mr Dustanshovel'” (203), 
mocking the adept's bogus archaeology.  The archaeology for Dousterswivel to undertake in this 
chapter, though, is of Ochiltree's design, designed to expose Dousterswivel's idiocy.  Ochiltree 
quickly feigns fatigue after starting in to dig for 'Search 2,' turning the digging over to the 
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German, who has been made eager by greed.  Edie proceeds to mockingly suggest that 
Dousterswivel might as well be a common laborer, not any sort of an antiquary, saying, “'My 
certie! few ever wrought for siccan a day's wage...Odd, ye work as if ye had been bred to pick 
and shool - ye could win your round half-crown ilka day'” (204).  What Ochiltree brings out in 
the German is, not coincidentally, more linguistic knavery: “Thus exhorted by the mendicant, 
Dousterswivel struggled and laboured among the stones and stiff clay, toiling like a horse, and 
internally blaspheming in German.  When such an unhallowed syllable escaped his lips, Edie 
changed his battery upon him” (204).  Edie proceeds to suggest that he sees a ghastly shape flit 
by, saying, “'when the moon was on it, it looked unco like a dead man's arm wi' a taper in it; I 
thought it was Misticot himsel'” (204).  Pressed by Ochiltree, Dousterswivel falls into 
transgressions in German, which Ochiltree will not abide.  And after censuring the German for 
his language, Ochiltree mocks the German ritual of “de hand of glory” while simultaneously 
tapping into Dousterswivel's fear of the deceased Scot Misticot.  When Dousterswivel seeks the 
treasure of Misticot, not only is he invading Scottish history, he is foregrounding a web of events 
that all dramatize assaults upon and restorations of Scottish history.  Accordingly, this final of 
Dousterswivel's assaults is met with reprisal that leads to his ousting.  After a few more strokes 
and a broken mattock, Dousterswivel begins to realize that he is being played for a fool, but the 
German still gets the worst of the conclusion to the archaeological excursion, as he is beaten to 
the punch of physical battery by the hiding Steenie Meicklebackit.  Edie landing in jail for the 
beating of Dousterswivel puts him in just the right place to disclose what he knows of 
Dousterswivel's knavery to a person with the power to send the German on the run under the 
auspices of the Aliens Act and the Traitorous Correspondences Act.
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IV.  'Invasion Repelled' – or, the Footnotes of History
  
With military frenzy gripping the nation, the climax of the novel commences with the 
lighting of the area's alarm beacons.  The resultant fervor reveals much nationalistic vigor.  On 
the morning of the alarm, Oldbuck is sleeping late, as is his wont, but when his kinswomen wake 
him, his response is, “'The French?...get out of the room womankind that you are, till I get my 
things on – And, hark ye, bring me my sword'” (349).  Though Oldbuck has been on the Gothic 
side of the Pictish Question, he springs immediately to Scotland's defense.  The women's 
response highlights Oldbuck's novel-long character as antiquarian: 
 “Whilk o' them, Monkbarns?” cried his sister, offering a Roman 
 faulchion of brass with the one hand, with the other an Andrea Ferara 
 without a handle. 
  
“The langest, the langest,” cried Jenny Rintherout, dragging in a two-
 handed sword of the twelfth century. (349) 
 
The chief function that Oldbuck has taken upon himself in life is to compile an eclectic mass of 
artefacts.  However, faced with invasion from abroad, Oldbuck says, “Give me...the sword which 
my father wore in the year forty-five – it hath no belt or baldrick – but we'll make shift” (349).  
Requesting his father's sword from 1745 further represents a transformation.  Oldbuck's father 
had worn the sword to put down Scottish insurrection against Britain, but now the Antiquary 
aims to wield it to defend Scotland from invasion. 
The alarm also has dramatic effect on Sir Arthur Wardour.  Wardour has been besieged by 
the German Dousterswivel through most of the novel and had resigned himself to the inevitable 
loss of his estate in Volume Three.  Accordingly, Oldbuck says to his nephew Hector upon seeing 
Wardour approach, “'But here comes Sir Arthur Wardour, who, between ourselves, is not fit to 
accomplish much [with his head or with his hand]'” (349).  But Scott tells us, “Sir Arthur was 
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probably of a different opinion; for, dressed in his lieutenancy uniform, he was also on the road 
to Fairport” (349).  Hearkening back again to the '45, we recall that Wardour's father had 
blustered a great deal in support of the Scottish cause, but that he had also wavered when the 
time came for him to take action in support of the cause, himself and the young Arthur being 
meekly submitting to be dragged off to the Tower of London for what was later discovered to be 
no good reason.  Faced with invasion in 1794, Sir Arthur appears resolutely prepared to fight for 
his country. 
 Perhaps most changed by the alarm is the Earl of Glenallan, whose entrance at the muster 
is described thus: 
At length the bugles of the Glenallan yeomanry were heard, and the Earl himself, 
to the surprise of all who knew his habits and state of health, appeared at their 
head in uniform...The clean and serviceable appearance of [the Earl's] band of 
feudal dependants called forth the admiration of Captain MacIntyre; his uncle was 
still more struck by the manner in which, upon this crisis, the ancient military 
spirit of his house seemed to animate and invigorate the decayed frame of the 
Earl, their leader.  He claimed, and obtained for himself and his followers, the 
post most likely to be that of danger, displayed great alacrity in making the 
necessary dispositions, and shewed equal acuteness in discussing their propriety. 
(351) 
 
Described earlier in the novel as “cadaverous” (228) and inhabiting a house more like a 
mausoleum than the seat of a living Highland Earl, the Earl appears in Fairport, after the alarm, 
having been revitalized by “the ancient military spirit of his house.” 
The spirit, however, extends beyond the Earl's house, as we have already seen, moving 
the entire community, and is perhaps best summed up by Edie Ochiltree in the chapter before the 
alarm.  When Ochiltree and Oldbuck are speculating about a French invasion, Oldbuck is 
surprised at Ochiltree's nationalistic spirit and questions what Ochiltree has to fight for.  
Ochiltree's response is, “'Me no mickle to fight for, sir? – is na there the kintra to fight for'” 
(346).  Edie goes on to suggest there are also different houses at which he goes begging to fight 
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for, but the first thing he lists is “the kintra.”  Putting such a sentiment in the mouth of Ochiltree 
is crucial, because he is a mere beggar, with no title or estate to fight for.  The 'country' for which 
Ochiltree would fight is largely an abstraction, falling in line with the theme throughout the 
novel to define the nation abstractly. 
Ochiltree's gesture toward abstract nationalism also punctuates the ambivalent nature of 
his character throughout the novel.  He has been characterized by Katie Trumpener, in Bardic 
Nationalism, as the “last survival of bardic functions, as [his] ceaseless circulation and news 
bearing connect locality to locality, fish hut to manor.  Apparently a parasite on the community, 
Ochiltree actually binds it together” (123).  Trumpener is right that Ochiltree is a key mover of 
practically all of the major events in the novel.  He is instrumental in saving Sir Arthur and 
Isabella when they get trapped by the tide; he hides, and possibly saves, Lovel, after Lovel's duel 
with Hector MacIntyre; he buries the 'treasure' that eventually saves Wardour and 
Knockwinnock; he carries Elspeth's message to the Earl of Glenallan, and he extracts Elspeth's 
tale of the fate of Eveline Neville; and his testimony to Oldbuck, albeit in self-defense, officially 
confirms Dousterswivel's knavery and clears the way for Dousterswivel's expulsion from 
Scotland.  For all of this, though, a function – arguably the key function – that we would expect 
from a bard is glaringly absent; in a sense, as Trumpener points out, Ochiltree represents the 
Scottish past – he is the “genial representative of an uncontaminated and unconstrained folk 
tradition” (122); however, we never really see that folk tradition.  While Ochiltree promises to 
give Oldbuck the ballad that Elspeth chants, he never does.  Oldbuck recognizes Ochiltree's 
valence, saying to Lovel at the Kaim of Kinprunes that Ochiltree is “'one of the last specimens of 
the old-fashioned Scottish mendicant, who kept his rounds within a particular space, and was the 
news-carrier, the minstrel, and sometimes the historian of the district.  That rascal, now, knows 
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more old ballads and traditions than any other man in this and the four next parishes'” (33-34).  
However, we never hear any old ballads from Ochiltree.  Ochiltree intervenes to prove Oldbuck 
wrong at the Kaim of Kinprunes, but the effect is conspicuously un-bardic: he reveals that there 
is no ancient tradition at the site, there was merely a wedding there twenty years prior.  If 
Ochiltree is the Scottish past, it is a past with no tangible present.  Just as Oldbuck is seemingly 
uninterested in obtaining Elspeth's ancient ballad from Ochiltree, so is the novel as a whole.  The 
nationalism stressed and manifested repeatedly in The Antiquary is not a tangible thing carried in 
a living source, it is an abstraction. 
 In the vein of abstract nationalism, the most significant revelation to come from the alarm 
is that which Lovel consciously rides to the muster to deliver: the true source of the alarm.  He 
has ridden up as Major Neville to notify the patriots that the beacons were lit in false alarm, the 
watchman at Halket-head having mistaken the bonfire made out of the recently repelled 
Dousterswivel's machinery for another beacon.  As it turns out, the surge of Scottish nationalism 
has all, ostensibly by accident, been in response to the German.  But the accident on the part of 
the characters is no thematic accident.  After laying the groundwork in Volume One by 
highlighting Oldbuck's interest in the Picts and Caledonians, Scott foregrounds the issue of 
philological nationalism in Volume Two with Dousterswivel's archaeological and linguistic 
assaults.  In the excursions with Ochiltree, with Wardour, and with the larger group, he is a 
linguistic outsider and corrupter of Scottish history.  Oldbuck is, therefore, willing to oust the 
charlatan under any possible pretenses, and the pretenses seized are no thematic accident, as the 
the German is ousted by wartime legislation aimed at putting down insurrection and warding off 
invasion.  Upon the revelation of the the mistaken beacon, Oldbuck complains, “'[Dousterswivel] 
has bequeathed us a legacy of blunders and mischief, as if he had lighted some train of fireworks 
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at his departure – I wonder what cracker will go off next among our shins'” (352).  The next 
cracker, though, is the revelation of Lovel's identity, which is officially reconstructed by Oldbuck 
and which preserves the Earldom of Glenallan. 
 Oldbuck may complain about the literal cause of the muster, but through the 
reconstruction of Lovel's identity, revitalization of the Earl, and the transformation of Wardour 
and Oldbuck, the muster serves as “a positive assurance to all present, that the courage and zeal 
which they had displayed were entirely thrown away, unless in so far as they afforded an 
acceptable proof of their spirit and promptitude,” as Lovel and Captain Wardour tell the 
assembled group (351-2).  The spirit of the community – and the novel – has indeed been proved, 
and the dynamics of Lovel's first words at the muster and of Oldbuck's complaint attest to 
Dousterswivel's functioning at a level that the characters don't fully comprehend – a highly 
figurative level.  In the end, all of the main characters – including the eclectic, Pinkerton-
supporting Oldbuck – have united to repel a presumed invasion in order to confirm that 
Dousterswivel's philological invasion has engendered the true battle of the novel. 
 In accordance with the paramount importance given to the repelling of Dousterswivel, 
Scott seems to find no fault with such facts as the Norman-rooted Wardours occupying 
Knockwinnock or the Norman-rooted Nevilles preserving the Earldom Glenallan; Lovel has 
never faced a dilemma wherein he must choose between women who respectively represent 
radical and moderate political positions.  The Antiquary seems to be about reconstructing a 
Scottish past more than it is about the futurity of Scotland in the modern world, figured through a 
middling hero, so the current loyalty of Scotland to the British crown seems to be a moot point.  
But so firmly is the novel rooted in the Pictish Question that Scott will not abide the German 
invasion of Dousterswivel, for it assaults the very potential for an intellectualized nationalism, by 
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corrupting the text linguistically. 
 While antiquarianism is obviously central to The Antiquary, Scott had also dealt with it in 
Waverley, just two years earlier, via the middling titular hero.  In a chapter titled “Scottish law 
and Waverley's museum of property,” Wolfram Schmidgen argues that “Waverley's meticulous 
reconstruction turns Tully-Veolan into a visual artifact” (210), for Baron Bradwardine “a 
representation of its former existence” (211).  Moreover, with the painting that Waverley has 
added to the décor of the house, a painting “by an Englishman on the behalf of another 
Englishman” (211), according to Schmidgen, Scott emphasizes that “Scottish things pass through 
English hands transformed, clearly visible and stripped of their native power” (211).  
Schmidgen's argument is founded upon the premise that “the decline of landed property as a 
communal paradigm was the base of new forms of personal, political, and national identity” 
(213).  This paradigm shift, in Schmidgen's estimation, means, for Scott, a departure from 
“Burkean traditionalism” toward “the epistemology of Bentham and Paine” (213), turning from 
the “'ancient combination of things'” (213), to the “antiquarian gaze of the bourgeois” (212).  
Scott has again taken up the question of reconstruction in The Antiquary, but there seems to be a 
different paradigm framing it.  We see an ancient estate – Knockwinnock – repeatedly in peril, 
but it is rescued before its Lord is ruined and before it must pass through the real estate market.  
Furthermore, The Antiquary most glaringly differs from Waverley in that there is no political 
contest.  The 1745 uprising, of course, is a story of martial defeat.  In The Antiquary, time and 
time again, Scott is at pains to figuratively – and often literally – dismiss martial contest as being 
beside the point.  This difference keeps the issue of nationalism, in The Antiquary, highly 
abstract.  Perhaps in Waverley, as Schmidgen suggests, “the museumizing activities of the 
English” (210) are the unfortunate consequence of the disembedding of traditional Scottish social 
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structure, but in The Antiquary, antiquarianism is the hope for formation of national identity all 
along, as the real disembedding throughout the novel is philological.  In this sense, The 
Antiquary seems to consciously pick up where Waverley leaves off, reopening the question of 
reconstruction through antiquarian activity.  This reopening becomes a difference that seems to 
make a difference, as, on the battleground of philology, The Antiquary suggests the theoretical 
possibility of victory for Scottishness.9 
   Part of the conclusion of The Antiquary is that Lovel and Isabella Wardour are wed, and 
for their wedding, the Antiquary gives as a present “the wedding ring, a massy circlet of antique 
chasing, bearing the motto of Aldobrand Oldenbuck, Kunst macht gunst” (355).  This motto, 
German for 'Art wins favor,' hearkens back to Volume One of the novel, when Lovel has the  
seemingly prophetic dream in which he sees Oldbuck's ancestor point to the motto written on the 
page of a book.  The story behind the motto is a story of conviction in the power of 
intellectualism.  Told by Oldbuck, his great ancestor, Aldobrand Oldenbuck, had to win the hand 
of his beloved by proving that he could work her father's press – a gauntlet set up by the young 
lady to cull out unworthy suitors.  Oldenbuck successfully worked the press where the suitors 
failed, recognizing that skill, or art, had won him the favor that he desired.  The art relied upon 
by Aldobrand Oldenbuck – skill as a printer – was the same art responsible for fostering a more 
intellectual culture, as Jonathan Oldbuck points out repeatedly in the novel, referring to his 
ancestor's printing of the Augsburg Confession.  About the motto, Oldbuck says, “'Each printer in 
these days...had his device...in the same manner as the doughty chivalry of the age...My ancestor 
boasted as much in his, as if he had displayed it over a conquered field of battle, though it 
                                                 
9.  In Why Literary Periods Mattered: Historical Contrast and the Prestige of English Studies, 
Ted Underwood classifies The Antiquary as a work that "dramatize[s] history as an occluded 
memory that needs to be revived before the protagonist can claim the authority of the past" (42). 
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betokened the diffusion of knowledge, not the effusion of blood'” (85-6).  The contrast set up by 
Oldbuck calls to mind a metaphor that we have seen throughout the novel: intellectualism – often 
philology, in particular – is the chief battleground for the characters.  This same contrast is what 
we see with the climax of the novel.  There is the suggestion of martial contest – of French 
military invasion – but this suggestion is swept aside, and it is really the German linguistic 
invasion with which the characters have been doing battle and which they must repel. 
 The presence of the Antiquary's family motto on the wedding ring affirms what Lovel has 
had to do to win the hand of Isabella Wardour.  Although there is a suggestion of some 
importance in martial prowess in Lovel's duel with Hector (a rival for Isabella), the duel does not 
win Lovel the favor he desires; it sends Lovel into hiding – far from joining him with Isabella – 
and dueling Hector is a defense of his right to temporarily hide behind the false name of Lovel, 
rather than establishing his Scottish roots.  The satisfaction that Isabella's father explicitly 
demands for the grace of his daughter's company is a legitimate pedigree.  As we have seen, 
Lovel's legitimate pedigree is only realized when he and his father meet at the muster, and the 
muster has all been for an alarm caused by the ousting of Dousterswivel.  In addition, Lovel's 
greater labor for the favor of Isabella has really been his initiation of the financial rescue of her 
father from ruin by the German invader.  In both cases, it is opposing what Dousterswivel 
represents that wins favor Lovel.  As Aldobrand Oldenbuck fosters intellectualism to win favor, 
Lovel must repel a philological invasion of Scotland to win favor. 
 For all of this, though, the wedding ring is problematic.  Scott describes the ring as a 
“massy circlet,” which is also an apt description for much of the antiquarian activity that we have 
witnessed in the novel.  In the real-life debate over the Picts, we recall the massive etymological 
web that Ritson traces in order to divine the true meaning of Peanfahel.  The quagmire that is 
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Peanfahel, of course, appears in The Antiquary, as do other hefty etymologies, such as the one 
that Oldbuck heaves upon the Earl of Glenallan, late in the novel.  To determine the roots of the 
place-name 'Quickens-bog,' Oldbuck takes nearly an entire page of text, leading the Earl from 
English, to Latin, to Saxon, to Celtic, and back to Saxon, through the words triticum repens, 
palus, burgh, burrow, brough, bruff, buff, boff, bogh, borgh, elisa hij, whilkens, whichens, and 
whackens; Oldbuck's “massy circlet” of philology, as it were, is only cut off by Scott stepping in 
and saying, “I will be more merciful to my readers than Oldbuck was to his guest” (283-4). 
 As we have seen, Scott was decidedly on the Celtic side of the Pictish Question, so we 
may wonder why he assigns the Gothic side of the Question to the titular hero of the novel and 
the Celtic side to the much less scrupulous Sir Arthur Wardour.  In addition, we may wonder why 
Scott, as I am arguing, chose to represent the repelling of the Gothic side figuratively, through 
the character of Dousterswivel.  Roland M. Smith suggests that respect for his “particular dear 
friend [George] Ellis” kept Scott from coming down too decisively on the Celtic side of the 
Question until after Ellis's death.  As much as by respect for his intellectual friend, Scott seems to 
have been made reluctant by the rhetoric of the debate.  The Pictish Question was an open 
question in 1816, when The Antiquary was published, which Scott recognized in spite of his 
belief in the Celtic side.  Even in his 1829 review of the esteemed Ritson, Scott characterized the 
discourse as “the very slough of despond, whereon much learning has been thrown without 
mending the path; or rather, a Serbonian bog, capable of swamping whole armies of 
commentators” (130).  It is fitting that the Serbonian bog-like etymology miring down the Earl 
and Oldbuck concerns the word 'Quickens-bog.'  The philological battleground of the Pictish 
Question had been made a mess by the warring armies, and Scott doesn't seem to have been 
willing to starkly declare in his fiction a victory for that cause.  In that fiction, as well as being a 
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“massy circlet,” the symbolic wedding ring is “of antique chasing” (my italics).  While “antique 
chasing” literally means ancient ornamentation, we needn't strain to hear a pun referring to the 
literal and figurative pursuit of antique things that we have witnessed throughout the novel.  In 
The Antiquary, the antique things being pursued are often elusive.  In the real-life debate over the 
Picts, the truth seemed, through most of Scott's lifetime, equally elusive, as the “armies of 
commentators” had to pursue it on an unmended path through a “Serbonian bog.” 
 In the few years following the publication of Ritson's Annals, which Scott said 
administered “a death-blow to the hypothesis of Pinkerton, called the Gothic system” (152), 
Scott nevertheless continued to carefully hedge his bets on the Celtic side.  Though he agrees 
with Ritson that “the Picts, being the ancient Caledonians, must have spoken a dialect of the 
Celtic” (152), he also says, in his History of Scotland, that Pictish “was probably Celtic, with a 
strong tinge of Gothic” (1: 12).  While in arguing that “language is the true genealogy of 
nations,” George Chalmers believes that Celts strongly resisted any adoption of inferior Gothic 
language; Scott is ultimately not so absolute.  Scott's careful acknowledgment of the possibility 
of a “strong tinge of Gothic” is a fair characterization of the presence of the German “Kunst 
Macht Gunst” on the polyvalent wedding ring at the conclusion of The Antiquary.  Scott's 
position in the Pictish Question and in The Antiquary ultimately becomes an objective 
microcosm of the philological discourse as a whole: it was an important and promising 
quagmire. 
 The final paragraph of the novel contains a crucial final testament to this thematic 
leaning, as Scott tells us that Oldbuck 
regularly enquires whether the Lord Geraldin has commenced the Caledoniad, 
and shakes his head at the answer he receives.  En attendant, however, he has 
completed his notes, which, we believe, will be at service of any one who chuses 
to make them public, without risk or expence to THE ANTIQUARY. (356) 
 108 
 
 
The notes without and independent of the poem are a perfect representation of the desirable but 
imperfect philological reconstruction of history that pervades both the Pictish Question and The 
Antiquary.  Actually depicting a victory for the Caledonians – whom Scott viewed as the same 
race as the Picts – never clearly materializes.  What we ultimately have are the footnotes of 
national history. 
 A prevalent conviction that attended early philology was that the discourse had the 
potential to engender nationalism through reconstruction of national history.  Scott was intrigued 
by this potential, and as the chronological frame and Advertisement to The Antiquary suggest, 
Scott wished to view language as having the power to theoretically mitigate the sort of identity 
peril that Britons felt in 1794 and in 1815.  We see this desire dramatized in The Antiquary, but 
Scott also recognizes the tenuous nature of such a construction, as the discourse producing it was 
fraught with complexity.  Philological nationalism thus ultimately remains more a footnoting of 
history than a present reconstruction. 
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Chapter Three: Frankenstein and the Need for Social Etymology 
 
I. "apparent connexion with visible objects" 
  
 In very basic terms, the plot of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein could be summed up thus: 
Victor creates and then rejects a Creature, prompting the Creature to wander from community to 
community causing chaos, sometimes accidentally, sometimes deliberately.  Where this chaos 
occurs in Western Europe, the polities in the respective communities – most prominently the 
legal systems – attempt to identify and rein in the source of the chaos.  At the heart of this 
process, during Justine's trial, Elizabeth sums up their legal system by saying, 
  '...when one creature is murdered, another is immediately deprived of life in a  
 slow torturing manner; then the executioners, their hands yet reeking with the  
 blood of innocence, believe that they have done a great deed.  They call this  
 retribution.  Hateful name!  When that word is pronounced, I know greater and  
 more horrid punishments are going to be inflicted than the gloomiest tyrant has  
 ever invented to satiate his utmost revenge.' (83) 
 
The linguistic 'pronunciation' of the concept of retribution, here, to borrow Elizabeth's 
characterization, echoes the radical philology of John Horne Tooke.  As I have discussed, Tooke 
believed that politics and law were based upon “metaphysical jargon and false morality, which 
can only be dissipated by etymology” (1: 18), and that such concepts as right, wrong, and justice 
“are all merely Participles poetically embodied, and substantiated by those who use them” (1: 
19).  In short, Tooke believed that the polities binding his society manipulated language to 
control the people of the society.  Elizabeth's analysis of Geneva's legal system seems to suggest 
that Frankenstein is informed by this Tookean principle. 
 Parts of Frankenstein are literally about the Creature's language acquisition, and criticism 
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has typically linked the Creature's linguistic development with his attempted integration in 
society.   Nevertheless, a pronounced Tookean strain in Frankenstein seems to escape notice.  We 
traditionally recognize Mary Shelley as a second-generation radical, wife of a second-generation 
radical, and daughter of first generation-radicals, but we seem to be missing the influence of a 
crucial first-generation radical in Tooke.  While the Creature is in some respects clearly derived 
from Rousseau's Natural Man, such readings, it seems to me, become problematic when 
broadening in scope to also account both for the geopolitical scope of the action in the novel and 
the geopolitical context in which the novel was written.  This chapter will argue that both the 
Creature's intellectual development and his inability to integrate in society are best understood 
through the radical philology of John Horne Tooke.  Such an understanding, I suggest, opens up 
to us what nationalism seems to have meant to Mary Shelley, and it provides a unique example 
of what I have been calling philological nationalism. 
 We can quickly recognize Rousseau's influence on Frankenstein.  As Paul A. Cantor puts 
it in Creature and Creator: Myth-Making and English Romanticism, “One could undertake a 
fairly simple interpretation of the monster's story in Rousseauian terms.  The monster as 
originally created corresponds to natural man; his fall is his fatal attraction to civil society; and 
his attempt to join the ranks of social men leads to his misery” (120).  And specifically, as Cantor 
also points out, the Creature's intellectual development “resembles Rousseau's speculations on 
the origins of speech and reasoning” (122).  Similarly, Anne K. Mellor has said, in Mary Shelley: 
Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters, “[Mary Shelley's] creature is Rousseau's natural man” (47).  
In broad enough strokes, the Rousseauian depiction is fair enough.  But while attempting to 
integrate in society is certainly the general cause of the Creature's misery, the precise reason for 
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this relationship seems a bit more slippery.  Mellor herself suggests that while Shelley “depicts 
Frankenstein's creature as Rousseau's natural man...she does not endorse Rousseau's view that 
the simple gratification of human passions will lead to virtuous behavior” (48).  Mellor goes on 
to argue that Mary Shelley's thoughts on pedagogy were “derived in large part from her father's 
espousal of Locke, and [emphasized] the role of the affections in the education of young 
children” (50).  However, Mellor points out that Victor's education had been couched in copious 
parental affection, and yet “his father's indulgence only encouraged his son's egotistical dreams 
of omnipotence” (50).  So, even guided by Lockean pedagogy, Shelley “registered a pervasive 
maternal anxiety: even if I love and nurture my child, even if I provide the best education of 
which I am capable, I may still produce a monster – and who is responsible for that?” (50).  The 
ultimate problem, according to Mellor, is that movement away from a Rousseauian natural state 
into civilization “entails a loss of freedom, a frustration of desire, and an enclosure within the 
prisonhouse of language or what Lacan has called the symbolic order” (50). 
 The tendency to proceed from recognizing a basic level of Rousseauvian influence to 
reading the Creature's developmental and social difficulties as Lacanian is a prevalent one in 
criticism of Frankenstein.  Margaret Homans presents, in Bearing the Word: Language and 
Female Experience in Nineteenth-Century Women's Writing, a thorough Lacanian argument that, 
in Frankenstein, “Shelley knew she was writing a criticism, not only of women’s self-
contradictory role in androcentric ontology, but also of the gendered myth of language that is part 
of that ontology” (110).  Shelley is taught this androcentric ontology, Homans argues, by her 
husband (and, to a lesser extent, Byron), and the male influence on her work, exerted 
overbearingly in the story-writing contest out of which Frankenstein grows, is so strong that she 
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feels as though she is forced to bear the male word as she would bear a child.  Homans concludes 
by arguing that the fate of the creature tells us that “It is only when both childbirth and a 
woman’s invention of stories are subordinated to the Law of the Father that they become 
monstrous” (118). 
 Peter Brooks, in his essay “‘Godlike Science / Unhallowed Arts’: Language, Nature, and 
Monstrosity” (1979), also gives a Lacanian reading of Frankenstein, arguing that the Creature is 
“a kind of accursed signifier” (218), and that the creature “uncovers the larger question of the 
arbitrariness, or immotivation, of the linguistic sign” (209).  On these points, Brooks points out 
how the creature “is in many respects an Enlightenment natural man, or noble savage; his first 
ideas demonstrate the processes of Lockean sensationalism and Hartleyan associationism” (208-
9).  This latter point by Brooks also represents an important trend, for Mellor, too, argues that the 
epistemological theories of Locke and Hartley bear on Frankenstein, suggesting that Mary 
Shelley adopts a “referential theory of language, in which sounds or words are conceived as 
pointing to objects or mental states,” (49).  It is crucial to note, though, that reference does not 
mean substantive connection.  Brooks's characterization of the Creature himself revealing “the 
arbitrariness, or immotivation, of the linguistic sign” is an apt description of what the Creature 
learns about actual language, in the process of acquiring it.  When observing and listening to the 
De Lacy family, the Creature quickly realizes that the words they use have no “apparent 
connexion with visible objects” (107). 
 What we are generally observing is a broad critical acknowledgment of disconnection as 
a central problem for the Creature, whether ontologically or epistemologically.  The critical 
problem for us as readers of Frankenstein is identifying which ontological and epistemological 
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models seem to bear the greatest influence on the novel.  The readings of the 1970s and 80s lean 
heavily toward the anachronistic psychoanalytic model of Lacan.  In much more recent work, 
William Keach suggests more of a return to the social context in which Frankenstein was 
conceived.  In Arbitrary Power, looking broadly at Romanticism's socio-political inheritance 
from the Enlightenment, Keach begins by pointing out that while William Blake “relentlessly 
repudiates the Lockean division of words from things, [Percy] Shelley – except in a few self-
consciously utopian moments – either accepts and confirms it, or finds its collapse cause for 
dismay” (36).  Keach argues that for Percy, “language never fully coincides with the mind’s 
perceptions of the world or of itself” (36), citing Percy’s declaration, in On Life, “How vain is it 
to think that words can penetrate the mystery of our being” (506).  As Keach further argues, 
Percy is probably most explicitly engaged with “the Lockean division of words from things” 
when he says in A Defence of Poetry, “language is arbitrarily produced by the Imagination and 
has relation to thoughts alone” (513).  It is Keach's suggestion that Percy’s adoption of this tenet 
– succinctly, the tenet of arbitrary signification – bears crucial influence on Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. 
 Locke of course remained highly relevant in English intellectual life in the Romantic 
period, but the preeminent contemporary English thinker who championed the principle of 
arbitrariness in language was John Horne Tooke.  As I have discussed, the full title of the 
Diversions – including Epea Ptereonta, or 'Winged Words' – evinces Tooke's belief that 
language's purpose is to communicate thoughts with the utmost thrift.  Tooke agreed with Locke 
– and thus also with Rousseau, Condillac, and Blair – that thoughts are motivated by empirical 
perception of things, and that words, in turn, signify only these thoughts, not things.  A degree of 
 114 
 
arbitrariness, therefore, is inherent in language.  Augmenting this inherent truth, though, in 
Tooke's estimation, was the need for thrift.  Tooke believed that thrift lead to progressive 
abstractness in modern languages, which, in turn, lead to increasingly (and dangerously) 
arbitrary meanings. 
 The Creature's process of epistemological growth – and specifically of language 
acquisition – dramatizes these principles of early philology.  The Creature recounts how, in his 
first days after rejection by Victor, he is pushed from attempted natural and solitary models of 
language to a social model of language.  The Creature recalls to Victor, “Sometimes I tried to 
imitate the pleasant songs of the birds, but was unable” (99).  The Creature resolves instead “to 
express my sensations in my own mode, but the uncouth and inarticulate sounds which broke 
from me frightened me into silence again” (99).  Imitative language is quickly ruled out.  After 
that, solitary language fails as well.  The Creature being frightened by the sound of his own voice 
is a tidy metaphor for the principle that language is inherently social.  Pointing out Tooke's belief 
that language's purpose was to communicate thoughts with dispatch takes as a foregone 
conclusion the principle that language's purpose is to communicate.  With no one else to hear the 
Creature speak, there can be no purpose in uttering words. 
 The Creature moves into language-proper when he observes society, in the form of the De 
Lacy family.  When observing the cottagers communicating, the Creature quickly discovers that 
the words they are using have no “apparent connexion with visible objects” (107).  Within this 
explicit framework of arbitrary signification, the first words the Creature learns are fire, milk, 
bread, and wood, and then the names of the cottagers.  At this early stage of his acquisition of 
language, the creature adds, “I distinguished several other words, without being able as yet to 
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understand or apply them; such as good, dearest, unhappy” (108).  This progression not only 
literalizes Tooke's philology, it is similar to Rousseau's theorization that “substantives were at 
first only so many proper nouns; the present infinitive was the sole tense of verbs; and the notion 
of adjectives must have developed only with great difficulty, because every adjective is an 
abstract word and abstractions are difficult and not very natural operations” (123).  Nouns come 
first, for the Creature, and adjectives are initially an inscrutable prospect, abstractions that they 
are. 
 So, my general suggestion is that we needn't turn to Lacan, that there was a philological 
discourse contemporary to Mary Shelley that makes a good deal of sense as a lens through which 
to read the parts of Frankenstein that are explicitly about language.  It is indeed strange that 
Tooke has been so overlooked as an influence on Frankenstein.  He was generally well known 
and respected in the period, but especially so in the radical circle in which Mary Shelley grew 
up.  We can readily see what allied Godwin and Tooke as thinkers.  The main foci of Godwin's 
Caleb Williams – published in the same year (1794) that Tooke found himself in the Tower of 
London on charges of high treason – are injustices perpetrated due to social stratification and the 
injustice of the legal system in England.  Godwin even explicitly weighed in on Tooke's treason 
trial, in “Cursory Strictures on the Charge Delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand 
Jury, October 2, 1794.”  Furthermore, let us remember that Frankenstein is set in the 1790s and 
inscribed “To William Godwin, Author of Political Justice, Caleb Williams, &c.”  My suggestion 
is that surrounding Frankenstein's dramatization of the philological principle of arbitrary 
signification, in the Creature's language acquisition, is a highly Tookean review of society and 
law.  Arbitrariness in language had profound socio-political implications in Shelley's day, and the 
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political climate in which Mary Shelley lived, it seems to me, is the very thing that is most lost in 
ontological and epistemological readings of Frankenstein that progress from Rousseau to Lacan. 
 Marilyn Butler's Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries recognizes this type of loss.  
Contrasting Frankenstein with Ann Radcliffe's highly psychological Gothic fiction, Butler calls 
Shelley's work “a non-realistic, non-behavioural general intellectual argument” (159).  Butler 
goes on, “It is of course open to any of us to claim that Mary Shelley's story is really about the 
unconscious, and ultimately her own.  This sort of assertion cannot easily be disproved; nor, 
using rigorous standards, can it be proved” (159).  Butler reads Frankenstein, however, as social, 
not psychological: “However the story may have rooted itself in the popular consciousness, as a 
study in the frightfulness of what may be within, it seems clearly designed to convey a social 
message” (159).  I am suggesting that no small part of this social message draws heavily upon 
the philology of Tooke.  Frankenstein seems to take interest in the arbitrariness that emerged in 
epistemology and ontology following some of the sweeping changes that the Enlightenment 
brought.  The general erosion of religion as a stabilizing force in society, the specific philological 
dismantling of the theory of divine language origins, and the therefore malleable and thus 
dangerous nature of language in society all appear in a Tookean light in Frankenstein. 
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II. Metaphysical Dissection 
 
As I have begun to suggest, one of the institutions in the crosshairs of Tooke's radical 
philology was religion.  To reiterate, Tooke says in The Diversions that the purpose of etymology 
is to “Lead us to the clear understanding of the words we use in discourse…But the importance 
rises higher, when we reflect upon the application of words to Metaphysics.  And when I say 
Metaphysics; you will be pleased to remember, that all general reasoning, all Politics, Law, 
Morality, and Divinity, are merely Metaphysic” (2: 121).  Tooke believed that morality and 
religion were pervaded by corruptions of language that amounted to “metaphysical jargon and 
false morality, which can only be dissipated by etymology” (2: 18).  The way that Tooke defines 
metaphysics suggests a profaning of morality and divinity.  In this sense, what Tooke is doing 
with philology, which is his foray into metaphysics, is one of the nationalism-attendant activities 
of the Enlightenment described by Benedict Anderson.  As I point out in my Introduction, 
Anderson argues that nationalism as a concept of community develops just as monarchical 
governmental systems are toppled and religious faith wanes.  And again, according to Anderson, 
language is central to both religious and national concepts of community: “if the sacred silent 
languages were the media through which the great global communities of the past were 
imagined, the reality of such apparitions depended on an idea largely foreign to the contemporary 
Western mind: the non-arbitrariness of the sign” (14).  As we have seen, the most fundamental 
tenet of the movement at the center of which Tooke stands is the arbitrariness of the sign. 
 The ‘Winged Words’ of the title of Tooke's work derives from his use of Mercury as a 
metaphor for language.  As Tooke believes that the purpose of language is to communicate 
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thoughts with dispatch, he sees the swift messenger Mercury as an apt embodiment of language.  
As “B” says at the end of the Introduction, "You mean to say that the errors of grammarians have 
arisen from supposing all words to be immediately either the signs of things or the signs of ideas: 
whereas in fact many words are merely abbreviations employed for dispatch, and are the signs of 
other words.  And that these are the artificial wings of mercury, by means of which the Argus 
eyes of philosophy have been cheated" (1: 21).  “H” agrees, and “B” then says, 
Well.  We can only judge of your opinion after we have heard how you maintain 
it.  Proceed, and strip him of his wings.  They seem easy enough to be taken off: 
for it strikes me now, after what you have said, that they are indeed put on in a 
peculiar manner, and do not, like those of other winged deities, make a part of his 
body.  You have only to loose the strings from his feet, and take off his cap.  
Come – let us see what sort of figure he will make without them. (1: 21-22) 
 
As we can see, the 'Winged Words' of Tooke's title is not only a reference to thrift in language, it 
is an ironicization of Mercury's divinity.  To strip him of his wings would be to render him unfit 
for his pantheon office as messenger of the gods.  The figurative suggestion for Tooke seems to 
be an affirmation of the doctrine of human language origins, which is of course congruent with 
the position maintained by the whole of The Diversions. 
 Attendant upon the prospect of stripping Mercury of his divinity is the emphasis on the 
construction of those deifying wings.  They are “put on in a peculiar manner,” and of course not 
actually part of his body, but rather an artificial apparatus.  Insofar as Mercury's hallmark of 
divinity is “put on in a peculiar manner,” his composition is rather arbitrary.  Mercury's divinity 
is not inherent, but rather contingent upon a construction that can be very easily removed: “You 
have only to loose the strings from his feet, and take off his cap.”  The way Tooke interpreted – 
or appropriated – the allegorical classical god seems in this sense aimed at embodying his own 
adherence to the doctrine of arbitrary signification. 
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 We can find more explicit evidence elsewhere in The Diversions for Tooke's espousal of 
the doctrines of human language origins and arbitrary signification, but his allocation of the 
metaphorical Mercury should be interesting for readers of Frankenstein.  The idea of dissecting 
Hermes (from whom we derive 'hermeneutics') suggests the study of language as an undertaking 
of scientific materialism and appropriates the body as a metaphor for his branch of epistemology.  
This was not lost on William Hazlitt, who, in The Spirit of the Age, described Tooke's philology 
by saying, "Mr. Tooke, in fact, treated words as the chemists do substances" (55).  Hazlitt also 
calls the Diversions "Horne Tooke's genuine anatomy of our native tongue" (128, my italics). 
 In describing Caleb Williams (1794), William Godwin used a similar metaphor: "the thing 
in which my imagination revelled the most freely, was the analysis of the private and internal 
operations of the mind, employing my metaphysical dissecting knife in tracing and laying bare 
the involutions of motive, and recording the gradually accumulating impulses, which led the 
personages I had to describe primarily to adopt the particular way of proceeding in which they 
afterwards embarked."  William Brewer has said about this, "in Godwin's view, literary works 
can serve as thought-experiments in the 'science' of mental anatomy.  They are imaginary 
laboratories in which writers can conduct psychological experiments on their characters, 
laboratories in which they can control the variables of environment, education, and situation, and 
attempt to determine their effects on a given personality" (19-20).  Godwin is interested in 
performing 'metaphysical dissection': observing how various stimuli to the mind influence 
action.  As Brewer notes, it is a psycho-social project, befitting the radical Godwin.  Tooke's 
work on Hermes is metaphysical dissection: the analysis of language to lay bare corruption in 
“Politics, Law, Morality, and Divinity.” 
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 My suggestion is that in Frankenstein – a novel set in the 1790's and inscribed "To 
William Godwin, Author of Political Justice, Caleb Williams, &c." – something similar is going 
on surrounding the scientific work of Victor on the Creature.  The Creature himself and the 
action surrounding him seem to dramatize the epistemological and ontological changes of 
Shelley's day.  Viewed through the lens of an intellectual context that bore heavily on Mary 
Shelley, the scientific experiment that is the Creature seems like an occasion for metaphysical 
dissection in the Tookean-Godwinian sense.  As we look at the creation of the Creature, and 
some of the basic challenges that he faces -- and in turn creates for Victor -- Frankenstein seems 
at pains to dramatize a human and imperfect model of epistemology, and specifically language. 
 To begin with, Victor’s intellectual progression toward creation figuratively follows the 
path of early philology’s genesis and growth, specifically emphasizing the importance of 
material science.  To a great extent, Victor’s initial frustration at Ingolstadt comes from a 
resistance to Enlightenment thinking.  He sums it up best himself when he says, 
…I had a contempt for the uses of modern natural philosophy.  It was very 
different, when the masters of the science sought immortality and power; such 
views, although futile, were grand: but now the scene was changed.  The ambition 
of the inquirer seemed to limit itself to the annihilation of those visions on which 
my interest in science was chiefly founded.  I was required to exchange chimeras 
of boundless grandeur for realities of little worth. (41) 
 
Victor’s sentiment here is a prime example of the type of impulse traditionally deemed 
quintessentially Romantic: he possesses ambition for possibilities in defiance with crude 
materialism.  Waldman successfully captures his attention, though, and tells him to focus on the 
material, saying, “‘If your wish is to become really a man of science, and not merely a petty 
experimentalist, I should advise you to apply to every branch of natural philosophy, including 
mathematics’” (43). 
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 Victor of course proceeds to apply himself to material science, artificially constructing a 
Creature.  Victor’s initial description of the Creature is a description by a student of anatomy, 
standing over a dissection (or construction, if there were such a thing) table: 
How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch 
whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form?  His limbs 
were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful.  Beautiful! – Great 
God!  His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; 
his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but 
these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that 
seemed almost of the same colour as the dun sockets in which they were set, his 
shrivelled complexion, and straight black lips. (52) 
 
Most striking to me here is the fact that the Creature is functional, scientifically speaking – “His 
limbs were in proportion,” he has all the components of a living human, and of course we know 
that he goes on to be physically hearty and mentally highly educable; he is just not superficially 
beautiful.  In The Spirit of the Age, Hazlitt said that Tooke saw "language stripped of the clothing 
of habit or sentiment, or the disguises of doting pedantry, naked in its cradle, in its primitive 
state" (54).  The Creature is very much like this.  We do not see a thing handed down from 
heaven, made in a divine image.  We see, rather, a crude, blank slate, shaped (and to be further 
shaped) by human hands.  The Creature is a man-made thing that, in truth, is very ugly in its 
composition, but is very functional, and very malleable -- neither inherently good nor inherently 
bad.  This all amounts to an effectual dramatization of Tooke's appropriation of Mercury. 
 In some ways, Victor's response to the living Creature he has just created is the crux of 
the entire novel.  After beholding the imperfect appearance of the Creature, Victor flees in horror.  
The creature persists, as, lying in bed mortified, Victor again sees the creature, saying, “He held 
up the curtain of the bed; and his eyes, if eyes they may be called, were fixed on me.  His jaws 
opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin wrinkled his cheeks.  He might 
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have spoken, but I did not hear; one hand was stretched out, seemingly to detain me, but I 
escaped, and rushed down stairs” (53).  Without the persuasive linguistic ability he will later 
possess, the Creature lacks the ability to detain Victor.  We see, here, why the metaphor of 
Mercury, the metaphor of metaphysical dissection, and the artificial construction of the Creature 
is so important -- why dramatizing language not as a divine but as a human institution is so 
important: without a providential Creator giving the gift of infallible language, communication is 
subject to insufficiency and arbitrary judgment, which we see in Victor's flight from the Creature. 
 The most obvious way in which Frankenstein gestures toward an erosion of religion is 
with Victor usurping the position of God as autonomous Creator of life.  We needn't trace all of 
the material in the novel dealing with the Creature as a forsaken Adam (or as a vengeful Satan), 
lost without a nurturing God-figure.  What is significant for us, though, is how the Creature 
explicitly makes the connection between religion and language.  When he begins to observe the 
De Lacy family using language to express themselves to one another, he ironically characterizes 
language as “godlike science” (107).  This characterization encapsulates the usurpation that 
Victor has accomplished, and it dramatizes the epistemological shift in the 18th century.  As the 
Creature soon discovers, though, language is scientific, not godlike; it is an imperfect human 
construction, subject to arbitrary meanings assigned it by human society, and anything but 
providential.  For this reason, we see a society prone to linguistic dysfunction, and this linguistic 
dysfunction has powerful social ramifications.  At several crucial points in the novel, downturn -- 
or downright catastrophe -- follows from the absence of linguistic articulation. 
 The first of these catastrophes for the Creature we have seen: his rejection by his Creator.  
After that rejection, without the social construct of language, the Creature is in the 'savage' pre-
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social state that Rousseau describes thus: "Man's first language, the...only language he needed 
before it was necessary to persuade assembled men, is the cry of nature.  As this cry was elicited 
only by a kind of instinct in pressing emergencies...it was not of much use in the ordinary course 
of life, when more moderate sentiments prevail" (122).  Of the first night that he can recall, the 
Creature says, “I was a poor, helpless, miserable wretch; I knew, and could distinguish, nothing; 
but, feeling pain invade me on all sides, I sat down and wept” (98).  The Creature lacks the 
ability to comprehend the world around him, and he likewise lacks the ability to articulate his 
feelings and needs in any kind of productive way.  This ineffectual weeping will return to the 
Creature later at a crucial point. 
 Similarly, when the Creature begins to wonder about his own origins relative to the 
society that he observes, he follows his summary question of “What was I?” by saying, “The 
question again recurred, to be answered only with groans” (117).  The connection increasingly 
being dramatized by the Creature is between socialization and linguistic articulation, exemplified 
here in the negative. 
 The Creature actually goes on to make this connection explicitly.  Facing his hideous 
appearance and void of ancestry, the Creature says, “although I eagerly longed to discover myself 
to the cottagers, I ought not to make the attempt until I had first become master of their language; 
which knowledge might enable me to make them overlook the deformity of my figure” (109).  The 
Creature conjectures that societal integration hinges on linguistic proficiency. 
 Accordingly, when the Creature tries to build upon De Lacy's pledge to help him by 
revealing his true identity, the outcome of the situation hinges on language.  As the Creature 
recounts to Victor, “This, I thought, was the moment of decision, which was to rob me of, or bestow 
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happiness on me for ever.  I struggled vainly for firmness sufficient to answer him, but the effort 
destroyed all my remaining strength; I sank on the chair, and sobbed aloud.  At that moment I heard 
the steps of my younger protectors” (131).  When the Creature has a chance to speak his revelation 
to the old man, he instead falls mute, and then begins to cry.  This constitutes a reversion to the 
pre-social linguistic state in which the Creature found himself when alone in the woods on the first 
night of his existence that he can recall – the ineffectual state that the Creature has sought to 
develop beyond.  The immediate result is the entrance of persons who perceive his hideous 
appearance and arbitrarily judge him. 
 When Felix attacks the Creature, the Creature retreats to his hovel, and then, “When night 
came, I quitted my retreat, and wandered in the wood; and now, no longer restrained by the fear of 
discovery, I gave vent to my anguish in fearful howlings.  I was like a wild beast that had broken 
the toils” (132).  The Creature here seems to confirm the social importance of language by 
responding to society's denial by reverting to an animalistic state, responding only instinctively to 
a sensation of grief, expressing himself only in ineffectual cries. 
 Interestingly enough, Victor at several points dramatizes a similar connection – between 
linguistic articulation and societal order.  When returning to Geneva following the murder of his 
brother, Victor reflects on the prospect of discovering the existence of the Creature to the 
authorities, saying, “I remembered also the nervous fever with which I had been seized just at the 
time that I dated my creation, and which would give an air of delirium to a tale otherwise so utterly 
improbable.  I well knew that if any other had communicated such a relation to me, I should have 
looked upon it as the ravings of insanity” (72).  Victor is pushed further in this direction after 
Justine's trial.  When Elizabeth and Victor are visiting Justine’s cell, Victor hides in the corner of 
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the cell during the ladies’ conversation.  Victor has already refused to utter revelation of the actual 
murderer’s identity, and his only response to hearing the conversation of Justine and Elizabeth is, 
“I gnashed my teeth, and ground them together, uttering a groan that came from my inmost soul” 
(83).  This catches Justine’s attention, and she then beseeches him not to believe her guilty, but 
instead of responding to her, Victor simply narrates, “I could not answer” (83).  The anguished 
groan and the inability to communicate in language are an unmistakable plunging of Victor into 
the status of a pre-social 'savage,' reminiscent of the Creature before the accidental tutelage of the 
De Lacy family.  And literally, of course, Victor's inability to articulate the true cause of the 
destruction that has been visited upon Geneva means that further injustice will be perpetrated. 
 Victor falls into a similar state of linguistic dysfunction after the murder of Clerval.  While 
Victor mentions vaguely that he knows the murderer of William and internally accuses himself of 
that crime around the time of Justine’s trial, he openly raves upon seeing Clerval’s body, “‘Have 
my murderous machinations deprived you also, my dearest Henry, of life?  Two I have already 
destroyed’” (174); and he continues, in his unconscious fever, to call “[himself] the murderer of 
William, Justine, and of Clerval” (174).  Ironically, the magistrate hears this but, astute as he is 
with physical criminal evidence, does not ultimately assign any meaning to the ravings.  All of 
Victor's ravings are of course inaccurate, so they move the magistrate no closer to the true identity 
of the murderer and thus to justice.  Victor continues to despair and rave to his father after his 
acquittal, but he never explicitly reveals the existence of the Creature. 
 The Creature's mode of perpetrating injustice draws the instances of linguistic 
dysfunction together in a very potent symbolic way.  When arguing with his first victim, William, 
the Creature says to the boy, “‘I do not intend to hurt you; listen to me’” (139).  The Creature is 
 126 
 
still operating on the hope that he can use language to overcome his hideousness.  On a 
conscious level, the Creature is most motivated to his next action by the revelation that the boy is 
associated with Victor, and so he kills the boy.  But about the murder, the Creature says, “The 
child struggled, and loaded me with epithets which carried despair to my heart: I grasped his 
throat to silence him, and in a moment he lay dead at my feet” (139).  The Creature stresses the 
pain that he feels from having inaccurate language applied to identify him (the “epithets”), and 
he characterizes his purpose in that moment as the desire to “silence” the boy's words. 
 This spontaneous response becomes the Creature's modus operandi.  After the Creature 
murders Elizabeth, Victor is forced to gaze upon the “murderous mark of the fiend’s grasp…on 
her neck” (193), just as there has been the “black mark of fingers” on Clerval’s neck (172), just as 
William has been strangled.  The Creature’s choice of strangulation as the method of killing each 
of his victims continues to metaphorically assault conduits (the victims' throats) of linguistic 
expression.  We have seen the Creature go from hoping to gain societal acceptance by becoming 
“master of their language,” to strangling innocent people to death.  This movement seems almost 
to have been inevitable, though, given the philological underpinnings that slowly became evident 
to the Creature.  After his own creation, he could only mutter to his Creator, and was rejected.  In 
a crucial moment of hoped societal integration, the Creature reverted to natural cries.  At several 
points, the Creator himself digressed into linguistic dysfunction.  Language has appeared as 
anything but “godlike;” it has rather been an ugly human creation arbitrary in construction and use, 
and thus prone to engendering disorder.  The language-inflected catastrophes that seem to follow 
both the Creature and Victor seem to dramatize the Tookean principle that the polities binding their 
society were founded upon the use -- or misuse -- of language. 
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III. "the sanguinary laws of man" 
 
 The social disorder attendant upon the linguistic dysfunction we have traced so far has 
taken place on a relatively microcosmic level.  Nevertheless, we are seeing larger legal systems 
repeatedly drawn into this action.  If religion was an institution that looked different with a new 
paradigm of language as a human institution, so was law, to just as great an extent.  Of course, 
the general social backdrop of Frankenstein was a tense one.  Far from ending all societal 
upheaval, the ending of the war in 1815 may actually have heightened social turmoil at home.  
Marilyn Butler calls 1816 “a year when the stability of society seemed in question” (119).  
Increasing mechanization in agriculture was already displacing droves of laborers when the 
militia disbanded and saturated the labor market with countless more men looking for work.  
This lead to machine-breaking and radical calls for reform.  We of course think forward to the 
Peterloo Massacre in 1819, but Peterloo is in some ways the culmination of a trend.  Unsettling 
sentiment had grown enough through 1816 that Habeas Corpus was repealed in early 1817, to 
suppress opposition to the establishment.  Yet this was not the first time in the period that Habeas 
Corpus had been repealed.  Few intellectuals had felt the repeal of Habeas Corpus – which Butler 
calls “that safeguard against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and most resonant of statutes [to 
writers]” (146) – like Tooke did in the 1790s. 
 The lot of English radicals in the 1790s was a fight against governmental suppression of 
revolutionary ideas.  Vehemently questioning the authority and justness of the institutions that 
ordered society, thinkers like Godwin and Tooke found themselves subject to reprisals from 
those very institutions, by means of what they believed to be empty rhetoric.  This manipulation 
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of law reverberated Tooke's analysis of the very word 'Law.'  In the Diversions, Tooke traces the 
etymology of 'Law' as Anglo-Saxon, and as a root verb meaning “Laid down” or “Ordered” (2: 
8).  As Olivia Smith reads the significance of this, in The Politics of Language: 1791-1819, law 
“is a human activity susceptible to discussion and change…If ‘law’ is a verb, then actions can 
alter it” (132).  Such a belief – which I agree was the undergirding to Tooke's etymology – is a 
double-edged sword.  If 'Law' can be altered by human actions, then revolutionary movement is 
justifiable and can be effectual.  By the same token, though, 'Law' is subject to manipulation by 
those holding positions of power in society.  This latter edge of the sword was of course the one 
that Tooke and his ilk found themselves rubbing up against. 
 Indeed, Tooke believed that his own trial “afforded a very striking instance of the 
importance of the meaning of words; not only (as has been too lightly supposed) to 
Metaphysicians and Schoolmen, but to the rights and happiness of mankind in their dearest 
concerns – the decisions of Courts of Justice” (1: 79).  This very line of thinking was used by 
William Godwin in Tooke's defense.  In "Cursory Strictures on the Charge Delivered by Lord 
Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand Jury, October 2, 1794," Godwin says, "Let us understand the 
ground on which we stand.  Are we to understand that...[legal]...reasonings are to be adduced 
from the axioms and dictums of moralists and metaphysicians, and that men are to convicted, 
sentenced, and executed, upon these?" (13).  The peril, Godwin understood (as Tooke did), was 
that "the man most deeply read in the laws of his country, and most assiduously conforming his 
actions to them, shall be liable to be arraigned and capitally punished for a crime, that no law 
describes...at the arbitrary pleasure of the administration" (13).  We hear some explicit echoes in 
Frankenstein of such manipulation.  In the history of Safie, the Creature says about Safie's father 
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that, "for some reason I could not learn, he became obnoxious to the government.  He was seized 
and cast into prison" (118).  We also hear of the De Lacy family having to await trial for five 
months, recalling Tooke's six-month stay in the Tower of London with Habeas Corpus 
suspended.  Shunning Habeas Corpus was one manifestation of the general manipulation by 
those in power in the 1790s.  The root issue was the suppression of any decentralizing political 
movement.  Prejudicial wielding of power is a tidy means of such suppression.  We find in 
Frankenstein a long series of experiences for the Creature in which society is arbitrarily cruel to 
him in what are described as adjudicatory processes.  There is a profusion of such adjudicatory 
processes in the novel, all of them dramatizing what Tooke both theorized and experienced.  The 
Creature suffers repeatedly at the hands of what Godwin succinctly described as "fiction, 
hypothesis, and prejudication" (32). 
 In laying out his theory of the 'noble savage,' Rousseau maintains that the root of evil in 
society is private property and competition.  In Frankenstein, the Creature consciously fears that 
he will not be accepted in society because he has no property and wealth.  Nevertheless, the 
communal goodwill that he extends to the De Lacy family is ineffectual for the Creature.  He is 
still rejected by them on completely arbitrary grounds: his appearance.  The specific wording of 
this rejection seems to break down the Rousseauvian paradigm yet further and take a decidedly 
Tookean view of 'Morality' and 'Law.'  When the creature first tells De Lacy that he is afraid of 
being rejected by the friends to whom he is going, De Lacy responds to the creature, “‘the hearts 
of men, when unprejudiced by any obvious self-interest, are full of brotherly love and charity’” 
(130).  The creature responds to De Lacy recognizing the crux that the old man highlights, saying, 
“‘They are kind…but, unfortunately, they are prejudiced against me.  I have good dispositions; my 
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life has been hitherto harmless, and, in some degree, beneficial; but a fatal prejudice clouds their 
eyes, and where they ought to see a feeling and kind friend, they behold only a detestable monster’” 
(130).  In the next paragraph, the creature says to De Lacy, “‘they believe that I wish to injure them, 
and it is that prejudice which I wish to overcome’” (130).  To again assuage the creature, De Lacy 
says, “‘I am blind, and cannot judge your countenance, but there is something in your words which 
persuades me that you are sincere’” (130); and, a short space later, De Lacy adds, “‘I and my family 
have been condemned, although innocent: judge, therefore, if I do not feel for your misfortunes’” 
(131).  And when Felix, Agatha, and Safie unexpectedly return, the creature says to the old man, 
in desperation, “‘Do not you desert me in the hour of trial!’” (131).  What the creature seeks from 
De Lacy is, to employ a cliché, blind justice.  The issue at hand is ‘prejudice,’ in the repeated words 
of both men, versus sound judgment – judgment based upon misleading signs versus judgment 
based upon actual things.  And the creature even goes so far as to explicitly liken the exchange to 
a trial.  The verdict of the Creature’s pseudo-trial, of course, is exile based upon prejudice. 
 After the Creature leaves the De Lacy family, we continue to see encounters that dramatize 
Tookean arbitrary injustice.  While traveling toward Geneva to commence his campaign of 
vengeance against Victor, the Creature inadvertently reverts to instinctive good will.  While 
walking through a forest, he is instinctively, uncontrollably cheered by the sensations of a beautiful 
spring day, and then hears the sound of voices nearby.  He hides from view, then witnesses a young 
girl fall into the swift river nearby.  Without thinking, the Creature rushes out of hiding and rescues 
the girl from the water.  As he is attempting to revive her, someone (probably the girl’s father) 
finds them, snatches the girl from him in horror, and flees.  The Creature instinctively follows them, 
and, in fear, the man shoots the creature.  As the Creature puts it, “This was then the reward of my 
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benevolence!  I had saved a human being from destruction, and, as a recompence, I now writhed 
under the miserable pain of a wound, which shattered the flesh and bone” (137-8). 
Learning better and better how arbitrarily cruel society is, the Creature checks his 
instinctive good will.  However, after reaching the vicinity of Geneva, the Creature calculates an 
opportunity to gain acceptance in some sort of society.  He says about being approached by a child, 
“Suddenly, as I gazed on him, an idea seized me, that this little creature was unprejudiced, and had 
lived too short a time to have imbibed a horror of deformity.  If, therefore, I could seize him, and 
educate him as my companion and friend, I should not be so desolate in this peopled earth” (138).  
However, the boy (who turns out to be William Frankenstein) is horrified by the Creature’s 
appearance, and says to him, “‘My papa is a Syndic – he is M. Frankenstein – he would punish 
you’” (139).  The answer to the Creature’s hope to overcome prejudice is the threat of the criminal 
justice system. 
 After murdering young William, the Creature's narrative verbally echoes Godwin's 
characterization of Tooke's trial.  The Creature takes the picture of Elizabeth, then proceeds to 
plant it on Justine Moritz in a deliberate attempt to frame her, saying, “thanks to the lessons of 
Felix, and the sanguinary laws of man, I have learned how to work mischief” (140, my italics).  
Godwin characterized Tooke's trial as a process of "wild conjecture," "premature presumption," 
and "dreams...full of sanguinary and tremendous prophecy" (18, my italics).  The Creature has 
learned to regard the institution of law much as Godwin did (and as Tooke does in the Diversions): 
sanguinary -- a system subject to manipulation, being more often the cause of bloodshed than of 
justice. 
 The actual workings of the legal system that we do see in the novel suggest the system as 
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a model of injustice inflected by highly fallible interpretation.  In the false conviction of Justine, 
there is physical evidence produced against Justine, in the form of the picture from her pocket.  
There is witness testimony against her.  There are circumstantial facts presented to establish that 
she was logistically capable of being the murderer.  Justine’s body language is presented as 
evidence – her mood around the time of the crime, her reaction to being shown the body, and even 
her countenance during the trial are all examined as pieces of evidence.  Further emphasizing the 
trial as a play of heuristics is Justine’s appeal that “‘I hope the character I have always borne will 
incline my judges to a favourable interpretation, where any circumstance appears doubtful or 
suspicious’” (78, my italics). 
 After the court reaching a verdict on Justine, Victor is told by an officer of the court “that 
Justine had already confessed her guilt.  ‘That evidence,’ he observed, ‘was hardly required in so 
glaring a case, but I am glad of it; and, indeed, none of our judges like to condemn a criminal upon 
circumstantial evidence, be it ever so decisive’” (81).  If a defendant persists with a plea of 
innocence, a court condemnation would technically be a matter of the court's interpretation, alone.  
If, conversely, a defendant ultimately confesses, the court may say that instead of deducing a 
verdict based upon interpretation, truth has revealed itself, leaving no room for doubt.  This seems 
to be the court's logic in having a clear conscience over the conviction of Justine. 
 We learn, however, that the court has been highly manipulative to secure itself a clear 
conscience.  In arguably the most stark dramatization of Tooke's characterization of institutions of 
power in society, we come to learn that Justine’s confession had been coerced.  She tells Elizabeth, 
“‘I did confess; but I confessed a lie.  I confessed, that I might obtain absolution…Ever since I was 
condemned, my confessor has besieged me…He threatened excommunication and hell fire in my 
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last moments, if I continued obdurate’” (82).  Justine’s confession again calls into question the 
validity of religion as a polity.  In the Diversions, Tooke asserts that Church is nothing more than 
an adjective, and that Fate, Heaven, Hell, Providence, Prudence, Fiend, Angel, Spirit, True, False, 
Just, Right, and Wrong, likewise, “are all merely Participles poetically embodied, and substantiated 
by those who use them” (2: 19).  The powerful institution that is the Church, in Frankenstein, has 
colluded with the legal system and used its power to coerce a confession from Justine.  Does a 
confessor really have the power to subject Justine to Hell?  The Tookean model suggests that 
because it is an abstraction, Hell can be effectively substantiated by a man of power wielding it; 
indeed this seems to have been the case with Justine.  Likewise, another huge abstraction is wielded 
by the confessor: Excommunication.  Excommunication is, of course, nothing tangible; it is, 
technically, an institution’s regard for an individual.  This is a slippery concept, and, again, it is 
seemingly substantiated by the man using the word.  Justine wishes not to be excluded from one 
abstraction – the Church – because exclusion from that abstraction would mean inclusion in 
another even more important abstraction – Hell – and this league is threatened via another 
abstraction – Excommunication. 
 Elizabeth seems to recognize what is at play in this scene.  After hearing Justine’s account 
of the coerced confession, Elizabeth indicts the society in which they live, saying, 
'when one creature is murdered, another is immediately deprived of life in a slow 
torturing manner; then the executioners, their hands yet reeking with the blood of 
innocence, believe that they have done a great deed.  They call this retribution.  
Hateful name!  When that word is pronounced, I know greater and more horrid 
punishments are going to be inflicted than the gloomiest tyrant has ever invented to 
satiate his utmost revenge.’ (83) 
 
Elizabeth perceives that a ‘hateful name’ – an italicized ‘word that is pronounced’ – is the vehicle 
of woe, here.  The abstraction Retribution is employed to justify action, vindicated by virtue of 
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being wielded by men of power, wielded to order society in a proper hierarchy of power.  A few 
pages later, Elizabeth explicitly sums up the social implications of the manipulation in Justine’s 
trial: “‘Alas! Victor, when falsehood can look so like truth, who can assure themselves of certain 
happiness?’” (88).  Again, according to Tooke, such things as 'falsehood' and 'truth' are not absolute 
things at all – they “are all merely Participles poetically embodied, and substantiated by those who 
use them.”  When such substantiation is not “dissipated by etymology,” as Tooke put it – or, 
challenged intellectually – the result is a justice system that amounts to "dreams...full of 
sanguinary and tremendous prophecy," as Godwin put it, and as the Creature learns. 
 Elizabeth again explicitly summarizes what seems to be the novel's position on the legal 
proceedings and their societal import when she says, “'When I reflect, my dear cousin,' said she, 
'on the miserable death of Justine Moritz, I no longer see the world and its works as they before 
appeared to me.  Before, I looked upon the accounts of vice and injustice, that I read in books or 
heard from others, as tales of ancient days, or imaginary evils; at least they were remote, and more 
familiar to reason than to the imagination; but now misery has come home, and men appear to me 
as monsters thirsting for each other's blood'” (88).  This powerful statement from Elizabeth 
suggests a transhistorical paradigm shift, in her perception.  A demystification has occurred for 
Elizabeth; her "world and its works" are man-made and sanguinary, rife with injustice.  
Furthermore, the metaphor that Shelley puts in Elizabeth's mouth -- the metaphor of the people of 
her society being "monsters thirsting for each other's blood" -- clearly points to the Creature as a 
vehicle for literalizing and critiquing what Mary Shelley believes is latent (or patent) in society. 
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IV. Deserts of a New World 
  
Let us reiterate Elizabeth's question to Victor, prompted by Justine's trial: "when falsehood 
can look so like truth, who can assure themselves of certain happiness?’” (88).  We have seen 
where meaning -- whether it be ontological meaning, or the epistemological search for meanings 
-- has become very unstable in a very Tookean way in Frankenstein.  I have suggested that we find 
the legal systems in the novel fraught with philological manipulation, that the Creature's murderous 
modus operandi is a potent philological metaphor, that general social dysfunction is often attended 
by linguistic dysfunction for both the Creature and for his creator, and that language as a fallible 
human -- not divine -- institution is foregrounded in the novel.  I have also suggested that the 
Creature himself, as a utilitarian but artificial construction, embodies Tooke's philology, recalling 
the dissection of Mercury early in The Diversions.  The Creature acting as this sort of embodiment 
perhaps becomes clearer as the plot of the novel moves toward conclusion. 
I have suggested that the Creature's creation by Victor dramatizes that when language is 
not a divine but a human institution, there is no providential Creator giving the gift of perfect and 
stable language; meaning is thus subject to dangerous instability.  If the Creature literalizes this 
sort of paradigm, some of his messages to his Creator toward the conclusion of the plot extend this 
dangerous instability to an extreme degree.  When pressuring Victor to create for him a female 
companion, he says, “‘You are my creator, but I am your master; -- obey!’” (165).  When leading 
Victor toward the North pole, the Creature leaves him a message that reads, “‘My reign is not yet 
over;…you live, and my power is complete’” (202).  Following Victor's death the Creature says to 
Walton about his own murdering spree, “‘Evil thenceforth became my good’” (218).  Similar to 
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when Elizabeth laments over the fate of Justine, "'when falsehood can look so like truth, who can 
assure themselves of certain happiness?'", the Creature sets up for his Creator and for Walton some 
profound inversions, both ontological and epistemological. 
The enabling force behind the propensity for these inversions is again figured at Victor's 
death.  With Victor lying in a coffin, Walton walks into his cabin to find the following scene: “Over 
[Victor] hung a form which I cannot find words to describe; gigantic in stature, yet uncouth and 
distorted in its proportions.  As he hung over the coffin, his face was concealed by long locks of 
ragged hair; but one vast hand was extended, in colour and apparent texture like that of a mummy” 
(216).  The scene is reminiscent of the scene following the Creature's creation, in which the 
Creature looks on Victor lying in bed, mutters inarticulately, and reaches a hand out toward Victor 
unsuccessfully.  Walton describing the Creature as "a form" suggests metaphorical significance in 
the Creature, and "distorted" is an apt descriptor for epistemological and ontological meaning in 
the novel.  The distinctly philological character to these distortions even seems to come out in the 
fact that the Creature strikes Walton as a thing that eludes conventional linguistic signification, 
thus a "form which I cannot find words to describe".  The Creature himself sums up why he is 
repeatedly rejected by society when he says to Victor, “‘the human senses are insurmountable 
barriers to our union’” (141). 
Given the insurmountable barriers that the human senses are, the Creature demands from 
Victor “‘a creature of another sex, but as hideous as myself’” (142).  After some vacillation, Victor 
is moved by both the pathos and logos of the Creature’s argument, and he consents to create a 
partner as requested.  However, later, during the process of creation, Victor reflects on the potential 
dangers of creating a female for the Creature: 
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He had sworn to quit the neighbourhood of man, and hide himself in deserts; but 
she had not; and she, who in all probability was to become a thinking and reasoning 
animal, might refuse to comply with a compact made before her creation…Even if 
they were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts of the new world, yet one of the 
first results of those sympathies for which the daemon thirsted would be children, 
and a race of devils would be propagated upon the earth, who might make the very 
existence of the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror. (163) 
 
Ultimately, Victor fears that two creatures united might become a sanguinary race, threatening to 
humanity.  The irony of this fear, after the sanguinary depiction that European society has been 
given in the novel, is clear enough.  Be that as it may, the reference that this passage makes to the 
Creature’s desire to form a harmonious new society in a new world explicitly frames the Creature's 
fate in terms of the revolutionary bent of the 1790s, a time, for radicals, of hopes for "human nature 
seeming born again," and renovated societies replacing old tyrannies. 
 This revolutionary bent is magnified by the actual narrative framing of the novel.  Robert 
Walton's epistolary narrative, which frames the novel, is primarily concerned with a quest for a 
new land.  What Walton expects to find is curiously resonant with some of the Tookean concerns 
in the novel.  Walton writes home to England, 
I try in vain to be persuaded that the pole is the seat of frost and desolation; it ever 
presents itself to my imagination as the region of beauty and delight.  There, 
Margaret, the sun is constantly visible for more than half the year; its broad disk 
just skirting the horizon, and diffusing perpetual splendour.  There…snow and 
frost are banished; and, sailing over a calm sea, we may be wafted to a land 
surpassing in wonders and in beauty every region hitherto discovered on the 
habitable globe.  Its productions and features may be without example, as the 
phenomena of the heavenly bodies undoubtedly are in those undiscovered 
solitudes.  What may not be expected in a country ruled by different laws and in 
which numerous circumstances enforce a belief that the aspect of nature differs 
essentially from anything of which we have any experience.  I may there discover 
the wondrous power which attracts the needle; and may regulate a thousand 
celestial observations, that require only this voyage to render their seeming 
eccentricities consistent for ever.  I shall satiate my ardent curiosity with the sight 
of a part of the world never before visited, and may tread a land never before 
imprinted by the foot of man. (9-10) 
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In the first half of this passage, Walton emphasizes natural harmony, with fair weather and calm 
seas.  Walton defines such an empirical realm as “a country ruled by different laws”.  Speaking 
literally of laws of nature, Walton's diction carries strong social connotations.  As we have seen, 
much of the material framed by this quest of Walton's has been concerned with the laws by 
which countries are ruled, depicting sanguinary institutions that produce discord rather than 
natural harmony.  This sense in Walton's imagination is further augmented by the idea of treading 
"a land never before imprinted by the foot of man."  In the narratives framed by Walton, we see 
society's footprint marring the Creature's natural goodness.  It is thus fitting that, like the 
Creature explicitly desires to retreat to an untouched land in order to find social harmony, Walton 
imagines something like a natural utopia at the undiscovered North pole. 
 Perhaps the most symbolically potent of Walton's motives to reach the North pole is the 
most obvious: to "discover the wondrous power which attracts the needle".  In the simplest literal 
terms, Walton's quest is to find the referent of the sign 'N' on a compass.  Considered thus, we 
needn't strain to see the parallel between this endeavor and Tookean etymology.  Walton's 
undertaking is one of geographical etymology.  Moreover, it is upon reaching the geographical 
referent that Walton imagines finding "a country ruled by different laws" -- laws of natural harmony.  
Throughout the novel, we have seen language manipulated -- etymology disregarded -- to create 
social discord.  In hoping to find a utopian society at a sort of geographical root logos, Walton's 
quest figuratively makes the Tookean connection between philology and societal order. 
  Walton never actually reaches this natural ideal.  The Creature says that he is leaving 
Walton's cabin to kindle a funeral pyre under himself at the North pole, but we never actually see 
the Creature reach that point, as he ebbs away into obscurity, exiting much as he entered society 
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in the novel: "He sprung from the cabin-window...upon the ice-raft which lay close to the vessel.  
He was soon borne away by the waves, and lost in darkness and distance" (221).  The geographical 
referent of the 'N' of the compass remains an obscurity located somewhere in a veritable 'desert of 
a new world.'  This new world has proven an inhospitable arctic wasteland.  Instead of colonizing 
the Americas with a bride, the Creature has come to an undiscovered land to confirm an ultimate 
meaninglessness, figured in the mutual destruction of himself and his creator.  Walton's quest for 
a sort of natural utopia and the Creature's fleeting desire find a pristine settling land are 
manifestations of a desire we see elsewhere in the novel.  Early in his narration to Walton, Victor 
says, “'how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world” (48).  To 
console Victor after Justine’s trial, Elizabeth tells him, “‘We surely shall be happy: quiet in our 
native country, and not mingling in the world, what can disturb our tranquility?’” (89).  When 
Victor is in final northward pursuit of the Creature, he says, “During the day I was sustained and 
inspirited by the hope of night; for in sleep I saw my friends, my wife, and my beloved country" 
(202).  When the Creature begins to realize that he does not fit in the society he desires to join, he 
thinks, “Oh, that I had for ever remained in my native wood, nor known or felt beyond the 
sensations of hunger, thirst, and heat!” (116).  As we later see, unable to return to the simplicity of 
his native wood, the Creature hopes at least to form some new society.  But for Victor, for Walton, 
and for the Creature, natural simplicity, native tranquility, and utopian idealism all remain distant. 
 Further interesting is the apparent reason for this conclusive reality in Frankenstein.  Native 
simplicity proves fleeting in the end of the novel, but it has been highly malleable all along.  When 
Victor returns to Geneva, he says, “I wept like a child: 'Dear mountains! My own beautiful lake! 
How do you welcome your wanderer?  Your summits are clear; the sky and lake are blue and placid.  
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Is this to prognosticate peace, or to mock at my unhappiness?'” (71).   Similarly, he later says, “My 
first resolution was to quit Geneva for ever; my country, which, when I was happy and beloved, 
was dear to me, now, in my adversity, became hateful” (199).  One's native home seems to hold 
the potential to either welcome or mock; a welcoming sense of identification seems anything but 
stable and concrete.  Another of Victor's apostrophes late in the novel, as he is mentally unraveling, 
also reveals this abstract nature of nativity: “Those were the last moments of my life during which 
I enjoyed the feeling of happiness...sometimes coasting the opposite banks, we saw the mighty 
Jura opposing its dark side to the ambition that would quit its native country, and an almost 
insurmountable barrier to the invader who should wish to enslave it” (190).  Victor still wants to 
think of his native home in terms of physical boundaries and actual invasion from abroad.  The 
plot centered on him has proven this mindset false.  The desire to return to native simplicity is not 
frustrated by physical, political invasion; native tranquility is not conquered from abroad.  These 
ideals are subverted from within by intellectual corruption, or relinquished by the natives 
themselves, through intellectual misguidedness. 
 I have suggested throughout this study that we see a very abstract and malleable sort of 
nationalism figured by philology in the period.  In Frankenstein, social dysfunction spreads 
outward from its epicenter on the main two characters in Geneva and Ingostadt, it does not invade 
physically from abroad.  If there is any sort of destructive, invasive force, it is an intellectual one 
that heeds no political boundaries.  Let us step back and consider the geographical scope of the 
novel.  It closes in tantalizing proximity to a source of (philologically-inflected) geographical 
reference.  This comes at the close of a novel that has, in a sense, been a geographical mass of 
chaos.  The novel takes into view Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, the Americas, 
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Russia, Ireland, Scotland, England, and the North pole.  This kind of setting for such exploration 
of the philological version of 1790s radicalism is particularly interesting when we remember that 
by the time Mary Shelley wrote Frankenstein, the Romantic period had witnessed the ideas of 
revolutionary France morph grotesquely into an empire engaging all of Europe.  What began as a 
desire to renovate French society became an international power struggle.  Frankenstein seems to 
represent this kind of distortion.  What begins as a Genevese's philologically-inflected project of 
creation becomes an unhinged, globe-trotting monster. 
 For all of the narrative and geographic diffusion, though, the narratives and travels funnel 
toward Walton.  The movement of all first-person narrators is bound for one place: the source of 
magnetic pull; in spite of the narrative complexity, all narratives are bound for England, refracted 
through one Englishman near the North pole.  In short, we see great effort to point a tremendous 
amount of material to England.  By the end of the novel, what we have come to, truncated, is this: 
an Englishman's quest for a natural utopia at a potent metaphor for etymological roots colliding 
with a story of socially disastrous arbitrary signification; or, an Englishman's quest for a new 
society colliding with a tale suggesting the dire necessity to reform society.  And, again, this tale 
is all mailed home to England.  This movement is very similar to the movement of revolutionary 
ideas in the 1790s, from the Continent to England.  The suggestion seems to be that Mary Shelley, 
an Englishwoman, had a distinct message to mail home to second-generation Romantic England: 
to mind the lesson of the radical philology of the 1790s.  When a modern nation becomes so far 
removed from its roots as an organically developing society, the institutions that organize the 
nation can come to rest entirely upon arbitrary signification.  Without attention to etymology to 
preserve meaning, a human institution like language, seeming to be "godlike science," can become 
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a false god, creating neither out of society nor ex deo, but ex nihil, like Victor constructing the 
Creature.  From this philological nothingness comes chaos and destruction -- a dystopian society. 
 The way that Shelley accomplishes sending this message to England -- through the complex 
narrative framing and geographic movement -- also reveals the importance of recognizing 
philology as a carrier for nationalism in the period.  If we believe that nationalism was generated 
in England in the 18th century primarily by war with France, we don't properly allow for the 
nationalism-forming effects of revolutionary ideas going across political boundaries, as they 
clearly did in the 1790s.  Some of the collision of narrative complexity and geographical diffusion 
in Frankenstein comes across as nearly absurd, seeming to deliberately dispel patriotic xenophobia 
as a version of nationalism.  For instance, at one point, we have an Englishman hearing the 
narration of a Genevese recounting the narration of a creature created in a laboratory in Germany 
that recounts hearing a narration recounting the involvement of a French family in the lives of two 
Turks.  This diffusion ultimately seems aimed less at delineating different nations than it seems 
aimed at illustrating the abstract nature of nationalism.  Setting up the Creature as a metaphor for 
an epistemological and ontological paradigm shift, turning that metaphor loose over much of the 
known world, and seeing how, everywhere it goes, arbitrary signification leads to injustice, we can 
see that, for Shelley, what generates nationalism is less about political boundaries than it is about 
ideas.  For 1790s English radicals, nationalism was more about the people of England opposing 
their own government than it was about England opposing France.  In Frankenstein, philology is 
less about defining Englishness in opposition to other nations' concepts of themselves than it is 
about defining social institutions in general in the age of nationalism.
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Chapter Four: John Keats Keeping English Up 
 
I.  Echo and Some Wight 
   
 In the letter framing arguably his finest and most famous poem, “To Autumn,” John Keats 
expresses the conviction that “English ought to be kept up,” and he lauds Thomas Chatterton as 
“the purest writer in the English Language” (2: 167).  Along with Percy’s Reliques, Chatterton’s 
Rowley poems formed a core of antiquarian poetry that appealed to the Romantics.  As Keats’s 
letter comments suggest, and as we have seen in the preceding chapters, this antiquarian interest 
went hand in hand with interest in native language.  However, while the past thirty years of 
critical discourse on John Keats have witnessed several valuable studies contextualizing Keats, 
consideration of Keats's interest in early philology has remained underexplored.  In fact, Richard 
Turley says, in The Politics of Language in Romantic Literature, that Keats is “the Romantic 
author no critical study, so far as I am aware, has sought to associate with philological debates in 
any concerted sense” (xxi).  Turley later acknowledges seeing how it “is difficult, somehow, to 
imagine Keats being interested in such an ostensibly ‘un-Keatsian’ pursuit as historical 
linguistics” (111).  I would suggest the opposite, though: as Keats has been long-revered as a 
master stylistic craftsman, to whose verse subtle turnings of language are crucial, there are few 
things that should seem more ostensibly Keatsian than interest in linguistics. 
 This chapter ultimately argues that Keats crafts “To Autumn” as a philologically inflected 
version of ‘pure English,’ offering a reading of the poem and its genesis substantially distinct 
from other major readings.  It is my contention, though, that this formulation by Keats comes 
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after a complex negotiation spanning several poems and letters.  This negotiation involves 
different modes of cultural identification, including religion, Hellenism, and Elizabethan-
Medieval-Hellenistic amalgams, and the malleability of these modes of identification is a 
testament to the tenuous nature of nationalism in the period.  As I have been moved to argue in 
the cases of William Wordsworth, Walter Scott, and Mary Shelley, early philology is an integral 
part of this tenuous negotiation. 
 In establishing how Keats had access to the philological discourse of his day, Richard 
Turley posits that “the poet was a close reader of [Condillac], moreover that he came across 
Condillac’s work at some point towards the end of 1817 (possibly during a stay with his friend 
Benjamin Bailey at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, between 3 September and 5 October 1817)” (112).  
Turley also mentions that Richard Woodhouse, friend and intellectual correspondent of Keats and 
legal and literary adviser to John Taylor, Keats’s publisher, was a polyglot.  This representation is 
an understatement, though.  While it seems to have consistently escaped the notice of contextual 
studies of Keats, Tim Chilcott mentions, in A Publisher and his Circle: the Life and Work of John 
Taylor, Keats's Publisher, that Woodhouse and Taylor formed a philological society just a few 
years before getting to know Keats.  The “Philological Society,” as they called it, appears to have 
been formed in 1812 and to have lasted only a little over a year, but Taylor’s interest in and 
dissemination of philology did not cease.  As Chilcott says about Taylor’s influence on another of 
the authors he published in the 1820s, “The range and fluency of their talk, as Richard 
Woodhouse noted, was remarkable.  Taylor would lead De Quincey into political economy, the 
origin and analogies of language, Roman roads, the pronunciation of Greek and Latin, old 
castles, the works of Shakespeare, the poetry of Spenser -- upon all these, De Quincey was 
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informed ‘to considerable minuteness’” (138-139).  It is difficult to imagine that such a range of 
discourse as that described by Woodhouse as being laid out by Taylor to De Quincey would not 
have been keenly interesting to Keats, and we know from the letters that Keats’s intellectual 
engagement with Taylor was close and regular.  Keats was in even closer contact with Leigh 
Hunt, whose Preface to The Story of Rimini has strong philological underpinnings.  And further 
filling the Cockney circle was William Hazlitt, whose philological interests I have highlighted 
throughout this study. 
 So, Keats had no shortage of access to early philology.  The early sonnet "Written in 
Disgust of Vulgar Superstition" seems to evince a particular strain of Tooke’s thinking.  It is 
important that we recall Tooke’s bold assertion about the presence of abstractions in English, 
early in Part Two of The Diversions, that, “These words, the Participles and Adjectives, not 
understood as such, have caused a metaphysical jargon and a false morality, which can only be 
examined by etymology” (2: 18).  Fate, Heaven, Hell, Providence, Prudence, Fiend, Angel, 
Spirit, True, False, Just, Right, and Wrong, among others, Tooke tells us, “are all merely 
Participles poetically embodied, and substantiated by those who use them,” and that Church is an 
adjective, produced the same way and to the same effect (2: 19).  This general hollowness that 
Tooke imputes to the religion of the day seems strikingly resonant with Keats's early sonnet 
"Written in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition": 
The church bells toll a melancholy round, 
Calling the people to some other prayers, 
Some other gloominess, more dreadful cares, 
More heark’ning to the sermon’s horrid sound. 
Surely the mind of man is closely bound 
In some black spell; seeing that each one tears 
Himself from fireside joys, and Lydian airs, 
And converse high of those with glory crown'd. 
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Still, still they toll, and I should feel a damp, 
A chill as from a tomb, did I not know 
That they are dying like an outburnt lamp; 
That ’tis their sighing, wailing ere they go 
Into oblivion; - that fresh flowers will grow, 
And many glories of immortal stamp. 
 
Keats seems to be stressing, here, that the Anglican Church operates with false signifiers.  The 
bell tolling is a conspicuous sign – an auditory way for the institution to communicate to its 
flock, to indicate that it is time to pray and be preached to, time to be holy.  But Keats believes 
that the church bells are actually “melancholy,” prayers “gloominess,” such ecclesiastical cares 
“dreadful,” and the sermon’s sound “horrid.”  In Keats’s assessment, this all indicates that the 
mind of man is bound in a black spell, the black spell being religion, or "superstition."  Where 
Tooke holds that religion becomes a false morality that can only be eradicated by the intellectual 
discourse of philology, religion also seems to be an intellectual issue for Keats, as he presents 
religion as an unenlightened discourse – as a “black spell.”  Furthermore, binding itself in this 
spell, the mind of man lamentably tears itself away from “Lydian airs.”  Keats has set up a 
contrast between devotion to ancient Greek culture – “Lydian airs” – and Anglicanism.  By the 
end of the sonnet, Keats has suggested that the tolling of the bells is actually wailing that 
precedes religion’s departure to oblivion, implying that the unenlightened discourse – the “black 
spell” – will give way to “many glories of immortal stamp.”  Keats imagines that a different 
discourse providing glory and immortality – conventional provisions of religion – will supersede 
religion. 
 Conceiving of religion as an ‘unenlightened discourse’ is particularly interesting because 
the Enlightenment produced, among many other things, philology and nationalism.  "Written in 
Disgust of Vulgar Superstition" comes across as explicitly identifying an intellectual problem for 
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Keats, and this problem is a condensed manifestation of the development of nationalism 
theorized by Benedict Anderson.  Anderson, we recall, argues that the rise of nationalism 
occurred alongside the Enlightenment's challenge to religion as a mode of cultural identification.  
Viewing religion as a waning, intellectually insufficient mode of cultural identification, Keats 
looks for a new abstract construction to foster identity.  With his lament over the abandonment of 
“Lydian airs,” Keats suggests this alternate mode of identification – the form that often in his 
poetry and letters takes the place of what he views as hollow Christianity: pagan Greek culture. 
 Stepping back from Keats for a moment, Hellenistic paganism did not only serve, in 
Keats’s day, as an alternative to Christianity; it often served double-duty as a way to imagine 
Englishness.  In Classics Transformed: Schools, University, and Society in England, 1830-1960, 
Christopher Stray argues that Greek was a carrier for Romantic nationalism -- that, “If Rome 
claimed respect because of its universality, in an age of romantic particularism Greece asserted a 
superior status because it symbolized the power of the individual as a unique source of original 
value” (15).  Similarly, Linda Colley has suggested, in Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 
that around the turn of the 19th century “patriotism of a kind was embedded in the classical 
curriculum” (167).  Colley goes on to argue that because so much classical literature celebrated 
patriotic achievement, it served as model for Britons, and could do so better than any other 
model because, since the societies they centered on were part of the antique past, they were not 
an actual threat to imperial Britain.  Locating Keats in this discourse, it is important to make the 
distinction that Stray goes on to make between Greece and Rome.  While Greece as a political 
entity could be viewed as antique, Rome, as Stray points out, was still a huge political force in 
18th and 19th century Europe, in the form of Christianity: “Greece stood beyond the existing 
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European structures, and particularly beyond the French and Catholic traditions associated with 
Latin: it offered an older, alternative legitimating source of value” (15).  In addition to specifying 
how Hellenism could function as a carrier for, not a threat to, English nationalism, this point by 
Stray also brings us back to the point of religion for Keats.  My suggestion is that we can see in 
Keats that not only did Greek stand beyond “the French and Catholic traditions associated with 
Latin,” it offered an alternative to Christianity. 
 Additionally, as Byron would ultimately attest with his life, Greece was a symbol of 
marginality for the second-generation Romantics.  This way of thinking would contribute to 
engagement in what Jeffrey Cox has called "a Cockney project of wresting the control of the 
definition of the classical from the conservative defenders of a deadening, urnlike tradition" 
(186).  To this argument about class, Ernest Gellner's discussion of economic factors contributing 
to the rise of nationalism is particularly relevant.  Increasing industrialization brought a model of 
economic organization that demanded and prized both division of labor and mobility of laborers.  
In such a model, according to Gellner, "Work, in the main, is no longer the manipulation of 
things, but of meanings" (32).  In a society so modeled, "The monopoly of legitimate education 
is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence" (33).  Like 
Jeffrey Cox, Marjorie Levinson is right to suggest the possibility of Keats's Cockney background 
informing his poetics.  Given what we know about the economic underpinnings of nationalism in 
general, it is possible that a sense of limited access to cultural legitimacy contributed to Keats's 
desire to challenge and experiment with different modes of cultural identification.  I ponder 
Levinson's argument, and the possible implications of class, at greater length later in this chapter; 
for the time being, early verse such as "Written in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition" begins to 
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suggest Hellenistic paganism as an alternative to the conventional Christianity of Keats's day.  
Also emerging in other early verse from Keats seems to be a certain type of nationalistic 
imagining, manifesting part of the function of classical education described by Christopher Stray 
and Linda Colley. 
We can see this intellectual matrix – of nationalism and religion, of English Hellenism – 
at work in Endymion, “Lines on the Mermaid Tavern,” and “Robin Hood.”  I do not offer 
comprehensive readings of these poems, I rather move through them briskly, pointing out 
glimpses of Keats amalgamating an English literary past with Hellenism.  In these glimpses, we 
see Keats wanting to locate in that amalgam an alternative religiosity. 
The invocation of Endymion is one example.  The poem is, of course, a Hellenistic 
romance, but it is dedicated to Chatterton, and its epigraph is from a Shakespeare sonnet.  In the 
opening scene of Book One, Keats says, 
O kindly muse! Let not my weak tongue faulter 
In telling of this goodly company, 
Of their old piety, and of their glee: 
But let a portion of ethereal dew 
Fall on my head, and presently unmew 
My soul; that I may dare, in wayfaring, 
To stammer where old Chaucer used to sing. (1: 128-134) 
 
Shakespeare and Chatterton have already entered Endymion, and now Keats talks metaphorically 
about following in Chaucer’s footsteps.  Along with the references to the other Englishmen, this 
is more than an arbitrary reference to an author of Hellenistic subject matter.  Keats is attempting 
to connect, in Endymion, to an English literary past.  Moreover, we see the religious dimension 
to what Keats is attempting, in his desire to “unmew [his] soul” and to be anointed with “ethereal 
dew” by writing about what he calls “old piety.” 
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Similarly, in the invocation at the beginning of Book Four of Endymion, Keats again 
imagines an English literary past, with overtones of sacredness, saying: 
Muse of my native land! Loftiest Muse! 
O first-born on the mountains! By the hues 
Of heaven on the spiritual air begot: 
Long didst thou sit alone in northern grot, 
While yet our England was a wolfish den; 
Before our forests heard the talk of men; 
Before the first of Druids was a child;- 
Long didst thou sit amid our regions wild 
Rapt in a deep prophetic solitude. (4: 1-9) 
 
This passage heavily emphasizes the primal character of a specifically English muse, predating 
civilization, the Druids, and even language.  Moreover, the muse is sacred, having been begot by 
“the hues / Of heaven on the spiritual air,” and being “Rapt in a deep prophetic solitude." 
We see an even more overt sacred amalgam of Hellenism and an English literary past in 
“Lines on the Mermaid Tavern.”  Keats imagines, for the Elizabethan poets, the Mermaid tavern 
as an “elysium” (2, 24).  Moreover, Keats fancies a modern connection to the bunch, speaking of 
an “astrologer” (16) seeing them “Underneath a new old sign / Sipping beverage divine, / And 
pledging with contented smack / The Mermaid in the zodiac” (19-22).  So, Keats imagines the 
Elizabethans as having once resided in the elysium of the Mermaid Tavern, then having taken up 
permanent residence in the Greek zodiac, as a new astrological sign.  This last piece is rich, 
because the implication of the Elizabethans having a sign in the zodiac is that an Englishman – a 
poet, for instance – could be ‘born under’ that sign, effectively a native son of that English-
Hellenic amalgam. 
“Robin Hood” is unmistakably a piece of nostalgia for an English past, beginning, “No! 
Those days are gone away,” referencing not the Elizabethans but medieval England, cataloging 
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all that is lamentably gone from the days of Robin Hood.10  As part of this catalog, Keats says, 
“There is no mid-forest laugh, / Where lone Echo gives the half / To some wight, amaz’d to hear 
/ Jesting, deep in forest drear” (15-18).  “Echo” is a subtle but unambiguous Hellenic reference.  
Moreover, “Echo” is interestingly placed, since she is the reverberation of the voice of “some 
wight.”  In his brief discussion of “La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” Richard Turley calls attention to 
the fact that in the first published version of that poem, the “knight-at-arms” is dubbed instead 
“wretched wight.”  Turley calls “wretched wight” a more philologically interesting choice, which 
it indeed is.  The word “wight” is unmistakably Anglo-Saxon in origin, and while Keats has 
placed this distinctive Englishness in “Robin Hood,” it is linked with the Hellenic presence of 
“Echo.”  Specifically, the connection is linguistic, as “Echo” is a figuration of the wight’s own 
voice.  This specific figuration turns Keats’s thinking back to philology, completing the 
intellectual matrix that has witnessed him pondering religion and Englishness. 
 
II.  “the holiness of the Heart’s affections” 
 
"Written in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition" is a brief, explicit statement of an intellectual 
problem for Keats: religion in England as a mode of identification.  Early poems like "Lines on 
the Mermaid Tavern," "Robin Hood," and even, in places, Endymion seem to be highly 
intellectualized amalgams experimented with as solutions to this problem.  When Keats moves 
                                                 
10.  Nicholas Roe, in John Keats and the Culture of Dissent, highlights the 'outlaw' spirit in both 
"Lines on the Mermaid Tavern" and "Robin Hood," pointing to dissatisfaction with economic 
policy as Keats's primary concern in the poems. 
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into the Odes of 1819, he moves into a relatively coherent and confident articulation of the 
intellectual solution he has been developing, and it is more purely Hellenistic. 
Recognizing that this Hellenistic solution is intertwined with early philology does not 
constitute a complete revision of the critical history of the Odes.  Stuart Sperry has 
acknowledged the importance of Lockean empiricism to Keats's speculations on sensation and 
language.  Helen Vendler has argued that “The odes that follow Indolence investigate various 
attitudes toward the senses, almost as though the odes were invented as a series of controlled 
experiments in the suppression or permission of sense-experience” (46).  Though critics like 
Sperry and Vendler don't step as far beyond general Lockean thought as I am suggesting we 
should – into the core of early philology – their arguments share common ground with my 
argument about Keats's experimentation with philological solutions to the problem of cultural 
identification. 
As per "Robin Hood's" suggestion of a Hellenistic figuration of Anglo-Saxon, in the form 
of 'Echo and some wight,' Keats's developing solution to the problem of cultural identification 
via religion is underscored by early philology.  As I suggested with my discussion of "Kubla 
Khan" in the Introduction to this study, the general notion of “old piety” was a significant tenet 
of early philology.  For instance, Condillac says in his Essay, “Poetry and music...were cultivated 
only to proclaim religion and laws and to preserve the memory of great men and the services 
they rendered to society” (152).  Blair says virtually the same thing in the Lectures on Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres; when discussing the origin and progress of poetry, Blair asserts that from the 
“very beginning of Society, there were occasions on which they met together for feasts, 
sacrifices, and Public Assemblies” (314, my italics).  Blair also uses Native Americans as an 
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example of primitive civilization and thus as a group using language and poetry in a primal state, 
and he says about them “that it is in Songs they celebrate their religious rites” (314).  About the 
first poets (in an abstract sense), Blair says “their persons were held sacred” (318).  So, 
sacredness, or holiness, was held by early philology to be an essential component of early 
language in general and early poetry in particular.  And, as we have also already seen, these 
notions were hand in hand with the tenet of language decline.  We recall Blair’s assertion, for 
instance, that, “Poetry, however, in its ancient original condition, was perhaps more vigorous 
than it is in its modern state.  It included then, the whole burst of the human mind; the whole 
exertion of its imaginative faculties.  It spoke then the language of passion, and no other; for to 
passion, it owed its birth.  Prompted and inspired by objects, which to him seemed great, by 
events which interested his country or his friends, the early Bard arose and sung” (322).  Primal 
poetry and language, then, were theorized both to be more sacred in function and to possess more 
vitality than modern language. 
 In the “O for a Life of Sensations” letter to Benjamin Bailey, from November 22, 1817, 
Keats effectually synthesizes the issues of language decline and arbitrary signification.  Keats 
asserts that he is “certain of nothing but the holiness of the Heart’s affections and the truth of 
Imagination – What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth” (1: 184).  Elaborating on 
what he means by the term ‘truth,’ Keats says, “The Imagination may be compared to Adam’s 
dream – he awoke and found it truth” (1: 184).  According to this explanation, by the term ‘truth,’ 
Keats does not seem to mean moral or philosophical truth; he seems to be referring to material 
reality.  While Richard Turley has suggested that Keats’s beauty-truth equation is a direct verbal 
echo of Condillac, the larger issue seems to be Keats’s engagement with the general discourse on 
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the relationship between sensation and the mind.  If, as I am suggesting, truth essentially means 
something like ‘things as they are,’ it makes sense that Keats equates ‘sensation’ and the ‘Heart’s 
affections.’  ‘Imagination’ clearly being the work of the mind, Keats is representing early 
philology’s conception of the relationship between things and ideas.  Saying, as he later does, 
that he cannot conceive of reaching truth by logic – by “consequetive reasoning” (1: 185) – 
Keats seems to be speaking against a model of highly abstract apprehension, in favor of a 
particularly empirical model of apprehension.  What Keats wants to avoid, it seems, is abstract, 
hollow modern thinking.  The way to avoid such thinking, and to gain the clearest concept of 
truth, or apprehension of things, comes from the mind working with the “Heart’s affections” – 
keeping the mind wedded to sensation.  Most importantly, sensations – or “the Heart’s 
affections” are holy.  Drawing upon the theorization that early language and poetry would have 
been both more sensuous and sacred, Keats seems to be expressing desire, here, for philological 
holiness along the lines of what we saw manifested in "Kubla Khan" in the Introduction to this 
study.11 
Keats’s philological thinking becomes even clearer in the “vale of Soul-making” letter.  
Ostensibly springing from the same sentiments as “Written in Disgust of Vulgar Superstition,” 
                                                 
11.  In The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, trans. ed. John P. Leavey, Jr. 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), Jacques Derrida argues that part of 
Condillac's very metaphysical objective, to unearth "'prelinguistc' origin, 'instinct,' or 'feeling'" 
(38), is doomed by its operation within language: "A philosophy of the sign -- Condillac's -- 
always threatens [the decision between the useful and the futile] but also expends and multiplies 
itself in order to reduce the threat, always adds 'too many signs' in order to efface the gap or 
fraction" (119).  As I think this chapter progressively demonstrates, though, this does not seem to 
be the way Keats read Condillac.  As I have begun to argue, Keats seems to have taken interest in 
Condillac's (as well as other early philologists') theorizations of vitality and sacredness in early 
language. 
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the letter asserts, “The common cognomen of this world among the misguided and superstitious 
is ‘a vale of tears’ from which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary interposition of God 
and taken to Heaven –  What a little circumscribed straightened notion!” (2: 101-102).  Keats 
defines his alternative to the hollow thinking of religion by saying, “Call the world if you Please 
‘The vale of Soul-making’” (2: 102).  In his edition of Keats’s letters, Hyder Edward Rollins 
notes that the system that Keats then lays out has resonances of Locke’s Essay.  The components 
of the system are “the Intelligence – the human heart (as distinguished from intelligence or 
Mind) and the World or Elemental space suited for the proper action of Mind and Heart on each 
other for the purpose of forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity” 
(2: 102).  Dismissing conventional religion, Keats is relocating the formation of holiness in the 
interaction of the mind and empirical experience – a system that seems to manifest conviction in 
the philological notion of the “holiness of the Heart’s affections.”  When Keats goes on to say, 
“Not merely is the Heart a Hornbook, It is the Minds Bible, it is the Minds experience,” (2: 103) 
the notion of the heart being holy is yet clearer.  What is at stake is indeed a “sense of Identity;” 
it is the sort of imagining of identity that Benedict Anderson theorizes as being necessary after 
the erosion of Christianity's authority by the Enlightenment.  Also, in this April 1819 letter, Keats 
more clearly evinces a desire for the union of the mind and sensation, in saying that the Mind 
and Heart should be made to act upon one another. 
“Why may they not have made this simple thing even more simple for common 
apprehension by introducing Mediators and Personages in the same manner as in the hethen 
mythology abstractions are personified” (2: 103).  This rhetorical question in the “vale of Soul-
making letter,” about what Keats refers to as the originators of the Christian scheme, makes plain 
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how the Hellenistic “Ode to Psyche” grows out of the letter.  Being the first of the great Odes of 
1819, “Ode to Psyche” begins a dominant and obvious trend in the Odes in that it is Hellenistic.  
As “Ode to Psyche” is an outgrowth of Keats’s thinking about philological holiness, the 
Hellenism is fitting, hearkening back to some of his motives in Endymion, “Robin Hood,” and 
“Lines on the Mermaid Tavern.”  Keats presents “Ode to Psyche” to the George Keatses, in the 
long April 1819 letter that includes the “vale of Soul-making” scheme, as a sacred act: “You 
must recollect that Psyche was not embodied as a goddess before the time of Apulieus the 
Platonist who lived after the Augustan age, and consequently the Goddess was never worshipped 
or sacrificed to with any of the ancient fervour – and perhaps never thought of in the old religion 
– I am more orthodox than to let a hethen Goddess be so neglected” (2: 106).  Psyche’s history 
constitutes a perfect appeal to Keats’s preoccupations in the “vale of Soul-making” letter.  
Relative to Keats, she is primitive; like Keats, she was, in a sense, belated.  Keats is explicit that 
writing the ode to her is an act of orthodoxy – it constitutes him, in a sense, becoming a Hellenic 
devotee.  Moreover, while ‘psyche’ of course means ‘soul,’ in its root sense, it takes on the 
modern connotation of ‘mind’ by the Victorian period.  This enacts a sort of shift of divinity into 
the human mind, which recalls something that we have seen already in this study: the shift of 
language from divine to human origins.  After all, according to Keats’s main source for Psyche’s 
history, Lemprierre, Psyche is a mortal who gets deified to satisfy Cupid’s love.  The suggestion 
seems to be that there is deifying power in the interaction of sensation with the mind. 
 After the invocation of the first four lines of the poem, Keats subtly questions a 
dichotomization of the activity of the mind and empirical perception, saying, “Surely I dreamt to-
day, or did I see” (5).  In line six, when Keats talks about seeing “The winged Psyche with 
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awaken’d eyes,” he stresses her receptors of empirical vision.  Moreover, the moment of 
reception that Keats captures is primal, as the eyes are just awakened.  In the following line, 
Keats elaborates on his own state as one of wandering “thoughtlessly,” but this thoughtlessness is 
crucially checked by the sight of Psyche and Cupid – mind and heart, respectively.  It is crucial 
that the first (and nearly only) ‘action’ that the poem narrates is the mind-stimulating 
apprehension of both Psyche and Cupid, physically joined, no less.  Keats is stressing that his 
poetic project is to wed mind and heart. 
Keats stresses repeatedly throughout the opening stanza the pristine nature of the scene.  
He describes Psyche and Cupid as “couched side by side / In deepest grass, beneath the 
whisp’ring roof / Of leaves and trembled blossoms, where there ran / A brooklet, scarce espied” 
(9-12).  The “deepest grass” suggests Keats delving deeply into something.  The “scarce espied” 
brooklet represents something relatively unwitnessed.  While the “whisp’ring roof” acts as an 
index for the wind, it also subtly speaks of secrecy, recalling Keats speaking of singing Psyche’s 
secrets just a few lines earlier, stressing the idea of unprecedented expression.  In addition, the 
“trembled blossoms” and “budded Tyrian” (14) both suggest freshness in new growth.  Indeed, 
the scene of the first stanza as a whole is one of “tender eye-dawn of aurorean love” (20, my 
italics), with this characterization stressing primal empirical sensation. 
Keats indicates his goal in the third stanza, when he says that Psyche was “…too late for 
antique vows, / Too, too late for the fond believing lyre, / When holy were the haunted forest 
boughs, / Holy the air, the water, and the fire” (36-39).  What Keats desires is connection with a 
state in which material elements were holy.  In the second stanza, Keats laments the thought of 
Psyche having no temple, 
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Nor altar heap’d with flowers; 
Nor virgin-choir to make delicious moan 
Upon the midnight hours; 
No voice, no lute, no pipe, no incense sweet 
From chain-swung censer teeming; 
No shrine, no grove, no oracle, no heat 
Of pale-mouth’d prophet dreaming. (29-35) 
 
Standard treatment of a goddess in the Hellenic world would have included the sacred indexes of 
the “altar,” “virgin-choir,” “incense,” “shrine,” “oracle,” and “prophet.”  The “virgin-choir” (my 
emphasis) enhances the notion of reaching back to pristine conditions. 
The second stanza is also striking for its sensuousness.  Beginning with the virgin-choir 
making delicious “moan” -- a good onomatopoetic word -- Keats launches into a passage that 
seems to aim for poetic effect as much as for emphasis on sacred Hellenism.  The “incense sweet 
/ From chain-swung censer teeming” is as marvelous a phrase describing one thing (all seven 
words combine to name just “incense”) as we’ll find in Keats – “incense” and “censer” 
containing alliteration in themselves with the soft “c” and “s” sounds, “incense” and “censer” 
alliterating and assonating with one another, “sweet” and “swung” alliterating with one another, 
and “sweet” and “teeming” assonating.  Keats’s meter in the rhyming lines “No voice, no lute, no 
pipe, no incense sweet /...No shrine, no grove, no oracle, no heat” is also striking.  The point of 
this seems clearer when we consider how the lines come back in the next stanza.  Keats repeats 
these lines substituting “thy” for “no” in the next stanza after assuming the role of Psyche’s 
priest.  Spoken by a priest in worship of a goddess, the lines come across as religious chant, as 
does the act of repeating them (slightly revised) from one stanza to another.  Condillac’s theory 
on ancient prosody seems to have been particularly resonant with Keats on this point.  Condillac 
says in Part Two of his Essay, at the opening of “Chapter III: The prosody of the Greek and Latin 
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languages and, en passant, the declamation of the ancients,” “It is well known that the Greeks 
and Romans had a notation for their declamation, and that it was accompanied by an instrument.  
Thus is was truly a form of chant” (123).  Nugent’s translation of this last sentence is very 
similar: “it was therefore properly a kind of chant or song” (183).  Condillac also explicitly links 
this idea of chant to language decline when he says, "if the Romans were more sensitive to 
harmony than we are, the Greeks must have been more sensitive than the Romans, and the 
Asiatics still more than the Greeks, for the older languages are, the closer they approach chant" 
(149).  “At its origin style was poetic because it began by painting ideas in the most sensible 
images and in addition was marked by its strongly rhythmic quality” (150).  This, Condillac 
maintains, is the origin of poetry.  To paraphrase Condillac, because in its connectedness to the 
empirical world primal language was necessarily sensuous, rhythmic, sensuous, chant-like poetry 
was a natural outgrowth of primal language. 
To go back to the second and third stanzas of “Ode to Psyche,” then, the modulating of 
the voice in the chant of lines 32-35 and 46-49 seems like a philological move - an attempt to 
reach back to the sort of vital connectedness to the empirical world that Condillac describes.  We 
can even see a sort of chant in the modulated repetition that takes place between the metrically 
identical lines 33 and 35: “From chain-swung censer teeming; /...Of pale-mouth’d prophet 
dreaming.”  Keats makes the same metrical parallel between lines 32 and 34, though they are just 
short of identical: “No voice, no lute, no pipe, no incense sweet /...No shrine, no grove, no 
oracle, no heat.”  We can understand why Keats would have been so moved by Condillac’s 
theory surrounding a word translatable as “chant.”  As Hans Aarsleff elaborates in his translation, 
Condillac’s word incorporated virtually all of the empirically-rooted qualities conceivable in 
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language.  Moreover, Nugent’s translation of the word as “chant” at the beginning of the chapter 
about classical prosody seems to have moved Keats in the specific way of breaking into a sort of 
chant as an integral part of the Hellenic “Ode to Psyche.”  On the whole, in those second and 
third stanzas, Keats seems to have been moved to reach back to a time “When holy were the 
haunted forest boughs, / Holy the air, the water, and the fire” (38-39) -- a time of sacred 
interaction with the elements -- a time in language that, it follows, would be characterized by the 
“holiness of the Heart’s affections.” 
Keats has from the beginning of his presentation of “Psyche” been cognizant of 
belatedness -- both his own and Psyche’s.  She is “too late for antique vows” (36) and has no 
temple.  In an ironic way, perhaps this adds to her appeal for Keats.  She represents something 
primal insofar as she is of the classical world (while Keats is a 19th century Englishman), but she 
is also fresh in the sense that she was not worshiped the way Athena, for instance, was.  As Keats 
says in the letter to his brother and sister-in-law, “the Goddess was never worshipped or 
sacrificed to with any of the ancient fervour – and perhaps never even thought of in the old 
religion” (2: 106).  This feeling is a stark contrast to Book Four of Endymion, when Keats feels 
that he has been beaten to the punch of the full accomplishment of the English muse by the 
Elizabethans.  Indeed, Psyche seems to be an empathetic figure to Keats, since she is belated, 
like he.  At the same time, she represents a time when the world was younger, and she is still 
fresh for new worship. 
Fittingly, the way that Keats conceives of his connection with Psyche is through 
empiricism.  The shift, in “Ode to Psyche,” from nostalgia to imagined connection takes place 
when Keats says, 
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Yet even in these days so far retir’d 
From happy pieties, thy lucent fans, 
Fluttering among the faint Olympians, 
I see, and sing, by my own eyes inspired, 
So let me be thy choir, and make a moan 
Upon the midnight hours; (40-45) 
 
“I see” marks the shift; Keats is “by [his] own eyes inspired.”  It seems that empirical grounding 
is the link to Psyche, for Keats.  Moreover, “by my own eyes inspired” would indicate a 
sacredness in this empirical grounding. 
The final stanza of “Ode to Psyche” emphatically affirms that Keats’s mode of 
reconciling the belatedness paradoxes inherent in the conception of the poem is his philological 
theory of soul-making. 
Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane 
In some untrodden region of my mind, 
Where branched thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain, 
Instead of pines shall murmur in the wind: 
Far, far around shall those dark-cluster’d trees 
Fledge the wild-ridged mountains steep by steep; 
And there by zephyrs, streams, and birds, and bees, 
The moss-lain Dryads shall be lull’d to sleep; 
And in the midst of this wide quietness 
A rosy sanctuary will I dress 
With the wreath’d trellis of a working brain, 
With buds, and bells, and stars without a name, 
With all the gardener Fancy e’er could feign, 
Who breeding flowers, will never breed the same: 
And there shall be for thee all soft delight 
That shadowy thought can win, 
A bright torch, and a casement ope at night, 
To let the warm Love in! (50-67) 
 
With the first two lines of this stanza, we must hearken back to “Written in Disgust of Vulgar 
Superstition” and John Horne Tooke.  We recall Tooke's belief that all the empty Participles that 
most people think of as moral truths become legitimized in the process that he calls poetic 
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embodiment.  The specific case of poetic embodiment that Tooke is here discussing has been to 
deplorable effect -- constructing Anglicanism.  Nevertheless, Keats must have, at the same time 
he agreed with Tooke's assessment of the state of the church, been compelled by the idea that the 
use of language had such power.  Because all of the empty moral signifiers are given a seeming 
potency by poetic embodiment, "the false morality...can only be examined by etymology."  While 
Keats would have recognized the formula that the fane of the masses is simply a construction of 
the mind at work linguistically, he would have at the same time recognized that the mind could 
be a fane, through the poetic use of language.  It is precisely this sort of work that Keats believes 
he has completed by the final stanza of "Ode to Psyche." 
 The final stanza of "Psyche" also seems to punctuate Keats’s definition of the word 
‘psyche.’  While the OED registers that ‘psyche’ clearly was taken to mean ‘mind’ by the 
Victorian period, there is no conclusive indication of such English definition as early as Keats’s 
day.  However, Alan Richardson has argued, in British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind, 
that the emerging science of neurology had a strong influence on Keats, with the final stanza of 
“Ode to Psyche” being a key manifestation.  Indeed, taken along with Keats’s “vale of Soul-
making” letter, the final stanza of “Ode to Psyche” seems to be a forerunner of the shifting 
definition of ‘psyche’ from soul and mind.  Specifically, to Keats, it is both.  As we have seen, 
the combination is crucial to him. 
 To go back to the “vale of Soul-making” letter, Keats clearly thinks of a soul as 
something that is made through a process in which humans take part, as opposed to something 
divinely bestowed.  The process that makes a soul is the interplay of heart and mind in the proper 
circumstances: “the Intelligence – the human heart (as distinguished from intelligence or Mind) 
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and the World or Elemental space suited for the proper action of Mind and Heart on each other 
for the purpose of forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity” (2: 
102).  Keats heavily emphasizes the mind in the final stanza of “Ode to Psyche,” talking about 
“some untrodden region of my mind,” “branched thoughts,” and “the wreath’d trellis of a 
working brain.”  It is both in and with his mind that Keats sanctifies Psyche.  It is as if his mind 
is becoming a soul -- as he put it in the vale of soul-making letter, he is trying “to school an 
Intelligence and make it a soul” (2: 102).  But it is then crucial that we locate Cupid -- the heart -
- in the final stanza, interacting with Psyche, and Keats makes this move with the concluding 
lines of the poem, making sure that there is “a casement ope at night, / To let the warm Love in.”  
The allegorical “Love” being “warm” is emphasis on the empirical connotations of the heart.  
Here is the heart to interplay with the mind.  What results from Cupid’s re-entry to the poem in 
the final stanza is a complex formation of identity, in Keats’s estimation: a soul.  Keats has 
striven to break down an irreverent dichotomization of sensation and thought.  In this vein, I 
would agree with half of Helen Vendler's argument about “Ode to Psyche,” that Keats's reverie 
will be “an internal making” (47).  I would disagree, though, with the contention that Keats 
wishes to “prescind from the bodily senses” (47) in “Ode to Psyche.”  “Psyche” represents a 
union of heart and mind, forged through a philological process. 
With the pieces of the soul-making scheme in place, Keats can “be [Psyche’s] priest, and 
build a fane / In some untrodden region of [his] mind.”  The psyche can be given a sacred 
dwelling.  And this seems to be further enabled by the pristine locale -- the “untrodden region.”  
Keats seems to be imagining a resolution to the problems of belatedness and outworn modes of 
identity.  Further on the final stanza, the psyche can be given “A rosy sanctuary,” dressed, no 
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less, by the poetic use of language to which “the wreath’d trellis of a working brain” would seem 
to refer. 
 
III.  “a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d” 
 
Whereas “Ode to Psyche” closes with the goddess of the soul united with Cupid and 
enshrined in the poet’s mind – with an allegorical sacred union of the mind and sensation – “Ode 
on a Grecian Urn” begins rather differently, with the object of the ode addressed as a “still 
unravish’d bride of quietness” (1).  While the "bride" recalls the union of Psyche and Cupid, the 
fact that the bride is “still unravish’d” would seem to resonate more with the virgin-choir of 
“Ode to Psyche.”  And even at this, unlike the natural purity striven for with the virgin-choir of 
“Psyche,” there is something decidedly unnatural about a bride being yet unravished.  
Furthermore, the ambiguous “of” of the opening line of “Grecian Urn” would seem to suggest 
either (or both) that the bride herself is quiet, or/and that she is wedded to quietness.  If we read 
the bride of “Grecian Urn” specifically as wedded to quietness, i.e., to the abstract idea of 
‘Quietness,’ then we have a direct formal parallel to “Psyche,” remembering that Psyche (herself 
an allegorical figure, in one sense) is the bride of the representative of an abstract idea: Cupid, 
whom Keats seems to have meant to represent feeling and sensuousness.  But this formal parallel 
creates a stark thematic contrast – with feeling replaced by 'Quietness,' imperiled is the religious 
incantation at the center of “Psyche” and annulled is the sacred union achieved at the end of the 
poem.  From the beginning of “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” then, Keats seems to be directly 
engaging with and representing a breakdown of the central philological accomplishment of “Ode 
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to Psyche.” 
Keats characterizes the urn as a "Sylvan historian" in line three.  This historian, however, 
has an unnatural lineage, as she is the "foster-child of silence and slow time" (2, my italics).  
Moreover, being fostered by "slow time" suggests a great chronological distance from Keats.  
Fraught with the suggestion of artificiality and with the prospect of attempting to draw a 
philological connection to the past from a product of "silence and slow time," Keats's project 
thus seems problematic from the outset.  Keats proceeds to follow this problematic identification 
of the urn as historian with a series of questions that reach after (hypothetical) fact: 
What leaf-fring'd legend haunts about thy shape 
Of deities or mortals, or of both, 
In Tempe or the dales of Arcady? 
What men or gods are these?  What maidens loth? 
What mad pursuit?  What struggle to escape? 
What pipes and timbrels?  What wild ecstasy? (5-10) 
 
Each of the questions is of the factual 'What' was or has happened, as if Keats is a documenting 
historian.  The stark contrast between this and "Ode to Psyche" is that in "Psyche," Keats views 
his transhistorical identity formation -- which is what his endeavor amounts to -- 
unproblematically, satisfied by his mind's power to build a fane.  From the outset of "Grecian 
Urn," though, the transhistorical undertaking of Hellenism seems rife with complications.  In the 
earlier ode, the object is the mind become a soul; in "Grecian Urn," feeling has been replaced by 
'quietness,' and soul is replaced by an historian of questionable legitimacy. 
Meanwhile, where Keats sees the sensuous as sacred through a meditation upon the union 
of a god and one-time mortal in "Ode to Psyche," he here wonders if he is looking at "deities or 
mortals," "men or gods," or "both."  Keats seems to be starting to ponder a sort of bifurcation, as 
opposed to union.  And though the line break after "shape" seems to help us read lines five 
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through seven as saying (paraphrased), 'What leaf-fringed legend of deities or mortals, or of 
both, in Tempe or the dales of Arcady haunts about thy shape,' when we read right through lines 
five and six as Keats has crafted them without punctuation, we have another "of" packed with 
double meaning: is the urn's shape the shape (figuratively) of a deity or a mortal, we might ask?  
Is the urn a sacred object with which a connection can be forged? 
 After all the questions of the first stanza, Keats begins the second stanza with, "Heard 
melodies are sweet, but those unheard / Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on; / Not to the 
sensual ear, but, more endear'd, / Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone" (11-14).  Questions are 
followed up with a maxim, but the maxim comes not from the questioned but from the 
questioner.  If Keats is trying to connect with the urn by getting it to speak to him, this turn is 
troubling, as he has simply answered for it.  Furthermore, the maxim of stanza two does not 
really answer the fact-related questions of stanza one.  Keats did not ask the urn about the 
respective merits of empirical reality and the imagination; he asked the urn about what was 
happening in the rendering of a particular circumstance.  It is a fitting irony, then, that the maxim 
of stanza two takes the side of an absence of audible expression (unheard melodies are 
preferred): the urn hasn't answered Keats.  Even more interesting is the way that stanza two's 
maxim takes up the key issue of "Ode to Psyche": where Keats previously envisions and 
facilitates a union of the heart and mind, he now dichotomizes empirical expression ("Heard 
melodies") and the work of the mind ("those unheard").  If the first two lines of the stanza 
weren't emphatic enough, Keats stresses the same idea with a preference of "the spirit" over "the 
sensual ear" in the third and fourth lines.  In addition to dichotomizing empirical sensation and 
the mind, these latter two lines divorce sensation from sacredness ("the spirit"), marking a crucial 
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break with "Ode to Psyche."  Where the "tuneless numbers" were suitable to forge a sacred 
connection with primal sensuousness in "Ode to Psyche," they here are made to define a crucial 
disconnect. 
Just as he does after pondering empirical perception and the imagination near the 
beginning of "Ode to Psyche," after the maxim about heard and unheard melodies in "Ode on a 
Grecian Urn" Keats envisions a scene involving two lovers: 
Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave 
Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare; 
Bold lover, never, never canst thou kiss, 
Though winning near the goal -- yet, do not grieve; 
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss, 
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair! (15-20) 
 
Like Psyche and Cupid, these two lovers are in a wild outdoor setting and just on the verge of a 
kiss.  Unlike Psyche and Cupid, who are ready to "outnumber" past kisses, this couple gives no 
indication that they have ever been joined by a kiss, furthering the theme of disunion.  It is 
important to Keats to identify Psyche and Cupid -- and to identify with Cupid, in a sense.  He 
also identifies, in a sense, with this young male, sympathizing with him, but the youth and his 
love object remain anonymous (as was the unravished bride).  Their anonymity is another 
example of a lack of understanding, functioning to the same end as the unanswered questions of 
the first stanza.  We have some indication of sensuousness with the song that can never be left, 
but, in addition to being tempered by the never-extant kiss, we are left to wonder if the song is a 
ditty of no tone. 
The turning point in "Ode on a Grecian Urn" -- like the turning point in "Ode to Psyche" -
- comes after the scene of the two lovers: 
Ah, happy, happy boughs! that cannot shed 
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Your leaves, nor ever bid the spring adieu; 
And, happy melodist, unwearied, 
For ever piping songs for ever new; 
More happy love! more happy, happy love! 
For ever warm and still to be enjoy'd, 
For ever panting, and for ever young; 
All breathing human passion far above, 
That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy'd, 
A burning forehead, and a parching tongue. (21-30) 
 
As he envisions in "Ode to Psyche" that "their lips touch'd not, but had not bade adieu" (17), 
Keats desires here in "Ode on a Grecian Urn" the idea of the leaves of the boughs never bidding 
the spring adieu, a situation that would mark a lasting pristine state.  The "songs for ever new" 
indicate the same desire.  And this desire stimulates a distinct linguistic mode in Keats.  Having 
gone through the first four lines of the stanza, we have been told of the "happy, happy boughs" 
and the "happy melodist," and then Keats practically explodes in his use of the word 'happy' in 
the fifth line, using it three times in that line alone.  This is the moment in "Ode to Psyche" 
where Keats breaks into the modulated chant, and in "Ode on a Grecian Urn" he uses the same 
word three times in four lines and three more times in the next line.  We can also discern 
semantic repetitiveness within the fifth line, as it simply says the same thing twice -- the only 
thing changed in the second clause is a doubling of 'happy.'  But while springing from the same 
impulse, this chant is a far cry from the chant of "Ode to Psyche," which is marked by semantic 
variation being grounded by rhythmic chant; even in the rhythmic dimension of the chant of 
"Psyche" there is more modulation than simply stating the same two-syllable word consecutively.  
The trochaic meter of 'happy' in "Grecian Urn" also seems to point to over-agitation, in contrast 
to the calm-beginning iambs of "No voice, no lute, no pipe, no incense sweet" of "Ode to 
Psyche." 
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Thinking further about 'happy' in "Grecian Urn," we see a signifier applied so broadly as 
to be of little semantic value.  How, we might wonder, can boughs (plant material), a melodist (a 
human), and love (an abstraction) all be 'happy'?  Even further, what exactly does 'happy' tell us?  
It's an excessively vague adjective.  Indeed, in this case, bearing in mind the exceedingly broad 
applicability Keats has given it, it seems to take on (ironic) meaning along the lines of its cognate 
'happenstance.'  This is all the more troubling when we note that in the explosion of 'happy,' it is 
"love" that is 'happy.'  Where 'love' has been the principle of sensation joined with the mind to 
form a soul in "Ode to Psyche," it is here dissipated into virtual meaninglessness (as Keats will 
recognize by the end of the stanza). 
 Keats continues his over-agitation to a breaking point in saying that the "love" is "For 
ever panting, and forever young."  This drastically departs from the "calm-breathing" (15) 
Psyche and Cupid.  With the phonetic quality of 'happy,' we could even characterize Keats's 
repetition of the word as an ironic onomatopoesis for panting; indeed, Keats realizes at this point 
in the poem that he cannot keep up or connect with the scene of the lovers.  After what 
retrospectively appears to be a stinging reference to being "forever young," Keats acknowledges 
that the "love" is far above all breathing human passion.  Therefore, the "love" can only leave "a 
heart high-sorrowful and cloy'd, / A burning forehead, and a parching tongue."  Where "Ode to 
Psyche" advances the "holiness of the Heart's affections," "Ode on a Grecian Urn" seems to see 
those hopes dashed.  Here the heart is full of sorrow, and  its affections amount to affectation, 
cloyed in over-fullness of what is for Keats, ironically, non-experience, or an inability to connect 
with the experience depicted on the urn.  It is fitting then, that Keats is left with "a parching 
tongue," a lack of capacity for linguistic expression. 
 170 
 
In stanza four, with "a heart high-sorrowful and cloy'd," Keats falls back to questioning 
the urn, as he did in stanza one, saying: 
Who are these coming to the sacrifice? 
To what green altar, O mysterious priest, 
Leadst thou that heifer lowing at the skies, 
And all her silken flanks with garlands drest? 
What little town by river or sea shore, 
Or mountain-built with peaceful citadel, 
Is emptied of this folk, this pious morn? 
And, little town, thy streets for evermore 
Will silent be; and not a soul to tell 
Why thou art desolate, can e'er return. 
 
The fact that Keats falls back to questioning the urn two stanzas after questioning it to begin with 
would seem to be further confirmation that his original questioning was fruitless.  This stanza 
also marks a further step in the poem with its identification of a scene of sacrifice.  Keats is 
following the same pattern that led to the religious worship of the second half of "Ode to 
Psyche," but here he can only question a "mysterious priest," continuing the emphasis on lack of 
understanding and sharply contrasting Keats himself becoming Psyche's priest.  Moreover, the 
religious ceremony on the urn is one specifically of sacrifice, as opposed to the vibrant scene 
involving Psyche.  Furthermore, where Keats formerly became the priest and thus the agent of 
worshiping Psyche and (figuratively) forming a soul, the mysterious priest here is the agent of 
sacrifice, which connotes ascesis -- a far cry from the sacred union of "Psyche."  The heifer (an 
unravished bovine) stresses this point, following from the unravished bride and the never-kissing 
lovers.  Keats again seems to be recognizing an absence of sensual connection.  And the fact that 
this absence -- the ascesis -- should exist as part of a religious ceremony widens the gap between 
"Ode on a Grecian Urn" and "the holiness of the Heart's affections" depicted in "Ode to Psyche."  
The "silken flanks with garlands drest" of the heifer, then, become especially ironic, as they 
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recall Keats saying in "Ode to Psyche," "A rosy sanctuary will I dress / With the wreath'd trellis 
of a working brain" (59-60).  The floral dressing in "Psyche" corresponded to the poetic soul-
making taking place, but it can now only prepare an ascetic victim for death. 
The "for ever" principle of stanza three also returns in this fourth stanza.  However, 
where it previously carried with hopes for transhistoricity, it now only preserves the absence of 
articulation.  The streets of the depicted town "for evermore / Will silent be."  Further, there will 
be "not a soul to tell" the reason for the desolation.  The "soul" seems carefully chosen here, 
ironicizing the soul-making of "Ode to Psyche." 
As Keats begins the final stanza, after a brief exclamatory apostrophe, highlighting 
"marble men and maidens" (42).  The men and maidens being marble emphasizes lifelessness, 
the lack of capacity for sensation.  Keats is refiguring the first stanza of the poem; there is no 
longer any question of status as deity or mortal or of pursuits, struggles, and wild ecstasy; they 
are now frozen on a vessel of mortal remains.  Keats also subtly plays with the word 
"overwrought" in mentioning the "marble men and maidens."  While "overwrought" establishes 
the "marble men and maidens" as part of the urn (wrought over the surface of the urn), it is a 
reminder of the cloyed state into which Keats worked himself in stanza three.  Coming from an 
overwrought artist, art becomes overworked art, excessively manipulated art, or mere affectation, 
which, again, we have seen with the "heart high-sorrowful and cloy'd." 
Addressing the urn as "silent form" in line forty-four reinforces the empirical non-
existence established with the "bride" of line one.  Moreover, the phrasing "silent form" (my 
italics) corresponds with the seeming allegorization of "quietness," the form to which the "bride" 
is wed, and this correspondence widens the gap between "Ode on a Grecian Urn" and the sacred 
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union of forms in "Ode to Psyche."  That the "silent form...dost tease us out of thought" (44) is 
also interesting in that it links Keats's inability to connect with the urn on an empirical level to a 
corresponding stifling of thought.  Empirical sensation and the mind were made to correspond in 
"Ode to Psyche," and they do correspond here in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," but only to the end 
that one nullifies the other.  It logically follows that the silent form teases Keats out of thought 
"As doth eternity" (45).  The transhistoricity ("eternity") necessary to connect with the primal 
sacredness of Hellenism has fallen to pieces in stanza three, and in this final stanza Keats 
emphasizes how such a concept has become inscrutable to him. 
It is important to remember what Keats's object of speculation in "Ode on a Grecian Urn" 
literally is: a container of mortal remains.  This fact would theoretically suggest that Keats's 
speculations can only lead him to a confrontation with lifelessness.  When Keats addresses the 
urn as "Cold Pastoral" (45) and talks about old age wasting his generation (46), this 
confrontation seems to be taking place, in a way.  The oxymoronic "Cold Pastoral" seems to 
emphasize how the realization to which Keats is coming is a far cry from the fresh liveliness that 
characterizes "Ode to Psyche." 
At the same time, the realization of a concept of "Cold Pastoral" has taken over forty 
lines to state, after two efforts of interrogation, and it is still not something that the urn divulges 
to Keats.  On this point, we remember that the urn is a container of mortal remains.  It does not 
release, it encloses.  Further, we could say that the urn conceals lifelessness -- that it attempts to 
put a gloss on lifelessness with art.  This logic falls right in line with the urn's unresponsiveness 
throughout the poem.  The urn finally does (sort of) speak to Keats: 
Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe 
Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say'st, 
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"Beauty is truth, truth beauty," -- that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. (47-50) 
 
Even here, the maxim about beauty and truth is not something that the urn divulges to Keats, it is 
rather something that it generally "say'st" to "man."  The emphasis on limitation of knowledge in 
the empirical world is also striking, here, with "all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."  
At the same time, what 'we' do know from the urn -- that "'Beauty is truth, truth beauty'" -- begs 
to be the focal point of the entire poem, being rhetorically presented as a climactic answer to all 
the interrogation.  However, like the maxim following the interrogation of the first stanza, this 
maxim does not really answer any of the numerous specific questions that Keats has posed.  
Furthermore, if we nevertheless welcome the urn's utterance as a response coming from a highly 
figurative consideration of Keats's questions and meditations, it still doesn't make much sense.  
Was 'Beauty' 'Truth' to Keats in the second and third stanzas?  I think we have seen that it was 
not; what appealed to Keats as 'beautiful,' we might say, was far above him and left him with "a 
heart high-sorrowful and cloy'd, / A burning forehead, and a parching tongue" (29-30).  We might 
say that there was a certain sort of beauty for Keats in the sacrificial scene of stanza four, but 
there also seems to have been something very disturbing about the ascesis and the muting of 
expression; it was at any rate much more complex than a simple formulation such as 'Beauty' = 
'Truth.'  It is also difficult to characterize the fourth, or first, stanzas as representing truth, 
because they are most prominently characterized by unanswered questions; we would at least 
have reformulate the maxim to say something like: 'Silence is Truth.' 
As I pointed out earlier, Jeffrey Cox, in Poetry and Politics in the Cockney School, argues 
that Keats's Hellenism is part of "a Cockney project of wresting the control of the definition of 
the classical from the conservative defenders of a deadening, urnlike tradition" (186).  "Ode on a 
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Grecian Urn," Cox maintains, pointing to the final lines as key evidence, abandons the 
unattainable ideals represented on the urn for an embraceable earthly eroticism, espousing 
libertine love: the urn ultimately tells Keats that erotic beauty is truth.  However, reading the 
poem this way requires believing the urn's statement in some way, when believing it in any way 
is difficult to do given all that happens in the poem leading up to the statement.  Furthermore, the 
shape of the statement suggests that the urn is still refusing to actually divulge any truth.  Cox is 
right to call attention to the sexual overtones in the poem, and it is well to remember that Keats 
initially addresses the urn as a bride.  This calls attention to the urn's yonic shape and 
corresponds with Keats's interrogation of the urn as an attempt to penetrate.  The overtone of 
ravishment, as Cox acknowledges, is hardly free love, nor is Keats's futility in attempted 
figurative ravishment.  Indeed, the enclosing, circular urn remains closed-off to Keats, and 
circularity is the best cue we have for understanding the urn's maxim.  The only thing that the urn 
says is syntactically circular.  The logic of the statement is also circular.  Beauty is truth...why, 
we ask? -- because truth is beauty, we are told.  This is far from convincing and is not at all, in 
any concrete terms, enlightening.  The urn's maxim simply continues the impenetrability that has 
characterized it throughout the poem, and Keats is aware of this reality.  He has realized that 
while beauty may be on the outside of the urn -- as it is on the syntactic outside (on both sides) of 
the urn's maxim -- truth is inside, as it is syntactically, but the truth inside is not the static 
rendering that is presented on the outside; the truth inside is decay to the point of lifelessness, not 
erotic beauty. 
Marjorie Levinson argues that Keats produces poetry "too happy by far, too full by half" 
(8).  This would seem to be a fair characterization of "Ode on a Grecian Urn."  Levinson further 
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argues that "The real perversion of Keats's poetry is not its display of its cultural fetishes but its 
preoccupation with the system felt to organize those talismanic properties" (9).  My suggestion, 
though, is that Keats becomes conscious, in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," of this system, or 
production, as affectation.  Levinson posits that "all Keats's meditations on art and identity 
(typically, plasticity), should be related to his abiding desire, to live" (9).  As I think we have 
seen, though, Keats seems very consciously, in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," to see his art as a 
varnish over fatality. 
 It has been my argument that, as far back as the early sonnet “Written in Disgust of 
Vulgar Superstition,” Keats is engaging with a specifically post-Enlightenment matrix of 
thought, which includes philologically inflected cultural identification concerns centered on 
religion and touching on Englishness.  To understand where the conclusion of "Ode on a Grecian 
Urn" has brought Keats, we would do well to revisit Benedict Anderson’s observation that “in 
Western Europe the eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of the age of nationalism but the 
dusk of religious modes of thought” (11).  Of course, as critical as Keats is of Christianity, he 
does not banish all “religious modes of thought” in favor of a simple form of nationalism, in the 
poems I have looked at thus far; he instead offers the English-Hellenistic amalgams and the 
wholly Hellenic Odes of the Spring of 1819.  But Keats seems to have felt, in “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn,” that he has missed the mark with those efforts.  As Anderson continues to observe, 
With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed 
did not disappear.  Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes fatality more 
arbitrary.  Absurdity of salvation: nothing makes another style of continuity more 
necessary.  What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into 
continuity, contingency into meaning…few things were (are) better suited to this 
end than an idea of nation.  If nation-states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and 
‘historical,’ the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of 
an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future. (11-
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12) 
 
Arbitrary and absurd concepts of fate and salvation clearly motivate the “Vale of Soul-making” 
letter and, in turn, it has been my argument, “Ode to Psyche.”  And it would be an apt summation 
to say that “Ode on a Grecian Urn” is characterized by a failure to transform contingency into 
meaning.  The illegitimate historian and the unanswered questions about deities and mortals in 
stanza one, the dichotimization of sensation and the mind in stanza two, the philological 
affectation in stanza three, the silent asceticism of stanza four, and the thought-denying artistic 
gloss over lifelessness of stanza five all speak to a failure to transform contingency into meaning.  
Desiring a form of continuity, "Ode on a Grecian Urn" founders upon arbitrary fatality. 
 As I discuss earlier, Benedict Anderson further asserts that "if the sacred silent languages 
were the media through which the great global communities of the past were imagined, the 
reality of such apparitions depended on an idea largely foreign to the contemporary Western 
mind: the non-arbitrariness of the sign.  The ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were 
emanations of reality, not randomly fabricated representations of it” (14).  Anderson, here, 
speaks of the concept of ‘holiness’ that becomes crucial to Keats beginning with the “Vale of 
Soul-making letter” and “Ode to Psyche”: linguistic wholeness.  As we have seen throughout this 
study, though Tooke, Blair, Condillac, and Rousseau liked to theorize that in primitive language 
and at etymological roots there was intrinsic meaning in language, arbitrary signification in 
modern language was a widely held tenet of early philology.  For Keats in “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn,” arbitrary signification seems carry the implications that Benedict Anderson theorizes: it is 
a sign of spiritual fragmentation.  Keats has come to see his Hellenistic attempt to reach back to a 
time “When holy were the haunted forest boughs, / Holy the air, the water, and the fire” as 
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affectation.  He has drawn the conclusion, in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," that his philological 
Hellenism falls far short of uniting experience with thought in a holy union -- it falls linguistic 
wholeness.  In this way, Keats is most certainly engaging with his statement, from the letter in 
which he also puts forth his idea of "the holiness of the Heart's affections," that "Whatever the 
imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth" (1: 184); Keats seems to be at pains to show that 
such a conception has become untenable.  "Grecian Urn" shows a disconnect -- a distance -- over 
which expression is denied.  There is no primal vitality of expression like in "Psyche."  Keats has 
come to see his Hellenistic philological identity-forming endeavor as historicist affectation, 
artificiality as opposed to naturalness.  By stanza three, Keats's own voice seems to sound to him 
as coming from the speaker of a modern language that has undergone decline to the point of 
meaninglessness.  Where "Ode to Psyche" creates identity through philological Hellenism, "Ode 
on a Grecian Urn" sees this philological Hellenism break down. 
 
IV.  The Purest English 
  
 Where philological Hellenism has now failed Keats, moving toward “To Autumn,” he 
will turn to what he views as a purer form of nationalism.  Again, Anderson suggests that if there 
is a need for a "secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning," then 
"few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation.  If nation-states are widely 
conceded to be ‘new’ and ‘historical,’ the nations to which they give political expression always 
loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future."  
Arguably the most prominent theorist of this particular suitability was Johann Gottfried Herder.  
 178 
 
As Anderson points out about Herder’s prominence, his “conception of nation-ness as linked to a 
private-property language had wide influence in nineteenth-century Europe” (68).  We remember 
from our consideration of Wordsworth that in his Essay on the Origin of Language, Herder 
agrees with Condillac, Blair, and Rousseau on the doctrine of language decline -- that "the 
ancient, the primitive, languages embody more of [ancient linguistic ancestry] the closer they are 
to the origin" (120).  Further, Herder argues that "Not surprisingly, we associate the strongest 
sentiments with our native language" (163).  So, it is not just primitive language, but a person's 
own native language that fosters connection to rich empirical experience.  Similarly, when 
talking about the fleeting sensory connections that must lie at the roots of words, Herder says, 
"Moreover these connections are so intensely national, engendered according to the peculiar 
disposition and viewpoint of a people and conditioned by the time and circumstances of a 
country" (148). 
 On the prospect of putting together an etymological dictionary, Herder says, 
  How much learning and adaptability of mind are necessary to enter into the  
 primitive intellect, the daring imagination, the national feelings of distant ages,  
 and to render them in our own idiom.  Such an undertaking would light a torch  
 and illuminate not only the history, the mode of thought and the literature of the  
 country, but also those dark regions of the human mind where ideas cross and  
 intermingle, where the most diverse feelings generate one another, where times of  
 need rouse all the powers of the mind and test its inventive ability to the full.  
 (148) 
 
The images of the torch and the dark regions of the mind, so contextualized, are tantalizingly 
resonant with the final stanza of "Ode to Psyche," but this specific resonance aside, we can 
readily see the potential attraction of the prospect to enter "the primitive intellect" and "the 
national feelings of distant ages" and "to render them in our own idiom."  And just as boldly, 
Herder later says, "By means of language [a child] is able to enter into communion with the way 
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of thinking and feeling of his progenitors, to take part, as it were, in the workings of the ancestral 
mind" (163).  These ideas would all have spoken forcefully to Keats's desires and frustrations 
evident in the poems I have discussed thus far.  Keats seems to have been moved by the desire to 
reach back to a genuine voice, and seems to have alternately believed in a poetic ability to figure 
that voice through Hellenism and in a practical inability to escape his actual disconnect from 
what Hellenism entails.  But Herder suggests that through native language a person can enter into 
effectual functionality with the "ancestral mind" in specific.  It is further compelling that Herder 
couples "the way of thinking and feeling of his progenitors," recalling the union in "Ode to 
Psyche."  The "working of the ancestral mind" also recalls the "wreath'd trellis of a working 
brain" in "Ode to Psyche."  But according to Herder it is the ancestral mind that can be tapped 
into through one's own native language, not, for instance, philological Hellenism.  This line of 
thought would seem to offer to Keats a practicable way to fulfill the desires that leave him "high 
sorrowful and cloy'd" in "Ode on a Grecian Urn." 
 As I sketched near the beginning of this chapter, Keats's intellectual circle had strong 
philological inclinations, and much of that inclination was nationalistic.  As I have pointed out, 
William Hazlitt, whose friendship was intellectually crucial to Keats and whose lectures Keats 
attended regularly in 1818 and 1819, was keenly interested in Tooke's Anglo-Saxon etymologies.  
Hazlitt's New and Improved Grammar of the English Tongue borrowed most of its etymology 
from Tooke.  Hazlitt's own reason for producing his Grammar was to promote interest in the 
mother-tongue.  In The Spirit of the Age (1825), Hazlitt regrets the contemporaneous lack of 
attention to Anglo-Saxon and to Tooke. 
 Leigh Hunt was also interested in native English.  In his Preface to The Story of Rimini, 
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Hunt says about poetic taste, "I do not hesitate to say however, that Pope and the French school 
of versification have known the least on the subject, of any poets perhaps that ever wrote.  They 
have mistaken mere smoothness for harmony; and, in fact, wrote as they did because their ears 
were only sensible of a marked and uniform regularity" (xiii-xiv).  Hunt also refers to Pope and 
the "French school" in The Feast of the Poets (1814) as employing "monotonous and cloying 
versification" (31).  Bad poetry is epitomized by the Neo-Classical and continent-associated 
Pope.  Even more interesting is Hunt's specific characterization of the poetry as "monotonous 
and cloying," which is a perfect description of the sort of false chant of 'happy, happy, etc.' that 
Keats breaks into in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," as Keats recognizes with the very word 'cloyed.' 
In describing his aims with The Story of Rimini in the Preface, Hunt says, 
With the endeavor to recur to a freer spirit of versification, I have joined one of 
still greater importance, -- that of having a free and idiomatic cast of language.  
There is a cant of art as well as of nature, though the former is not so unpleasant 
as the latter, which affects non-affectation.  But the proper language of poetry is in 
fact nothing different from that of real life, and depends for its dignity upon the 
strength and sentiment of what it speaks.  It is only adding musical modulation to 
what a fine understanding might actually utter in the midst of its griefs or 
enjoyments.  The poet therefore should do as Chaucer or Shakespeare did, -- not 
copy what is obsolete or peculiar in either, any more than they copied from their 
predecessors, -- but use as much as possible an actual, existing language (xv-xvi). 
 
The idea of an "idiomatic cast of language" is another subtle nationalistic gesture.  Hunt clearly 
echoes Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads in the sentiment about the language of real life, 
even if Hunt is not as explicit about an affinity for a rustic -- or more authentically English -- 
register.  The principle of using "an actual, existing language" is interesting because it would 
seem to fall in line with the dissatisfaction that Keats develops with the sort of nostalgia 
represented in the Hellenism coming to a climax in "Ode on a Grecian Urn."  We also see in this 
passage another resonance with what Keats has come to see as cloyed chant in "Ode on a 
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Grecian Urn" in Hunt talking about a "cant of art."  'Cant' is literally an ironicized cognate of 
'chant.'  Hunt seems to be warning against a poetry of the sort that Keats consciously represents 
falling into in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," in which a sort of cloyed Hellenism usurps what should 
be a genuine English poetic voice.  What should be desired in this vein is spelled out when Hunt 
goes on to say at the end of the Preface, "All the merit I claim is that of having made an attempt 
to describe natural things in a language becoming them, and to do something towards the revival 
of what appears to me a proper English versification" (xviii). 
 John Taylor, too, shared the nationalistic philological inclinations of Hazlitt and Hunt.  
John Clare, another of Taylor’s poets, was practically a philological project for Taylor.  As Tim 
Chilcott points out, much of Taylor's interest in Clare was linguistic: "The poetry was sprinkled 
liberally with dialect words, which obviously would have appealed to the philologist in him" 
(87).  In specific, Chilcott argues, Taylor saw what he deemed to be linguistic strength in the 
clarity and directness of Clare's rusticity.  Taylor defended Clare's rustic language in the 
introduction to Poems Descriptive, and he published a letter in the London Magazine in 
November 1821 taking up the same subject.  After speculating, in this letter, that Spenser and 
Shakespeare would have been reduced to nothingness had they been forced to conform to 
standard idiom, Taylor writes, 
…in reality, Clare is highly commendable for not affecting a language, and it is 
proof of the originality of his genius.  Style at second-hand is unfelt, unnatural, 
and common-place, a parrot-like repetition of words, whose individual weight is 
never esteemed…In poetry, especially, you may estimate the originality of the 
thoughts by that of the language; but this is a canon to which our approved critics 
will not subscribe: they allow of no phrase which has not received the sanction of 
authority, no expression for which, in the sense used, you cannot plead a 
precedent.  They would fetter the English poet as they circumscribe the maker of 
Latin verses, and yet they complain that our modern poets want originality! (544-
5) 
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Taylor's rejection of affectation, of style that is "unfelt, unnatural," and of "a parrot-like repetition 
of words" sounds much like what has vexed Keats in "Ode on a Grecian Urn." 
 It is also worth noting the striking similarity between the image of "the English poet" 
being fettered and the Keats sonnet "If by dull rhymes our English must be chain'd," where Keats 
argues that if the "sonnet sweet" must be "Fetter'd, in spite of pained loveliness," English poets 
should at least "weigh the stress / Of every chord, and see what may be gain'd / By ear 
industrious, and attention meet" (7-9).  The premise of this sonnet, as Keats explains in a letter, is 
that English words do not adequately lend themselves to the rhyme scheme of the Petrarchan 
Sonnet (2: 108).  Keats clearly, here, has a philologist-like ear closely attuned to English, though 
he is down on its "dull" rhyming possibilities. Keats is arguing that it is with minute attention to 
language that English poets are to achieve good poetry -- by "weigh[ing] the stress / of every 
chord," just as Taylor, from his philologist perspective, talks about the "individual weight" of 
every word. 
 This leaning toward philological nationalism in Keats's circle should not be surprising 
from the standpoint of social class.  To revisit Ernest Gellner, middle-class mobility (real or 
perceived) is a major feature of nationalism emerging in industrial society.  With a class of 
society increasingly thinking of themselves not as subjects but as citizens, capable of upward 
mobility, shared culture through language becomes a major form of identification.  Specifically, a 
native language history was something that the Cockney circle, for instance, could imagine 
ownership of -- something, unlike Latin or French, for instance; something unmediated by a 
cultural elite. 
 In the letters framing "To Autumn," Keats goes further into what "native language," or the 
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"way of thinking and feeling of his progenitors," or the "workings of the ancestral mind" look 
like in poetry as distinct from what he has been doing from the early Elizabethan-Hellenic 
amalgams to the Hellenistic Odes of the Spring.  In the September 21, 1819 letter to Reynolds, 
Keats writes, 
How beautiful the season is now -- How fine the air.  A temperate sharpness about 
it.  Really, without joking, chaste whether -- Dian skies -- I never lik'd stubble 
fields so much as now -- Aye better than the chilly green of the spring.  Somehow 
a stubble plain looks warm -- in the same way that some pictures look warm -- 
this struck me so much in my sunday's walk that I composed upon it.  I hope you 
are better employed than in gaping after weather.  I have been at different times so 
happy as not to know what weather it was -- No I will not copy a parcel of verses.  
I always somehow associate Chatterton with autumn.  He is the purest writer in 
the English Language.  He has no French idiom, or particles like Chaucer(s) -- 'tis 
genuine English Idiom in English words.  I have given up Hyperion -- there were 
too many Miltonic inversions in it -- Miltonic verse cannot be written but in an 
artful or rather an artist's humour.  I wish to give myself up to other sensations.  
English ought to be kept up.  It may be interesting to you to pick out some lines 
from Hyperion and put a mark X to the false beauty proceeding from art, and one 
// to the true voice of feeling (2: 167) 
 
We should consider this alongside Keats's September 24 letter to the George Keatses, in which 
he says, 
I shall never become attach'd to a foreign idiom so as to put it into my writings.  
The Paradise Lost though so fine in itself is a corruption of our Language -- it 
should be kept as it is unique -- a curiosity, a beautiful and grand Curiosity.  The 
most remarkable Production of the world.  A northern dialect accommodating 
itself to greek and latin inversions and intonations.  The purest english I think -- or 
what ought to be purest -- is Chatterton's -- The Language had existed long 
enough to be entirely uncorrupted of Chaucer's gallicisms and still the old words 
are used -- Chatterton's language is entirely northern -- I prefer the native music 
of it to Milton's cut by feet I have but lately stood on my guard against Milton.  
Life to him would be death to me.  Miltonic verse cannot be written but it the vein 
of art -- I wish to devote myself to another sensation -- (2: 212) 
 
We can readily see how the two letters are in many ways more or less different versions of the 
same statement.  In the letter to Reynolds, Keats characterizes Chatterton as the purest writer in 
 184 
 
the language, citing the absence of what he refers to as French idiom.  Keats goes even further on 
this point in the letter to the Keatses, considering Chaucer's gallicisms and Milton's latinisms to 
be no less than corruptions of the English language.  Such explicit statements about Milton in 
this latter letter cast in clearer light that Keats's assessment of the Miltonisms in the Hyperion 
poems, in the letter to Reynolds, is also a longing for purer English.  As Keats goes on to say in 
the letter to Reynolds, "English ought to be kept up."  We can clearly see that these letters bear 
strong traces of the Herderian and Tookean philology that interested Hazlitt, Hunt, and Taylor. 
The idea that "Miltonic verse cannot be written but [in] the vein of art," in the letter to the 
Keatses, makes more sense in light of Keats writing to Reynolds about distinguishing "false 
beauty proceeding from art" from "the true voice of feeling."  The Miltonisms, being written in 
an "artists humour" seem to be what give rise to "false beauty proceeding from art."  So, what we 
have is impure English yielding false artistic beauty.  The idea of "false beauty proceeding from 
art" would be a fair characterization of how Keats comes to view the "Beauty" of "Ode on a 
Grecian Urn."  Indeed, the speaker can respond with only a cloyed utterance, not what we might 
call "the true voice of feeling." 
While acknowledging the greatness of Paradise Lost, Keats insists on seeking a purer 
mode of English for his poetry.  In both letters, deploring Miltonisms is followed by a resolution 
to commit himself to "other sensations," as he puts it in the earlier letter.  These "other 
sensations" would be his new poetic mode, which would, from all indications in these letters, be 
a new version of 'pure English,' or the linguistic mode of connecting with "the workings of the 
ancestral mind," in Herder's terms.  It is crucial that Keats characterizes the new endeavor(s) as 
"sensations," remembering the philological emphasis on primal purity in empirical experience, as 
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this emphasis seems to have motivated "Ode to Psyche."  After the breakdown of the Hellenistic 
medium in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," a native English version of empirical experience, or 
"sensations," seem to be large part of the poetic mode into which Keats wants to move. 
The letter to Reynolds is perhaps most remembered for its description of the 
circumstances surrounding the composition of "To Autumn" -- the five lines of text beginning 
"How beautiful the season is now."  We must also read the rest of the passage in the letter to 
Reynolds -- and thus also the passage in the letter to the George Keatses -- as describing what 
contributed to writing "To Autumn," for two main reasons: for one thing, the thoughts on 
Chatterton, Chaucer, Milton, gallicisms, latinisms, and pure English are all concerning Keats's 
poetic compositions, of which "To Autumn" is the most recent (September 19); even more 
significantly, Keats connects his description of the Autumnal setting that inspired "To Autumn" 
with all of the thinking about language when he says, "I always somehow associate Chatterton 
with Autumn."  This seemingly trite statement is actually what precipitates all the thinking about 
language.  The following sentence, "He is the purest writer in the English Language," completes 
for us a crucial equation: Autumn = Chatterton = pure English.  Truncated: Autumn = pure 
English; or "To Autumn" = pure English.  It seems, then, that "To Autumn" is the other sensation 
or sensations to which Keats wants to devote himself in departing from the corrupted English 
and its practitioners that he discusses both of these September letters, and the poem is thus 
Keats's attempt at 'pure English.' 
Turley recognizes Keats's interest in Chatterton in the September 1819 letters as 
philologically inflected, but Turley ultimately suggests that "Whereas Wordsworth offered some 
indication as to what this ideal idiom would sound like...Keats is less certain.  Like Hunt, he is 
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only really convinced of one thing - that 1680 represented the cut-off point for a truly poetic 
language" (80).  While Keats's idea of genuine poetry is complex and shifting leading up to 
1819, he does seem to make an attempt an ideal of philological Hellenism in "Ode to Psyche."  
Further, the philological interest in Chatterton, along with the autumn-Chatterton association, in 
the September 1819 letters cues up a revised attempt at genuine poetry in "To Autumn" -- it is 
precisely when Keats is most explicit about his desire for genuine English poetry that he makes a 
clarified attempt in that vein. 
Beginning to look at how "To Autumn" constitutes "the purest English" for Keats, there is 
one very distinct surface feature of "To Autumn" that seems to consistently escape being deemed 
of interpretive importance: unlike all the other great Odes of 1819, it is not Hellenistic.  "Ode to 
Psyche" and "Ode on a Grecian Urn" are quite obviously Hellenistic, and they are the poems that 
I am suggesting "To Autumn" is most in discourse with.  But "Ode on Indolence" is only less 
Hellenistic than "Ode on a Grecian Urn" in title.  "Ode to a Nightingale" has a different type of 
central topical concern, but it, too, has Hellenisic references a-plenty, with Lethe (4), Hippocrene 
(16), and "Bacchus and his pards" (32).  In "Ode on Melancholy," we again have Lethe (1) and 
Psyche (7), and we have Proserpine (4).  "To Autumn" has none of these things, nor does it 
contain any other sorts of transhistorical or transcultural references, both of which the other Odes 
abound in.  To draw these factors together, "To Autumn" is what I would term immediate to 
Keats, with Keats atypically focusing on Autumn in England. 
Furthering this theme of immediacy, "To Autumn" is relatively free of the sort of 
abstractions that dominate the other Odes.  Indolence itself is an abstraction, as are the three 
identifications Keats makes in stanza three of that poem: Love, Ambition, and Poesy.  
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Melancholy also is itself an abstraction, and in treating it, Keats also considers Beauty, Joy, 
Pleasure, and Delight, all in stanza three alone.  In stanza three of "Ode to a Nightingale," Keats 
deals explicitly with Beauty and Love; in stanza four, we have "the viewless wings of Poesy" 
(33), and in stanza five, Keats reflects on "easeful Death" (52).  In "Ode to Psyche," we 
encounter most notably the abstractions Psyche and Love, and in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," 
besides making the urn highly abstract, Keats ponders Quietness, Love, Beauty, and Truth.  In 
"To Autumn," the nearest Keats gets to abstraction is with Autumn itself, but Autumn is, of 
course, the totality of a myriad of empirical things, and, fittingly, Keats only identifies Autumn 
tangibly: as "Season of mists" (1), as the miller/reaper/gleaner of stanza two, and as the "music" 
(24) of the final stanza; Keats never actually says "Autumn" in the poem, and this seems to be a 
deliberate effort at empirical immediacy. 
 In addition to the absence of Hellenism, another glaring surface dimension of "To 
Autumn" that differentiates it from almost all of the other odes of 1819 is the stanza length and 
rhyme scheme.  After "Ode to Psyche," Keats settles into a ten-line stanza, rhyming 
ABABCDECDE (or a very slight variation in the final three lines).  "To Autumn," though, is 
written in eleven-line stanzas rhyming ABABCDECDDE or ABABCDEDCCE.  In addition to 
being longer as a whole (than the earlier odes), either variation has the effect of drawing out the 
wait for the concluding E rhyme.  As Paul Sheats has argued, this seems to forward the theme of 
drawing out sensation. 
 Much of the subject matter of "To Autumn" is the sensuous fecundity of Autumnal 
England.  The first stanza, for instance, is all about the tangible ripeness of the time of year: 
Season of mists and mellow fruitfulness, 
Close bosom-friend of the maturing sun; 
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Conspiring with him how to load and bless 
With fruit the vines that round the thatch-eves run; 
To bend with apples the moss'd cottage-trees, 
And fill all fruit with ripeness to the core; 
To swell the gourd, and plump the hazel shells 
With a sweet kernel; to set budding more, 
And still more, later flowers for the bees, 
Until they think warm days will never cease, 
For summer has o'er-brimm'd their clammy cells. 
 
Fruitfulness is the theme, as the first line suggests, and the magnitude of this fecundity is 
highlighted repeatedly, in "load," "bend," "fill," "swell," "plump," "more" and "more," and "o'er-
brimm'd."  In addition to denotation, many of these words are onomatopoetic.  The word 
"plump" is imitative in origin (OED); "load," with its low vowel sound is suggestive of being 
weighty; "swell" is expansive with its 'sw' cluster. 
We can see what seems to be a philological move in Keats manifesting the fecundity of 
the subject matter in his language through onomatopoeia.  This dual-fecundity is also heightened 
in stanza two with striking alliteration and assonance.  For instance, line fifteen -- "Thy hair soft-
lifted by the winnowing wind," with the 'ft' repeated in "soft" and "lifted," the short 'i' of "lifted" 
returning in both the first and last syllables of "winnowing" and in "wind," and with the 'w' 
sounds repeated internally in "winnowing" and from "winnowing" to "wind" -- rivals the 
"incense sweet / From chain-swung censer teeming" in "Ode to Psyche."  The rest of stanza two 
continues to aim for linguistic effect as much as anything: 
Or on a half-reap'd furrow sound asleep, 
Drows'd with the fume of poppies, while thy hook 
Spares the next swath and all its twined flowers: 
And sometimes like a gleaner thou dost keep 
Steady thy laden head across a brook; 
Or by a cyder-press, with patient look, 
Thou watchest the last oozings hours by hours. (16-22) 
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"Drows'd" is onomatopoetic, as is "oozings."  This last line is so deliberate in its use of "oozings" 
as opposed to 'oozing' and "hours by hours" instead of 'hour by hour' that it calls extra attention 
to the 'z' sound created and recreated.  The effect is to draw out sensation, paralleling the drawing 
out of this part of the sensuous time of year.  Personified Autumn, after all, is "sitting careless on 
a granary floor" (14), "sound asleep" "on a half-reaped furrow," "Spar[ing] the next swath," and 
watching the oozing of cyder "with patient look."  Looking back to stanza one, we see the same 
theme of maximizing sensation in the last three-and-a-half lines: "to set budding more, / And still 
more, later flowers for the bees, / Until they think warm days will never cease, / For summer has 
o'er-brimm'd their clammy cells." 
Keats's project to craft pure English is also manifested quite literally with the 
predominant etymology of his diction.  Geoffrey Hartman has discussed Northwesterly 
movement in "To Autumn," in considering the ideological implications of the form of the ode.  
Hartman traces the poem paralleling a day's course of the sun, from East to West, sunrise to 
sunset, seeing this as reflecting national interest.  Hartman also notes Keats's national interest in 
Chatterton, and says about the final stanza, "consider the northernisms.  The proportion of 
northern words increases perceptibly as if to pull the poem back from its southerly orientation.  
There is hardly a romance language phrase: sound-shapes like sallows, swallows, borne, bourn, 
crickets, croft, predominate" (314).12  The letters framing the ode clearly indicate that Keats had 
an ear attuned to etymology that reached back beyond Middle English.  Hartman is right to point 
                                                 
12.  Justine Morrison has also observed this in "Chatterton and Keats: The Need for Close 
Examination."  Keats-Shelley Review 10 (1996): 35-50.  Morrison's essay gives a close-reading 
of similarities in phrasing and theme between "To Autumn" and the Thyrde Mynstrelle's song in 
Chatterton's "Aella." 
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out the northern sound-shapes in the final stanza -- more right than he allows.  In the final stanza 
alone, we can add "whistle," "aloft," "garden," "hedge," and "gnat" to the list of words that Keats 
would have easily recognized as Anglo-Saxon in origin.  But this northerly orientation is hardly 
limited to the final stanza.  In the first two stanzas, we encounter "mists," "bosom," "thatch," 
"apples," "moss'd," "cottage," "swell," "hazel," "kernel," "brimm'd," "winnowing," "reap'd," 
"furrow," "hook," "swath," "twined," "laden," and "brook."  Keats has had a southerly 
orientation, in the Hellenism of the earlier odes, but the entirety of "To Autumn" seems to be an 
English philological effort. 
James Chandler has argued that "To Autumn" reads as a "neopagan hymn," following 
from "Ode to Psyche," offering "a thanatopsis, a view of death, and as such it addresses the 
issues which the various forms of 'deism' in Keats's age have had most difficulty handling" (430).  
As I have suggested throughout this chapter, Keats's Hellenism (or paganism) is correlative with 
philology and inherently religious.  Chandler is right to further point out that there are "decisive 
invasions of history-as-death in the middle Odes" (430), as I have argued about "Ode on a 
Grecian Urn."  But while I read "To Autumn" as following in the discourse in which "Ode to 
Psyche" figures prominently, I think that we must be careful in assigning the term "neopagan" to 
"To Autumn," since Chandler clearly means it to carry Hellenistic connotation.  As I have already 
pointed out, the absence of Hellenism is conspicuous in "To Autumn," so the last ode seems to 
follow "Ode to Psyche" more in a line of philological inquiry (with the inherent religious 
concerns), than in paganism. 
 What is most compelling about the thanatopsis of "To Autumn," which comes primarily 
in the final stanza, is how, having been relegated to lifelessness in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," Keats 
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now handles mortality: 
Where are the songs of spring?  Ay, where are they? 
Think not of them, thou hast thy music too, -- 
While barred clouds bloom the soft-dying day, 
And touch the stubble-plains with rosy hue; 
Then in a wailful choir the small gnats mourn 
Among the river sallows, borne aloft 
Or sinking as the light wind lives or dies; 
And full-grown lambs loud bleat from hilly bourn; 
Hedge-crickets sing; and now with treble soft 
The red-breast whistles from a garden-croft; 
And gathering swallows twitter in the skies. 
 
The chorus of sound in this stanza -- which is self-consciously called to attention with the first 
two lines -- is a drastic departure from the silence of "Ode on a Grecian Urn," just as the vibrant 
world of process of "To Autumn" is a drastic departure from the cold, static 'pastoral' of "Ode on 
a Grecian Urn."  Indeed, as has been often noted,13 "the songs of spring" can be read as the Odes 
of earlier in the year, beginning with April's "Ode to Psyche" and including "Ode on a Grecian 
Urn."  The notes of mortality in the music of Autumn come in the "soft-dying day," "stubble-
plains," "wailful choir" of mourning gnats, "sallows," and the pun of the light wind living or 
dying.  We do not have cold despair here, like we have in "Ode on a Grecian Urn."  Keats tells us 
in the letter to Reynolds, "Somehow a stubble plain looks warm," and the stubble plain in stanza 
three of "To Autumn" is touched with "rosy hue."  Accordingly, once Keats actually utters the 
word "dies," he turns to expressive life with "And full-grown lambs loud bleat from hilly bourn."  
Keats seems to be suggesting that with the mortality that comes with being grounded in the 
empirical world also comes such sensuous warmth as the "rosy hue" and such sensuous 
                                                 
13.  See, for instance, Stillinger's notes in John Keats: The Complete Poems, and Chandler, 
England in 1819. 
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expression as the imitative "bleat" (OED) of lambs in the wonderfully alliterative 'l' sounds of the 
line "And full-grown lambs loud bleat from hilly bourn."  In short, the Autumnal English 
landscape in "Autumn" is empirically alive in response to the prospect of death. 
Keats's course, then, in this thanatopsis, seems to be enacting something along the lines 
of what Benedict Anderson called a "secular transformation of fatality into continuity, 
contingency into meaning," or philological Englishness.  Continuity is suggested by the "full-
grown lambs" -- something both rooted in a primal state and empirically present.  The "gathering 
swallows" function similarly.  To begin with, the verb "gathering" is conspicuously present-tense, 
suggesting immediacy.  Swallows are also an interesting choice as they are a migratory bird.  In a 
sense, they portend the death of the year with their gathering for southward migration.  Their 
southward migration also, though, serves to increase the significance of their return north to 
England to generate new life in the inevitable new year.  Thus, more than they represent death or 
life, the swallows represent continuity, and they do so in that present-tense verb, with another 
imitative form of expression: "twittering" (OED).  And sensation has been drawn out in the 
innovative rhyme scheme to the effect of the "skies" in which the swallows twitter, in completing 
the E rhyme, affirmatively refiguring the "dies" of line twenty-nine. 
 Though "To Autumn" does contain a sort of thanatopsis, we should hesitate to call it a 
neo-pagan hymn as Chandler suggests.  This Hellenistic reading of the poem places Chandler in 
company with Hartman, who defines what he reads as the westerly movement of the sun in the 
poem as Hesperian, and who argues that the poem is concerned with Apollo.  We also find 
Hellenistic readings in Helen Vendler and Nicholas Roe, who identify personified Autumn in 
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stanza two with Ceres.14  These consistent Hellenistic identifications are somewhat curious, 
though, given the conspicuous absence of the overt Hellenism of the earlier odes.  The sun is 
"him," but it seems that if Keats had wanted to make reference to Apollo, he would have done so 
explicitly.  Concerning the Ceres identification, there is nothing in the poem that actually genders 
the Autumn personification female.  Making the Autumn personification female to 
counterbalance the male sun makes little sense in light of the fact that the two are bosom-
buddies, without any hint of being lovers.  Throughout the poem, Keats consistently adheres to 
neutral direct-object or second-person pronouns, such as "thee" and "thou."  But most 
importantly, identifying as Ceres the figure in stanza two overlooks the fact that Keats tells us 
after describing the compositional conditions of "To Autumn" that he always associates someone 
with Autumn: Thomas Chatterton, the writer of "The purest English."  When we remember 
Keats's shift in sentiment from "Ode to Psyche" to "Ode on Grecian Urn," along with all the 
unique philological characteristics of "To Autumn," the Autumn = Chatterton truncated formula 
from the letters becomes very persuasive. 
 If we consider again the question of social class, it is curious that Marjorie Levinson does 
not account for “To Autumn.”  She argues that “the deep desire in Keats's poetry is not for 
aesthetic things or languages per se...but for the social code inscribed in them...Keats could have 
had all the urns, Psyches, nightingales, Spenserianisms, Miltonisms, Claudes, and Poussins he 
wanted; he was not, however, permitted possession of the social grammar inscribed in that 
aesthetic array, and this is just what Keats was after” (9).  With “To Autumn,” though, this theory 
                                                 
14.  Vendler forwards this argument in The Odes of John Keats.  Roe suggests the same in John 
Keats and the Culture of Dissent. 
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would seem to break down.  In the letter framing “To Autumn,” Keats explicitly distances 
himself from Milton (and Chaucer).  In aligning himself with who he thought of as a writer of 
pure English, Keats adopts a “social grammar” that does not feel like affectation to him.  Native 
language roots were, indeed, a social grammar newly available to the bourgeoisie.  In this sense, 
philological nationalism can become the very answer to the problem of cultural elitism. 
 Leaving off classical and Gallic linguistic influences, in "To Autumn," Keats represents 
what Herder called "the way of thinking and feeling" of what he had come to consider his 
linguistic ancestry.  The poem strongly manifests the philological convictions expressed by John 
Taylor, and those such as this expressed by Leigh Hunt: describing "natural things in a language 
becoming them," and thereby doing "something towards the revival of what appears to me a 
proper English versification."  This act of keeping English up, as Keats would put it, is really the 
conclusion -- as of late-September 1819 -- of a long process of experimentation with different 
modes of forming identity.  It has been a process negotiated through philology all along, and the 
ultimate resolution of the negotiation is the poet settling on an abstract phenomenon that was 
both motivated and expressed by philology: nationalism. 
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Afterword: Borders of Philological Nationalism 
 
 The central goal of this project has been to explore the intersection of thinking on 
language and nationalism in the Romantic period.  The impetus for this exploration was the 
repeated encounter with what have come to seem like 'philological moments.'  Explicit moments 
such as Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Keats's letters, Scott's Advertisement to The 
Antiquary, and the Creature's epistemological development in Frankenstein prompted the 
following questions: what was the foundation for these thoughts language?  Why do they emerge 
at this point, in the Romantic period?  And what was at stake?  Exploring the first of these 
questions, there emerged a rich tradition of early philology from the eighteenth century.  
Exploring how and why this tradition mattered to the Romantics has moved me to argue to that 
early philology provided a new mode of cultural identification: philological nationalism. 
 Recognizing philological nationalism in the Romantic period obviously adds to our 
understanding of conceptions of language in the period.  It also prompts us to reevaluate British 
philological nationalism in general.  It is perhaps easier to recognize philological nationalism in 
the heyday of comparative philology and during the apex of the British empire -- in the Victorian 
period.  But early philology, as we have seen, bore distinct differences from the comparative 
philology of the Victorian period, and these differences engendered a different philological 
nationalism -- one more concerned with an imperiled Britain's sense of itself than with growing a 
powerful empire.  Understanding philological nationalism's role in this time of upheaval also 
thus adds to our picture of Romantic radicalism. 
 Engagement with philological nationalism shows up in a variety of venues in the period.  
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We see the radical national implications of language debated in reviews of Wordsworth's work.  
The Pictish Question was hotly contested in primitivist histories.  'Pure' English was of particular 
interest to Keats's publisher, John Taylor.  The most prominent philology of the day -- John 
Horne Tooke's Anglo-Saxon-centered insistence on etymology -- entered the legal sphere with 
the beleaguered Tooke.  And of course philological nationalism found expression in letters, 
essays, novels, and poems, by Coleridge, Wordsworth, Scott, Mary Shelley, and Keats. 
 The discursive diversity of manifestations of philological nationalism is equaled by the 
subtly varying attitudes ultimately taken toward it.  While Keats seems to be confident in an 
enactment of 'pure English' in "To Autumn" (after struggling mightily with philological 
affectation in earlier poems), Scott is intrigued by the potential for philology to reconstruct 
history, but ultimately skeptical about the practical viability of the undertaking.  In response to 
dashed revolutionary hopes and a persistent sense of homelessness, Wordsworth invokes his own 
production of a Volksstimme to construct an imagined 'England' atop Mount Snowdon.  
Conversely, Frankenstein seems to regard a return to native simplicity as desirable but 
impossible, warning England against the danger posed by societal institutions whose authority 
comes to rest upon arbitrary signification. 
 Differences such as these collectively become the most salient feature of philological 
nationalism in the Romantic period.  On a broad scale, Wordsworth, Scott, Mary Shelley, and 
Keats approach the discourse for different reasons and in different ways, and they reach different 
conclusions.  On a more narrow scale, the greatest challenge for each of these artists engaging in 
the discourse of philological nationalism is the extent to which philological nationalism was 
subject to variation.  This propensity for variation, or malleability, is intrinsic to the discourse 
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because of its roots.  As I have pointed out, the Enlightenment reduced long-enshrined 
institutions such as monarchy, religion, and language to human constructions subject to change.  
As we have seen, while this emphasis on mutability in the new paradigm brought the possibility 
of meaningful cultural redefinition, it also meant that meaning could be manipulated, or could 
prove elusive. 
 In the same vein, though it is perhaps counter-intuitive, tangible political borders are 
often hazy in the philological nationalism of the Romantic period.  For Wordsworth, the 
revolutionary ideas he embraces come from France, but the Vox Populi he requires for the 
definition of his poetry comes from England; at the same time, Wordsworth feels materially 
homeless in England.  In Scott, a periphery of the British empire produces the same 
preoccupations with language and nation that we find coming England; and in The Antiquary, the 
true borders and conflicts are linguistic, not political.  In Frankenstein, we follow the destructive 
movement of an Enlightenment Natural Man over most of Europe, but the idea of idyllic native 
simplicity is actually subverted from within the Creature's land of origin, through intellectual 
corruption; the breakdown of native simplicity is not the consequence of any actual international 
political conflict. 
 As Benedict Anderson and Linda Dowling argue, one of the great shifts brought by early 
philology was to situate language in human history.  Language undergoes change throughout 
history, in the mouths of speakers.  Language is shaped by people, therefore belongs to people, 
and thus shapes cultural identity over time.  Philological nationalism imagines identity based 
upon shared cultural history.  In this sense, philological nationalism is an act of retrospection.  
However, the view afforded the Romantics by this type of retrospection was not of historical 
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process as an uninterrupted march toward simple and stable present definition.  The Antiquary 
and Frankenstein are both explicitly framed as acts of retrospection.  Both are published in the 
second decade of the nineteenth century, but set in the 1790s.  Frankenstein is profoundly shaped 
by 1790s Tookean radicalism, and it seems to call attention to the failure of that radicalism as a 
warning to an unstable England in the years just following Waterloo -- an England arguably less 
socially stable following military victory than before.  The retrospection of The Antiquary 
suggests that Germanic linguistic invasion was a greater threat to Scottish identity in 1794 than 
was the fear of French military invasion.  At the same time, this revisionary history recognizes 
that attempted reconstruction by philology was problematic, perhaps capable at best of a sort of 
footnoting of history; after all, as late as 1829, Scott was still reluctant to unequivocally 
pronounce victory for the Celtic side of the Pictish Question.  In both The Antiquary and 
Frankenstein, we see an awareness of philological nationalism as a historical process -- both 
subject to and produced by retrospection -- and as part of that process, inherently complex and 
fluid. 
 This historical process, producing a tenuous and malleable form of identification, 
continues today.  The population center for speakers of English has long since shifted from 
Britain to America.  It is telling that we can observe contemporary American mutations of the 
mode of cultural identification that we have seen growing from philology in British 
Romanticism.  For instance, mainstream American cinema in the twenty-first century routinely 
employs English as a means of appropriation of cultural heritage.  Hollywood has a penchant for 
inflecting foreign cultures throughout Western history with a British accent.  For a predominantly 
English-speaking, Caucasian audience, films routinely feature American actors putting on 
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modern British accents to portray ancient Greeks, ancient Romans, or medieval Scandinavians, 
for example.  Moreover, Shakespeare is also rendered in a modern British, which is to say non-
rhotic, accent, in spite of the fact that the shift to a non-rhotic 'r' had not occurred by 
Shakespeare's day.  Conversely, when depicting non-Caucasian historical cultures, racial 'others' 
with whom Hollywood seems to presume that a majority Caucasian audience neither imagines 
nor desires a cultural connection, the modern British accent is typically absent.  Thus, English 
seems to function as a way to approximate cultural connections and thereby appropriate cultural 
heritage.  This sort of philological conquest of foreign culture shouldn't seem overly strange to 
us; appropriation of classical culture in a search for identity is precisely what we have seen with 
Keats's pairing of Echo and some wight, and in his Hellenic odes. 
 Hollywood's modern American mutation of fluid cultural identification via English is 
benign compared to how English is often wielded in contemporary political discourse.  
"Agitation on behalf of official language laws, for example, arises in part from convictions over 
what a city or nation is or should be, and requiring English is a way to enforce views about 
society or ethnicity through language" (8).  This observation from Tim William Machan 
highlights the same power that we find language possessing in the Romantic period: the power to 
define the nation.  In the Introduction to this study, I suggested that philology in the Romantic 
period was a mode of reconstructing the past that was just coming to serve the purpose of 
defining the present.  Machan characterizes English as "something that evokes the horrors of the 
past and encodes the tensions of the present" (8).  The parallelism in these two statements 
constitutes the double-edged sword of malleability in philological nationalism.  Definition can 
empower, and it can oppress; it can grant membership, and it can disenfranchise.  Tooke certainly 
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believed that his government sustained oppressive power through the manipulation of language. 
 Language became for the Romantics and still seems to be today a medium for the 
negotiation of cultural conflict.  As such, philological nationalism provides interesting 
commentary on several types of borders.  In the Romantic period, it pervaded diverse venues, 
accommodated diverse conclusions, rendered contemporaneous political boundaries hazy, and 
suggested historical process as highly malleable.  Even where Wordsworth and Keats seem to 
settle on a sense of English identity, this sense is the product of an extensive process of 
intellectualization, challenged at many turns.  This type of tenuous and critical engagement by 
the Romantics helps illuminate both the origins and the legacy of both philology and 
nationalism.  Springing as it did from Enlightenment philosophy, early philology participated in 
a challenge to the sovereignty of ancient societal institutions.  This challenge, in turn, produces 
an ongoing process of challenge.  Ultimately, the story of philological nationalism is, in a sense, 
much like Jonathan Oldbuck's "Caledoniad": not the rendering of a definitive battle, but the 
footnotes of historical process.  The body of "Invasion Repelled" defies composition, for 
intellectual and cultural history is not one battle that settles all future conflicts, but a constant 
process of definition and redefinition. 
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